740.5/4–1454
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor (MacArthur)1
[Extract]
. . . . . . .
We then discussed Indochina briefly. M. Laniel said the effect of the gallant stand at Dien-Bien-Phu had greatly helped him in the Parliament because, except for the Communists, even those members who wish to withdraw from Indochina do not feel that they can say anything which would undermine the morale of Colonel de Castries’ forces defending Dien-Bien-Phu. However, if Dien-Bien-Phu falls a most serious situation will result.
I said to M. Laniel that I recalled the assurances, that his government would take no action which directly or indirectly would turn Indochina over to the Communists, which he had given me when I saw him last July regarding increased U.S. assistance for the Indochinese war. I also recalled that he had given similar assurances informally to the President at Bermuda. I said that we knew that his determination not to turn Indochina over to the Communists was unshakeable and this had been one of the considerations which had led us to massively increase our aid to the French, including many additional aircraft and other types of supplies.
M. Laniel reaffirmed that he would not be a party to turning the area over to the Communists. He said, however, that the situation was very difficult in France because of war weariness and a desire on the part of many people to get out of Indochina at any cost.
I said that there was one thing the French could do rapidly to aid in the defense of Dien-Bien-Phu and the improvement of their military position in Indochina. This was to send additional aviation mechanics and maintenance personnel speedily to the area. I said that there was such a shortage of personnel of this category that the French were not able to maintain and make full operational use of the aircraft they now had in Indochina and that for the U.S. to furnish additional aircraft did not make much sense if there were not the flight and maintenance personnel to operate them. M. Laniel said that he was not aware of this and I had the impression that he had not been brought very fully into the picture by the French National Defense [Page 1328] people with regard to the difficulties of the French air forces in Indochina, stemming in considerable part from the lack of qualified personnel.
- Secretary Dulles and his party flew from London to Paris on the afternoon of Apr. 13. This conversation between MacArthur and Laniel occurred at the Prime Minister’s private residence from 10:15 p.m. to midnight that night. For the portion of the memorandum not printed here and additional documentation on discussions on subjects other than Indochina which occurred during the Secretary’s visit to Paris, Apr. 13–14, see volume vi.↩