Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

790.5/4–2154: Despatch

The First Secretary of Embassy in France (Godley) to the Department of State

secret
No. 2667

Paris, April 21, 1954.

Subject:

• Minutes of Conversations held in Paris by the Secretary of State and Foreign Minister Bidault with relation to “Unified Action” in Southeast Asia.¹

The following are the minutes of the conversations concerning “Unified Action in Southeast Asia” held at Paris on April 14 at the Foreign Office.

Participants

• Foreign Minister Georges Bidault
• Messrs. Alexandre Parodi
• Jean Chauvel
• Roland de Margerie
• Francis Lacoste
• Maurice Schumann
• Jacques Roux
• James [Jacques] Baeyens
• Claude Cheysson
• Folin
• Secretary of State Dulles
• Messrs. Merchant
• Robertson
• MacArthur
• Ambassador Dillon
• Messrs. Achilles
• Bonsal
• McBride
• Gibson

M. Bidault opened the meeting with the usual welcoming remarks. He referred to the number of times the same protagonists had met in this same room. He asked Mr. Dulles to explain what he had in mind, and particularly what had been the nature of his conversations with Mr. Eden. He expressed the gratitude of the French Nation for the U.S. effort and aid for Indochina and referred to the meeting of urgent requests for matériel for Dien-Bien-Phu in record time—on one occasion within 24 hours.

Mr. Dulles replied that he, too, felt great satisfaction in finding himself once more in this room where he had met with M. Bidault so many times and, at all times, to the benefit of the United States. His trip abroad was occasioned by the thought that it would be useful to explain more fully than was possible by cable the motives which had led the United States Government to embark on its present course as regards Indochina. He reminded M. Bidault of a statement he had made to him at Berlin to the effect that if Indochina were inscribed on the agenda for Geneva it would lead to increasingly vehement attacks by the Viet Minh. The latter should be expected to intensify their military efforts in a reckless manner in order to improve their negotiating position at Geneva. He remarked on the large increase in Chinese aid which the Viet Minh had received since the Berlin Conference. The purpose was clearly to create a political position at Geneva which would permit profitable negotiations by the Viet Minh. The other nations should find a political asset to counterbalance this threat. We must go to Geneva with it and, Mr. Dulles suggested, it might take the form of a united defense of other nations in the area. We must be in a position of [to] counteract the effort which the enemy will pursue, even possibly during the Conference. Unless Indochina is held by anti-Communist forces, Mr. Dulles stated, the whole area could collapse. The war might spread to Siam, Malaya, Indonesia and other countries in the area. Indonesia is at present balanced between Communist and anti-Communist forces and an advance in the area of Communist control would cause it to turn Communist. The countries with interests in the area should join forces, determined to resist and to make the Communists desist from their intentions to conquer all Southeast Asia.

Mr. Dulles has had conversations with Congressional leaders of both houses on this subject and they think that the continuation of aid and participation thereby of the United States in the struggle depends on the recognition by the other nations of the area of the fact that there is such a peril. The countries which have immediate interests in the area are Thailand, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Burma. If they do not recognize the peril it would be difficult for the United States to continue the struggle or take a more active role in it. If other countries did not take the same interest as the United States, it would be difficult to have the United States Congress and the United States people continue with their present policy of which the first objective was to save the territory from Communist domination.

Mr. Dulles continued to say that the whole purpose of the United States Government is to increase the possibility of an acceptable solution in Geneva. The United States does not wish the war to continue. It wishes peace in Indochina. The United States was able to conclude an armistice in Korea and does not seek any different result in Indochina. The United States study concludes that no peace is possible in Indochina unless the Communists give up their intention of conquering all of Southeast Asia. If Geneva is but a step toward that goal, it will do no good. The enemy must recognize that they cannot conquer all of Southeast Asia. We must, therefore, create such strength as to deter them. It is under such conditions that the best chances of a successfully negotiated peace at Geneva exist.

Mr. Dulles continued to state that he had made an address, two or three weeks ago, in which he spoke of the importance of creating unity in order to meet the threat in Indochina. He had had conversations in Washington with the Ambassadors of the countries most concerned—France, the United Kingdom, the Associated States, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand and Thailand. In addition, the following other countries were informed for information purposes of what Mr. Dulles had in mind—Burma, India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Nationalist China, Korea and Japan.

