790.5/4–1354: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Department of State
niact
Secto 1. Repeated information Paris 616. Paris for Dillon. For the Acting Secretary from the Secretary. Following is résumé of our discussions with British today (April 12) on united action in SEA:
This morning while I was meeting with Eden on other matters, Robertson and MacArthur had preliminary discussions with Denis Allen on this subject.1 They outlined in detail to Allen our thinking on possible declaration of common purpose which might be issued by countries of SEA whose security and vital interests are threatened by Communist expansion in this area. They also expressed our belief that some such declaration would enable us to go to Geneva with position of strength and alternative to any settlement which might involve turning over of this area to Communists.
Allen expressed great reserve, indicating that for UK internal political reasons as well as the question of general opinion it was important not to take any action which would give the impression that decisions had been made prior to Geneva which foreclosed the possibility of a successful negotiated settlement there. Allen also felt that such declaration would involve guaranteeing territorial integrity of Associated States and liquidation of Communist military activities there which in turn would imply commitment re military forces of substantial nature. He did not believe that HMG could reach such decision until efforts for settlement had been explored at Geneva and had failed.
Allen mentioned apparent differences in estimates of our JCS and UK chiefs. We gathered British chiefs feel that joint intervention in Indochina by ourselves and other likeminded people would probably [Page 1320] result in overt Chinese intervention. But even if this does not occur, the British feel that, in addition to air and navy, additional ground forces will be needed.
When queried re UK ideas on a negotiated settlement at Geneva, Allen stated frankly UK does not have any good solution in mind. Least bad alternative might be territorial division of Vietnam. If hostilities ceased on this basis, the nations interested in the security of SEA could join together in some form of collective arrangement which would then in effect serve notice that further expansion into South Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia would be met with united action. Admittedly, however, such division of Vietnam was not good answer and there was no guarantee that it would stop the Communist drive.
We had impression that UK is thinking of some form of collective arrangement for SEA modeled on NATO but that they do not quite see how it can be put into effect with respect to Vietnam where full-fledged war is going on without involving them in commitment to liquidate that war successfully.
At our meeting this afternoon,2 I discussed this question at length with Eden, who indicated that it did not seem possible to give an undertaking or implement any arrangements prior to Geneva which would become operative if Geneva conference failed. He said frankly that there is real problem of UK parliamentary and public opinion; that any implied commitment for involvement in the Indochina war would be intensely unpopular; but that if negotiations at Geneva fail the situation may well be different. In the light of these factors, HMG did not feel that it could imply that it was going to take action involving very serious commitments when in fact it was not now in a position to make such commitments. On the other hand, he was impressed with the reasons I gave why US and UK should indicate that we are prepared to consult with other nations in SEA whose security is also threatened with view to possible collective defense measures looking to security and freedom of area.
I tabled paper giving my thoughts on what such joint communiqué might look like, and after some discussion we agreed on text in immediately following telegram3 subject to indicated alternatives to be resolved tomorrow. While UK is obviously opposed to organizing united action prior to Geneva, I think they have moved forward considerably as result our discussion. I am encouraged that they seem willing to state publicly their readiness to examine possible collective defense measures.