Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 193d Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, April 13, 1954¹

top secret
eyes only

April 13, 1954

[Extracts]

Present at the 193rd Meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 1 and 2); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Mr. Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

The following is a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

Using both a chart and a small relief map of the Dien Bien Phu area, the Director of Central Intelligence briefed the Council on the latest developments in this battle. The President asked a number of questions regarding the terrain. Mr. Dulles then announced that the French had succeeded, during the period April 7 to 12, in dropping another battalion (Foreign Legion) into the fortress. This brought the total number of battalions replaced by the French to four. Mr. Dulles indicated that the CAT pilots operating to supply Dien Bien Phu were very critical of the performance of the French Union Air Force. The French dropped their supplies from very high altitudes, as much as 8000 feet, which explained why so many of the drops fell into the hands of the enemy. The CAT pilots, using C–119’s, dropped their supplies from very low altitudes.

Mr. Dulles indicated that the French were reporting some 13,000 new Vietminh replacements as having reached Dien Bien Phu, and that a comparable number were on their way to the scene. The great majority of these reinforcements were raw recruits. Renewal of the mass assaults was anticipated by the French about April 15.

In other parts of Indochina fighting had been stepped up slightly. This, said Mr. Dulles, was in preparation for the Geneva Conference.

The President observed that he could not avoid going back to the reason why the French made no effort to relieve their situation at Dien Bien Phu by sending a French column to the relief of the fortress. This would at least have the advantage of drawing off the Vietminh reinforcement. Admiral Radford replied that he had gone into this question with the same curiosity. He pointed out that Dien Bien Phu was 140 miles from Luang Prabang. Up to within 30 miles of the fortress this road actually consisted merely of a trail. While this area had been infested with guerrillas earlier, the French now claim that these guerrillas are largely concentrated at Dien Bien Phu. Accordingly, Admiral Radford said that he felt that the French could move forces along this route if they had the will to do so. Certainly, said Admiral Radford, we would have done so if the United States faced the same problem as the French.

. . . . . . .

7. Reports by the Acting Secretary of State

Secretary Smith said that he had just received a report on the discussions between Secretary Dulles and Mr. Eden on Southeast Asia, which report the President himself had not yet seen. This consisted of a joint communiqué to be issued by Secretary Dulles and Mr. Eden.² In the first instance, a false impression had been current that the United States was trying to induce its allies to issue an ultimatum to the Communists with respect to Indochina. The initial reception in London had therefore been quite cool. For purely internal reasons alone, the British had insisted that it was undesirable to give the impression that we had closed the door on any results from the Geneva Conference. The British Chiefs of Staff were also worried that united action would bring Chinese interference. They also believed that united action would require ground forces additional to those already in Indochina. In view of these difficulties the agreement to explore the possibilities for united action, as set forth in the joint communiqué, represented a considerable achievement.

With respect to the Geneva Conference, Secretary Smith said that our great concern was to avoid being traded out of all our bargaining positions by our allies prior to the opening of the Conference. Secretary Smith expressed confidence, however, that the United States would be able to prevent such a sell-out.

With respect to the work of the Special Committee created by NSC Action No. 1019,³ Secretary Smith said that the Committee had been given two missions, the first to devise additional steps to help the French win the battle for Indochina. He said that he believed our response to French requests for additional assistance in carrying out the Navarre Plan had been so prompt and effective as to be almost miraculous. The French performance, on the contrary, was often worse than disappointing. They had brought themselves to order two additional battalions to be sent to Indochina, with an airlift provided by the United States, and when assured that such airlift would be provided, had given two weeks leave to the personnel of the two battalions. This illustrated the whole situation.

The second mission given to the Special Committee was to survey the range of possible actions open to the United States in the event that the French were defeated or withdrew from Indochina. The proposals offered by the Special Committee had been overtaken in the main by the Planning Board’s report to the Council at last week’s meeting.⁴ Accordingly, the Special Committee wished to be relieved of further responsibility with respect to this mission.

Mr. Flemming inquired whether, on the basis of Secretary Smith’s report, it would be accurate to state that we will not work out any regional grouping of nations for the defense of Southeast Asia prior to the Geneva Conference. The President said that we really couldn’t hope to do more than to get the nations in question to look into the problem, as opposed to actually agreeing to create the regional organization. He nevertheless believed that the British would ultimately come along, as did Secretary Smith.

With respect to the Geneva Conference, the Vice President inquired whether the Korean and Indochinese questions were to be discussed at the Conference at the same time. Secretary Smith replied not if we could help it. We very much hoped that the Communists would manifest such complete intransigence with regard to a settlement in Korea, that some of the pressure on us to agree to a negotiated settlement in Indochina would be relieved.

The National Security Council:⁵

a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Acting Secretary of State on:

(1) The results of the discussion by the Secretary of State with Foreign Secretary Eden on Southeast Asia.

(2) The problems facing the United States at the Geneva Conference.

b. Noted the President’s agreement that the Special Committee created by NSC Action No. 1019 be considered as having completed its work and be discontinued, in view of a report by the Acting Secretary of State that:

(1) The Special Committee recommends that it be relieved of further responsibility under NSC Action No. 1019-b; and

(2) When the Special Committee reported to the Operations Coordinating Board on March 3, 1954 with respect to NSC Action No. 1019-a, the OCB assumed responsibility for continued coordination of actions contained in that report.⁶

Note: The action in b above subsequently transmitted [to] the Under Secretary of State.

. . . . . . .

1. Prepared by S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, on Apr. 14.
2. See telegram Secto 2 from London, Apr. 13, p. 1321.
3. The text of NSC Action No. 1019 is included in extracts from the memorandum of discussion at the 181st Meeting of the National Security Council, Jan. 21, p. 986.
4. For the memorandum of discussion at the 192d Meeting of the National Security Council, Apr. 6, see p. 1250. Regarding the report of the Planning Board, see footnote 2, ibid.
5. Points a and b below constituted NSC Action No. 1095, Apr. 13, 1954. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Actions”)
6. For the Special Committee’s report of Mar. 2, transmitted to the OCB on Mar. 3, see p. 1109.