Mr. Dulles stated that the reception he received from these countries was, on the whole, satisfactory. The idea seemed to be welcome, especially by Thailand and the Philippines, both of whom have subsequently announced their intention to proceed with the plan. Australia and New Zealand received the suggestion favorably but cited their desire to act only in conjunction with the United Kingdom. There was hesitation on the part of the United Kingdom due to the lack of understanding of the U.S. purpose. It was misunderstood in some quarters, particularly in the press, that Mr. Dulles wished to give Pekin an ultimatum to desist from their present support of the Viet Minh or to face the prospect of war. This was a gross misunderstanding. It therefore seemed desirable to have direct talks with the United Kingdom Government and this suggestion was shared by the United Kingdom itself. Mr. Dulles therefore went to London last Sunday.²

He had had talks in London on Monday and Tuesday with Mr. Eden and his associates and had dined on Monday evening with Mr. Churchill.³ Once the purpose of his visit had been made clear it was accepted and at the time of his departure a joint communiqué was issued yesterday.⁴ The communiqué fully satisfies the purposes which Mr. Dulles had in mind in coming to the United Kingdom. It agrees to studying the establishment of a common defense in the area. It makes clear that the purpose exists before Geneva to shrink the intentions of the Chinese Communists without which they might not otherwise have come to Geneva.

Mr. Dulles recounted that there had been some discussion in London as to whether it was desirable to create a formalized treaty system in the Asian area similar to the North Atlantic Treaty. He expressed the view that what the United States had in mind might lead to such a result but that that should not be looked upon as an immediate purpose. It would take 18 months to negotiate the signatures, ratifications, etc., of such a system of treaties, whereas at the present time we were faced with a critical situation which might develop before the treaties could be concluded. We should do something to create an association now on an ad hoc basis before attempting the creation of a series of multilateral treaties on a formula comparable to that of NATO. The latter is the basis on which the United Kingdom had been thinking, while the former is more along the lines of our thoughts. In other words, the United Kingdom had been thinking of an arrangement on a more or less permanent basis white we had been thinking of an ad hoc basis for the time being. This represented the slight difference in point of view which Mr. Dulles had encountered in London. Mr. Dulles continued to state that the United Kingdom had indicated they would take part at once in an informal working group in Washington in which their Ambassador would participate in studies in which other interested Governments would take part. They intended to explore all possibilities and to work out the practical details of the proposal Mr. Dulles had in mind.

Mr. Dulles stated that in the course of his conversations with the representatives of the interested States, a great deal of emphasis had been put on the status of the Associated States as independent nations. He believed that it would greatly help in the creation of a unity of purpose at Geneva if their independence could be manifested beforehand. Other countries attach a great deal of emphasis to this point. Mr. Dulles recognized the difficulties of the French Government in this respect and realized that the people of Viet Nam were neither ready nor willing to make an effort to preserve their independence even if they had it. He recognized equally the advantage of the voluntary participation of the States in the French Union. There was a feeling among these countries, which was shared in the United States, that the land fighting should be assumed more and more by indigenous troops. The Viet Minh proved that this is possible. The Viet Nam Government has the same capacity to recruit the same men as the Viet Minh. There was also an impression that the Vietnamese would do better if they were fighting for their independence and would take the wind out of the sails of Ho Chi-Minh if they had actually acquired that independence.

He continued to state that from a purely material standpoint the balance sheet of the two forces on either side reflected a great superiority of the French Union Forces. They outnumbered the Viet Minh Force by about two to one, according to his understanding. Moreover they had complete air control while the Viet Minh had none. Furthermore, while supplies sent in by China to the Viet Minh had increased up to an estimate of 4,000 tons a month, this figure did not compare with one of nearly ten times as much for the matériel which was being sent in by the United States alone to support the loyalist forces. On such a balance sheet it would, therefore, appear that the balance is on our side. Many people, with whom Mr. Dulles did not necessarily agree, attributed the superior powers of the Viet Minh to the fact that it felt it was fighting for independence while the others were not sure. In any case, this is a factor which must be taken into account.

Finally, to summarize, Mr. Dulles concluded that he believed that if it were possible to create a condition where the Communists would recognize that it was not possible to extend their empire into Southeast Asia, then possibly a negotiated settlement could take place in Geneva which would result in real peace. If, on the other hand, the Communists came to Geneva believing that they could extend their rule to the rest of Southeast Asia there would be no settlement or there would be one which would simply be an interlude to a resumption of armed action on an even more extensive scale. Mr. Dulles believed that the free nations must marshal enough strength to join our efforts to make the Communists renounce their purpose and permit the area to resume its peaceful existence.

M. Bidault then spoke, saying that he had nothing to add to what Mr. Dulles had said except that he questioned one point which would create difficulties for the French Government. The one problem is the question of timing and the moment when the suggestion should be carried out. He commented that if such a suggestion had been made three years ago matters might have been very different. We must take into account all considerations in view of our common purpose. Before explaining the perspective of the French Government he wished to make one particular point. The independence of the Associated States was first proclaimed in 1949 and was again proclaimed in 1953. If the transfers arranged in the various treaties have not yet taken place it is only because the French received no counterpart (contrepartie), especially as concerns military matters where the transfer of fighting responsibility and burden was refused on the part of the native government.

