Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/6–1152: Telegram

The Chargé at Saigon (Gullion) to the Department of State¹

top secret
priority

Saigon, June 11, 1952—8 p.m.

2487. Rptd info Paris 779, Hanoi unn. Re Paris tels 419, June 3² and 433, June 7.³ Constructive reftels much appreciated here. Subj Min. Heath‘s view, we agree in gen with Emb opinion and note that Emb thinks as we do that program of action to “revitalize” Indochina sit is necessary. Since Leg’s suggestions forwarded, Letourneau‘s outline Fr expectations forthcoming talks and surprise installation Tam Govt in Indochina constitute new facts, underlying following comments with reference to numbered paras of Paris tel 419:

Para 1:

We recognize that any program for Indochina must be “viewed against Tunisian and Moroccan backgrounds”. Despite general blackout on North African crises in local press, Viets follow situation and think they see that Fr policy in Morocco and Tunis, which juridically have a lesser grade in Fr Union hierarchy than that of Assoc States imperils their own evolution within Fr Union. Tunis and Morocco affect Indochina as much as Indochina affects North Africa; also if troops diverted North Africa from narrow margin left over from NATO commitment, potential replacement program for Indochina may suffer. This last effect might be subject of query to Letourneau in response to invitation in penultimate para Paris tel 433.

Manner and extent of US intervention is of course at heart of proposed approach to Fr. Whatever it has been in North Africa the measure of our intervention here is precisely that Indochina wld have long since been lost without our econ and mil aid, amounting to over billion dollars. Since our recognition Indochina we have been extremely considerate of Fr sensibilities. Altho our recognition of AS as “independent” within Fr Union was based on assumption of continued evolution of AS toward fuller independence in union, we have refrained (at least so far as record of various internatl confs available this Leg shows) from pressing Fr to accelerate this development or state their intentions privately or publicly. We wld not now raise question about their polit or mil policies here if it were not for: (a) threat of stalemate; (b) collapse of optimistic estimates of victory (e.g. De Lattre‘s “matter of months”); (c) removal from scene of De Lattre, one man capable, if anyone cld, of transforming situation by personal evangelism.

As much logic as there may be in our pres approach, it wld be unavailing if it shld decide Fr to “cut their losses”. Paris Emb can best judge Fr intentions but we submit that consideration of honor, cohesiveness re Fr Union; Fr leadership in European defense; the tradition of services; leverage of econ interests, and difficulties of evacuation also operate to hold them to their commitments.

Para 2:

Leg wholly agrees in Embassy’s proposal in this para to link US desiderata with Fr requests. If we make request from Fr for info or action, it shld be made at same time Fr ask us for aid. For reasons outlined above our approach has hitherto in fact tended to be “piecemeal” and local. We now have new opportunity and new levers. Among latter wld be Fr desire that we finance natl armies (see Legtel 852, Oct 16, 1951)⁴ or that we give them commitment on defense of Indochina or join in warning to China.

We heartily agree that Viets must be required to do their part. Tam Govt is hardly instrument we wld have chosen to execute our suggested Viet action program but we can work on and thru it while it is still in malleable state. Eventually, however, it may be that only govt with popular mandate cld accomplish kind of reforms needed and indicated in Legtel 2218.⁵

Para 3:

Apparently, however, present Letourneau talks not set up for far-reaching exchange of views on Franco-Viet policies in Indochina. He is not accompanied by many technicians and far as we know here has had no indication of any desire of ours to broaden scope of inquiry. If however talks continue thru new innings as indicated Paris tel 433, desirability further round-table examination policies at working levels cld be broached to Letourneau now.

A Fr request for fin aid for AS armies shld give us leverage on broad range subjects and particular right to more info about mil system, capabilities of combat units; broader flow of intel; closer contact with Viet army, and access to proceedings of Franco-Viet military committee.

