Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

JCS files

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Chief of Staff of the French Armed Forces (Ely)

top secret

[Washington,] 12 April 1954.

My Dear General Ely: I am most appreciative of your kindness in sending Colonel Brohon to Washington¹ to bring me your personal messages about Indo-China, and the reactions of General Navarre to our discussions last month.

All of us here in Washington are deeply interested in the progress of the battle of Dien Bien Phu. The gallant defense of that besieged strong point by the garrison itself, and the inspirational personal leadership being displayed by General DeCastries, stimulate our greatest admiration and esteem. I am certain that their renown will be recorded in history as meeting the highest traditions of the military service. At the direction of the President, himself, the United States is rendering every possible assistance, short of actual participation by United States armed forces, to influence the battle at Dien Bien Phu and to provide a victory at that point.

I was very glad to receive Colonel Brohon’s report that General Navarre will make more effective use of the U.S. staff officers and will accept the assignment of U.S. officers as instructors to assist in the training of the Vietnamese army. In my opinion, this is a step in the right direction and I agree that the details should be worked out between General O’Daniel and General Navarre.

I plan to brief General O’Daniel prior to his arrival in Indo-China. For your information, he will have the rank of major general and the same mission as his predecessor, General Trapnell. However, I am very anxious that his relationship with General Navarre be both intimate and mutually helpful. I am sure you will agree that this is absolutely necessary in the interest of France, the United States and the cause of the whole free world. This is so important as to transcend personal sensitivities on the part of either of the individuals.

Colonel Brohon informed me of your disappointment over the position of the United States Government relative to the request by the Government of France for intervention by U.S. aircraft in the battle for Dien Bien Phu. I cannot understand how you could have gained the impression from your conversations with me or with the Secretary of State, that an affirmative reply to such a request would automatically follow. I felt that it was made absolutely clear by both of us that the decision to employ U.S. forces in combat was one that could only be made at the highest governmental level and in the light of constitutional processes and congressional action. I did state that no such participation by U.S. forces was possible without a formal request by the French Government, and that I was certain that such a request, if made, would receive prompt and thorough consideration by the United States Government.

Events connected with the request have proved my prediction to be true. The Secretary of State is moving with great urgency to cope with the situation. It is receiving the continuing attention at the highest levels of the United States Government. Meanwhile, every possible effort is being made to take all action, short of actual intervention by U.S. armed forces, to assist in the defense of Dien Bien Phu until international arrangements involving the nations who are so directly affected, can be completed.

Again, my dear General, I want you to know of my deep personal, as well as official, interest over the situation in Indo-China and of Dien Bien Phu in particular.²

Most sincerely,

[File copy not signed]

1. Regarding the conversations with Colonel Brohon, see memorandum from Admiral Radford to Secretary Dulles, Apr. 10, p. 1303.
2. General Ely replied by letter of Apr. 20. He expressed his appreciation for U.S. aid and also stated “I do think that we fully understood each other in our conversations in Washington. The question has however, I believe, been slower than expected in its progress on the political level.” (“Je ne crois pas qu’il y ait eu entre nous de malentendu au cours de nos conversations de Washington. La question, je crois, sur le plan politique, a cependant évolué plus lentement que prévu.”) Ely’s letter and the translation quoted here are in JCS files.