751G.00/4–1254
Memorandum of Conversation, by N. G. Thacher of the Office of South Asian Affairs1
Subject:
- Indochina Situation
Participants:
- Mr. G. L. Mehta, Ambassador of India
- Mr. S. N. Haksar, Minister of India
- Mr. James C. H. Bonbright, Acting Assistant Secretary, EUR
- Mr. N. G. Thacher, SOA
The Ambassador and Mr. Haksar called at the Department’s request for a discussion of our view of the present situation in Indochina.
Mr. Bonbright referred to the Secretary’s Overseas Press Club speech and how it reflected our deep concern over the threat of communist expansion in Indochina. Communist control of the Associated States would threaten the continued independence of all of Southeast Asia, and would bring closer the threat to India itself, to Australia and New Zealand, and to Japan which was particularly dependent on the raw resources and markets of Southeast Asia. Mr. Bonbright said that under present circumstances negotiated settlements with the Viet Minh seemed to promise nothing but complete control of the three countries by the communists: a cease fire line similar to that drawn in Korea was impracticable since the character of the Viet Minh penetration [Page 1316] was such that in the many small pockets under its control a truce would be unenforceable and communist infiltration would continue, while any attempt to form a joint government between the Viet Minh and the present Associated States would with Chinese pressure lead to eventual Communist control.
Mr. Bonbright stated that the Secretary had thus concluded that some joint action must be undertaken to make clear to the Chinese Communists that the expansion of communist power could not continue unchecked in this area. We hoped therefore that “unified action” might take the form of an ad hoc coalition including the United States, France, Britain, the Philippines, Thailand, New Zealand, Australia and others indicating their determination that communist power should spread no further. Such a grouping would be particularly desirable at this time since it would tend to strengthen our position at the Geneva conference. Further in case of communist conquest of the Associated States it would serve as a valuable unifying factor on which to base opposition to additional communist expansion. Simultaneously we would urge the French to implement as rapidly as possible the declaration of intent of last July and to give complete independence to the Associated States. In the manner of the British Commonwealth the Associated States should be entirely free to maintain or terminate this as they chose, but we would hope that they would continue their tie with the French Union.
Mr. Bonbright stressed that contrary to the impression given by speculation in the press, there was no thought of a declaration which could be interpreted as an ultimatum to the Chinese Communists. What was hoped for was that the Chinese, on becoming aware of the determination of the powers who had joined together, would quietly withdraw their support from the Viet Minh. We hoped, of course, that the fighting would not spread.
Ambassador Mehta said that in the minds of the people of Asia no matter what the other factors the war in Indochina still partook of the nature of a colonial war and that it would be impossible to carry it on successfully without a clear promise of ultimate freedom. He said that he believed that the setting of some future date for the complete freedom of the States would necessarily have to be accompanied by a guarantee, perhaps by the UN, in order to have the desired effect. The Ambassador questioned whether the Chinese Communists might not become deeply alarmed by any indications that the western powers were considering military activity in an area which like Korea was so close and so vital to China as the Associated States. The Ambassador also wondered whether there was a relation between the Secretary’s call for united action and the battle for Dien Bien Phu.
Mr. Bonbright declared that we were in entire agreement with those who urged the need for complete independence for Indochina and that [Page 1317] we had frequently urged this upon the French. However, we had fotind that over the years even those among the French leaders who were most nearly in accord with our viewpoint were restrained by the realization that as a practical matter the French people would have no enthusiasm for fighting for a country which had no ties with France. Mr. Bonbright stated that the Secretary’s decision to seek some form of united action had not been caused by concern over the course of the isolated struggle for Dien Bien Phu. In response to the Ambassador’s suggestion that this particular battle might not have taken place if we had supported the Indian proposal for a cease fire, Mr. Bonbright expressed scepticism and pointed out that the communist attack there had been launched with the goal of achieving a victory which would provide them with a psychologically advantageous setting for negotiations at Geneva.
Ambassador Mehta asked Mr. Bonbright why it was in view of the withdrawals made by the British and the Dutch from their colonial possessions in Asia with their enormous interests in those possessions, the French still clung to their little enclaves on the coast of the Indian sub-continent.
Mr. Bonbright said that perhaps this could be explained in the intensity of the national pride of France which had lost so much of its strength as a nation in the war that it now resented anything which seemed further to diminish its power.
Alluding to Prime Minister Nehru’s interest in the possibility of establishing a cease fire in Indochina, Ambassador Mehta inquired as to its feasibility. Mr. Bonbright said that a cease fire could, under present circumstances, work only to the advantage of the Communists. Mr. Haksar suggested that ultimately the people of Indochina must be the ones to determine their own fate and that this would seem to point to some kind of elections by which they would be permitted to decide whether they wished a communist or some other type of government and in any case no outside power should force a given type of government on them.
- This conversation was summarized in telegram 1183 to New Delhi, Apr. 13. (751G.00/4–1354)↩