He continued to state that it was a very different matter to make a lien with a country which, for 1500 years, has never had any sovereignty. Independence was not a key to courage. What the French Government proposes is an integration with people with 1500 years of history behind them during none of which period they have had any sovereignty. He compared this with the fact that France and Germany were making a lien which had never existed before either, but they were two sovereign nations with long histories of sovereignty. M. Bidault then referred with considerable irony and bitterness to the amount of aid which might be expected from such countries as Thailand, Burma and the Philippines. What would they bring to Viet Nam after the French had left? Nothing. We would then see what would happen to their determination and courage.

The Foreign Minister continued to say that his language might not be diplomatic but that it was at least outspoken and frank. With regard to the numerical figures cited by Mr. Dulles he was not under the impression that they were correct. The Viet Minh had an army of some 350,000 men of very unequal value, while the French Expeditionary Force amounted to 250,000 men and the Viet Nam National Army to 200,000 men. To this should be added approximately 40,000 from Laos and Cambodia making a total of approximately 500,000 men. The contribution of the native troops was not negligible. It was a true contribution. There were other factors which he was not taking into account. A large part of the indigenous forces had little value in actual fighting. The French were obliged to defend everything everywhere. It was a war that was both military and political. Suppose they had chosen to abandon the jungle and mountains and defend only the delta? They should thereby release themselves of an enormous responsibility involving approximately nine-tenths of the country. Napoleon had carried out such a system with great success. He had less men than the enemy but he picked the place to fight them. If the French abandoned such a large area it would include Laos and Cambodia. This they cannot bring themselves to do as they cannot abandon the Associated States one by one. They are obliged to defend all the Associated States wherever and whenever they are attacked.

M. Bidault reminded Mr. Dulles that the war was almost 7 years old and that for a long time it had been ignored and misunderstood. It is a heavy burden—no longer financially thanks to U.S. aid—but a great burden on the French army and national morale. Many Frenchmen ask why the war is continuing. It is being carried on 12,000 kilometers away. Many people in and out of Parliament claim that while France is fighting the Communists abroad the war is nourishing them at home. This is an unpleasant but true fact. France must have an opportunity to negotiate an honorable peace. This is the idea of many people, including those sitting around the table on the French side. The Government cannot do anything at Geneva which gives the impression that the conference is not likely, from the first, to reach results. The war in Indochina is a French war and has been since the beginning, not overlooking U.S. aid. Now the question arises—should it become a collective war? If Geneva fails, collective security is a possibility but nothing can be done before Geneva which would allow it to be said or thought that anything had been decided beforehand about what was to be done if Geneva failed.

The chances for success at Geneva are considered weak. M. Bidault agreed with Mr. Dulles that nothing must be accepted in exchange for Communist promises. Nevertheless, M. Bidault had a thought, which was shared by all his collaborators at Berlin, that Russia is afraid of China and the possibility that China might drag Russia into something against her will. She fears that China might take initiative on her own. China is probably now in a state of famine and Russia cannot any longer give her the food which she needs. It might be possible to get territorial concessions we need from the Chinese. All this is of course only a hypothesis. The French, however, cannot get it out of their minds and it must be taken into account when considering the prospects at Geneva. The French have experts working on the Geneva Conference preparations. They are exploring all possibilities. M. Bidault did not think it appropriate to get into detail with the Secretary. The summation of his ideas is that we should go to Geneva having prepared all our positions in advance but not in any sense conveying the impression that we had tied our hands in advance. This is not in conflict with either Mr. Dulles’ reasoning or his presentation.

M. Bidault continued to say that we must give no credence to the argument that Geneva is in any sense a sham (trompe l’oeil) and condemned from the beginning. “I have been accused of that by enemies of the Government (note: an apparent reference to Mèndes-France) and I stated in reply that we must give Geneva a chance and see what happens there. In any event, our policy is not peace at any price.”

M. Bidault concluded by saying that this summed up what he had to say and he thought it best to now put things in writing in the short time which remained to us.

Mr. Dulles replied that regarding the Soviet attitude and the possibility that the USSR might exert an influence on Communist China to desist, he believed that the Soviets would only do so because they feared that the Chinese might drag them into a general war but that if they thought the Chinese could take over countries one by one they would be pleased to have them do so.

M. Bidault agreed with this but commented that it was not only Russia who feared a general war. The opponents of Communism everywhere were afraid that we were heading toward a general war.

G. McMurtrie Godley

1. These minutes record the discussions which occurred during a 2-hour meeting at the Quai d’Orsay on the morning of Apr. 14. The meeting was summarized in telegram 3888 from Paris, Apr. 14. (751G.00/4–1454) Informal notes of the same meeting by Assistant Secretary Merchant are in EUR files, lot 59 D 233, “Secretary’s Trip to Paris and London 4/12/54”.
2. Apr. 11.
3. For text of the memorandum of conversation by the Secretary of State describing discussion which occurred at his dinner meeting with Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden on Apr. 12, see volume vi. The memorandum provides no indication that Indochina or Southeast Asia were discussed at that time.
4. For the pertinent portion of the communiqué, see telegram Secto 2 from London, Apr. 13, p. 1321.