Para 4:

Recent Cabinet coup confirms Bao Dai not ready “step out in front”. He used Tam either as shield or decoy. In past two years Bao Dai gained little if any prestige in loyal Indochina altho he has probably picked up some in VM territory. Year ago it is doubtful that Tri wld have refused an imperial summons to form govt. Year ago Tam probably cld have enlisted better group of natls for cabinet. It is not yet clear that Tam Govt is one of “genuine natl elements” prepared take broad view. It undoubtedly will refrain from criticism or “excessive independent action” vis-à-vis Fr.

a. We pleased note Paris agrees that some Fr “commitment going much farther in favor of evolution of AS” now required as well as concrete evidence Fr intentions altho we still do not believe that evolutionary statement cld cite timetable or name a date. We think some declaration now feasible and may be useful for example in swinging Phil recognition.

b. Leg agrees that AS shld not move too fast in expanding dipl rep. Missions to Vatican and Japan appear desirable, latter in order prepare increase of Jap—Indochina trade, counter unreal Viet expectations of reparations and improve Viet knowledge of threat of communism.

c. In our opinion, formation of some kind of natl assy or popular consultation can be put off no longer if Bao Dai experiment is to survive. Formula all the more urgent to take police curse off Fr citizen Tam as he himself realizes. (Even before accession to power he effectively ruled polit life of country by Franco-Viet police apparatus and application of Decree No. 10 of August 6, 1950, effectively checking organizations of meetings, parties, polit clubs or labor unions.) He now considering an elective rather than appointive assy constituted by indirect suffrage thru three or four stages of regional councils. Fr themselves claim to be for some kind of assy altho recent difficulties in Cambodia may incline them to caution

Under present system, each time Bao Dai makes or breaks a govt he antagonizes powerful segment, losing some of his appeal and auth. He can not share responsibility with an assy or parties. Viets increasingly realize that in process of forming govt Fr and if they cared to do so Americans cld exert more influence on Bao Dai than Viets. Moreover once Tam experiment created under present system runs its course, there will be little else to try except Tri or Diem govt. There is hardly any way for new man to make his mark in Franco—Bao Dai regime. Viets cannot make their reputations in popular assy, free press, or army or finance since opportunities highly restricted. In over two years except for mixed Franco-Viet mtgs and some govt councils there has been no gen mtg of any Vietnamese for any purpose other than social or sporting. Result is to drive potential leaders into clandestinity [sic] or into paramilitary sects into third force or VM itself. In absence assy little check on corruption and no semblance popular ratification of Viets acts in internatl field. All these things argue for formation assy which Pignon⁶ saw as necessary two years ago, altho he indicated it cld not be altogether “pure in its origins”. At beginning it wld exercise its auth only in limited field. During De Lattre experiment of brilliant mil govt assy was under discussion but never put thru because conflicting views as form it shld take.

d. Janot has indicated to Williamson⁷ Fr willingness to relax preferential stipulation for Fr advisors. Another way out is assign them to STEM and tech assistance programs. Our proposals also contemplate generous use of UN and third country advisors. Fr sensibilities are now less acute than under De Lattre, and need for expert assistance from any source is as great or greater.

We recommend that:

1. Letourneau be advised of our desire to review situation Indochina in line with Legtels 2224 May 12; 2218 May 10; if not at this, then at subsequent mtg.

2. Fr opinion in Indochina and at home be brought to understand magnitude of “US intervention” in their favor.

3. Approach in this and reftels be made condition to any increase in our commitment; i.e., warning to China; or guarantee of frontier; a tripartite declaration on SEA; financing of natl armies or increased material aid.⁸

Gullion

1. This telegram was transmitted in two parts.
2. Ante, p. 168.
3. Ante, p. 174.
4. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 1, p. 534.
5. Dated May 10, p. 131.
6. Léon Pignon, French High Commissioner in Indochina, 1948–1950.
7. David Williamson, Chief of the Mutual Security Agency Mission at Saigon.
8. In telegram 2531 from Saigon, June 14, Gullion submitted additional comments and suggestions with respect to positions which might be taken by U.S. representatives during the Washington conversations with Letourneau. The Chargé addressed himself particularly to military matters. (751G.00/6–1452)