Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 238

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) and the Counselor (MacArthur)

top secret

[London,] April 12, 1954.

Subject:

• Joint Action in Southeast Asia

Mr. Robertson and I met this morning with Mr. Denis Allen and two other officials of the UK Foreign Office to discuss the problem of what might be done with respect to united action in Southeast Asia to prevent that area from falling under Communist domination.

Mr. Allen said that in the light of the discussion between the Secretary and Mr. Eden last night he thought that an informal exchange of views on the following might be helpful:

(1) A tripartite statement (US–UK–French) which might be issued at the conclusion of Secretary Dulles’ trip in the three capitals. It would, of course, have to be discussed with the French, and the final text should have tripartite approval. (Mr. Allen, on an informal basis, handed us at the end of the meeting a draft statement which is attached to this memorandum.)¹

(2) It would be useful to set down on paper an outline which might serve as guidance in defining what sort of collective security system was envisaged; the countries which might participate and how the approaches to appropriate countries might be made.

Mr. Robertson and Mr. MacArthur said that following the Secretary’s conversation with Mr. Eden last night, they had drawn up, at Secretary Dulles’ direction, a draft declaration of common purpose which the nations whose security and vital interests are threatened by Communist expansion might sign. (A copy of this draft is also attached to this memorandum.)² The purpose of the draft which was being given to the UK very informally was to indicate the lines along which we were thinking. If we were in general agreement on the concept contained therein, the question of how best to get on with this project could be discussed.

Mr. Allen expressed great reserve and doubted that the UK would wish at this stage to issue such a declaration. He said that for UK internal political reasons as well as for general world opinion it was important not to take any definitive action prior to Geneva which would give the impression that decisions had been made with respect to Southeast Asia which foreclosed the possibility of a successful negotiation on Indochina at Geneva. After reading through the US draft declaration Mr. Allen said he felt it would raise serious questions in the mind of HMG. The declaration seemed to involve a guarantee to restore the territorial integrity of Indochina. This was a commitment of a very substantial nature, and he doubted that HMG could undertake such a course of action, at least until after efforts for settlement had been explored at Geneva. The US declaration appeared to him a commitment to clean up the Communists in Indochina, and if the UK and others undertook such a commitment they would have to see it through successfully.

He also thought there were some differences in the estimates of the United States JCS and the UK Joint Chiefs regarding Indochina. In the first place, such a commitment would involve sending forces into Indochina which, in turn, might result in an all-out war with China, possibly involving the use of atomic weapons. In any event he felt the British Chiefs’ estimate of the possibility of overt Chinese reaction to joint action by us in Indochina was much higher than the US-JCS rated it. In such circumstances world war might even result if the Soviets honored their commitments under the Sino-Soviet Treaty. Furthermore, the British Chiefs feel that if we intervene in Indochina air and sea power will not do the trick and inevitably there will be a demand for ground forces.

Mr. Robertson and Mr. MacArthur pointed out that it was all very well to try to have a successful negotiation at Geneva, but we were not clear as to what sort of solution the French themselves envisaged, nor indeed what sort the British had in mind. In so far as the United States was concerned we were opposed to any settlement which directly or indirectly turned the area over to the Communists. We did not see how we could be associated with such a settlement. Did the British hold a similar view? This seemed important to establish.

Mr. Allen said that the British did not have any good solution in mind. Among the alternatives which they had examined the territorial division of Vietnam seemed the least bad. If a settlement on this basis were arrived at hostilities would come to an end and then through a joint declaration the areas of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos as well as other appropriate states in Southeast Asia could be covered by the proposed joint declaration for united action if further aggression occurred.

In summary, Mr. Allen and his associates seemed to find great difficulties in any kind of joint declaration covering Indochina. He said that if hostilities were not actually in full course there it would be different. Mr. Allen commented that the joint declaration we had in mind involved guaranteeing all of Southeast Asia right up to the frontier of China, whereas if the guarantee covered areas where hostilities were not taking place, the commitment would be less, the risk of spreading war would be less, and the Chinese acceptance of the fact that further aggression or penetration would not be accepted and would be met by united action would be much greater.

