751G.5/4–2454: Telegram
The Consul at Hanoi (Cameron) to the Department of State
priority
[Received 3:52 a.m.]
606. Repeated information Saigon 511, Paris 276. When Kidder1 and I called on Governor Tri yesterday, we found him deeply discouraged about current situation in North Vietnam. He painted a particularly black picture of situation in the delta, citing reports from province chiefs that in some localities the paramilitary forces were considering disbanding because lack of arms prevented effective resistance to Viet Minh. Tri mentioned daily telegrams from province chiefs reporting paramilitary losses and said that in the near future he might be confronted with decision to disband the whole paramilitary structure. This, he emphasized, would amount to handing delta completely over to Viet Minh because extent to which delta is being held today depended on paramilitary forces. If these forces were disbanded, Tri foresaw that the individuals would be immediately impressed by the Viet Minh. Tri added that delta had been virtually stripped of French Union Forces and that those which remained were physically exhausted by continuous action.
Using phrase which Secretary recently employed, Tri said time for “promises” had long passed, but he felt there was still time, though short, for “acts”. In Tri’s mind, two “acts” are immediately necessary: 1, transfer of French Union Forces from “Atlante” operation to delta and 2, arming effectively the paramilitary forces. He said he had discussed transfer troops from “Atlante” with Cogny on April 22. Documents [Page 1381] supporting request for arms to paramilitary forces have been forwarded to Embassy and MAAG, Saigon. (Tri will undoubtedly review this problem with General O’Daniel when he visits Hanoi early next week.)
Tri urged that these measures be rapidly effected in order prepare delta withstand increased Viet Minh assaults which he felt would be inevitable consequence of fall Dien Bien Phu. This unhappy event, would, he pointed out, release battle-hardened Viet Minh troops for action in delta which, as he put it, had always been and remained, the objective “number one” of the Viet Minh.
Comment:Tri’s attitude yesterday was in sharp contrast with that which he showed week previously when Sturm and I had long talk with him about situation in North Vietnam. I understand that his attitude in past has been marked by changes from hopefulness to discouragement. Sturm who is now in Department and Embassy Saigon are in much better position than I to assess significance of Tri’s remarks. I suggest they be read in light most recent restatement General Cogny’s views contained Contel 591.2
Tri’s discouraging estimate of current situation in North was corroborated in subsequent conversation Kidder and I had with Compain, French Delegate General in North Vietnam. Compain said that in his opinion situation here had reached its most critical point in long struggle against Viet Minh. He commented that except for Hanoi, Haiphong, Namdinh and a tenuous hold on Hanoi-Haiphong communications, the delta was no longer held by French Union Forces. He, too, thought that though very late, there was still time to redress situation.