It also seemed clear that, tentatively at least, the British have recently begun thinking about some kind of collective system of security similar to NATO for Southeast Asia. In this connection Mr. Allen said that one way to get along with consultations with like-minded people who wish to save Southeast Asia was to establish a working group similar to the old NATO group (which for over a year worked on the formulation of the Treaty prior to its signing in April 1949). Such a working group could explore all the possibilities and perhaps eventually come up with a Treaty. It was pointed out to Mr. Allen that time was of the essence and that if we had to negotiate for months before we could have a Treaty, which in turn would have to be ratified before common action could occur, the area would probably be lost.

Mr. Allen then tabled the draft tripartite statement mentioned on page 1 of this memorandum. Mr. Robertson and Mr. MacArthur gave the personal reaction that it didn’t seem to meet the purposes which we had in mind.^*

The meeting then adjourned with the participants joining Mr. Dulles and Mr. Eden in the latter’s office.³

[Annex 1]

Draft Statement Submitted by the British Representatives

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[London, April 12, 1954.]

(Note: This paper was given informally to Mr. Robertson and Mr. MacArthur at meeting April 12, 1954)

Draft Statement

On the conclusion of Mr. Dulles’ visit to London and Paris on April 12 and 13, for the purpose of carrying forward in discussions with Mr. Eden and M. Bidault the consultations which have been taking place between the three Governments in preparation for the Geneva Conference, the following statement was issued in the three capitals.

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have been following with concern the course of the recent heavy fighting in Indo-China. The new scale and nature of Communist rebel operations, especially the concentrated attack on Dien Bien Phu, has been rendered possible only by increasingly massive support from China. It is evident that an attempt is being made to win military victories, regardless of the cost in human life, in the hope of influencing the course of events at the Geneva Conference.

The three Governments affirm that they will not allow the prospects of the Geneva Conference to be prejudiced by this manoeuvre. They declare their joint interest in the security, welfare and independence of the three Associated States, as well as the other states in South-East Asia menaced by Communist imperialism. Their conduct at the Geneva Conference will be governed by this joint interest in a spirit of common resolution and mutual co-operation. It will not be influenced by attempts at military coercion.

[Annex 2]

Draft Declaration Submitted by the United States Representatives

top secret

[London, April 12, 1954.]

Declaration of Common Purpose

(Given informally to Denis Allen (UK) as indicating present U.S. thinking)

The Governments signatory hereto,

Desiring to assure the independence of the States of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia which are now subject to armed attack and invasion by forces which serve international Communism;

Realizing that this threat endangers not only those now directly involved but endangers the peace and security of the entire Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific area where they have vital interests; and,

Convinced that the situation calls for their exercise in this area of the inherent right of collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;

I

Declare

1. That if the lands of any of them in the Southeast Asia and Western Pacific area fell under the domination of international Communism that would be a threat to the peace and security of them all;

2. That they will combine their efforts to prevent such threat;

3. That they have no aggressive purpose against any state.

II

For the purpose of carrying out this Declaration they hereby agree to seek the creation of a collective defense arrangement to maintain peace and security in this vital area, and pending the organization of such a collective system to establish:

A political council composed of the Foreign Ministers or their Deputies of the subscribing governments; and

A military committee, composed of their military representatives, to advise the Council regarding the measures required to accomplish the purposes of this Declaration.

III

They will request the United Nations to send a Peace Observation Commission to the area and to take such further action as is appropriate to maintain international peace and security in the area. Meanwhile, measures taken by the signatory governments pursuant hereto shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

The adhesion of each government is subject to its constitutional processes.

1. See Annex 1 below.
2. See Annex 2 below.
3. (At the meeting later in the afternoon Mr. Dulles told Mr. Eden he did not enthuse over the draft tripartite declaration and it was accordingly shelved.) [Footnote in the source text.]
3. The meeting between Dulles, Eden, and their advisers regarding Indochina and Southeast Asia on the afternoon of Apr. 12 is described in telegram Secto 1 from London, Apr. 13, p. 1319.