Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

711.5611/4–954

Memorandum by the Counselor (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State

top secret
eyes only

[Washington,] April 7, 1954.

Captain George Anderson (Special Assistant to Admiral Radford) asked to see me this morning on a “delicate matter”. He gave me the following information on a most confidential basis, which he said Admiral Radford wished conveyed to Secretary Dulles:

The “advance study group”¹ in the Pentagon has been making an estimate of whether atomic weapons could be used to clean up the Vietminh in the Dien Bien Phu area. It has reached the conclusion that three tactical A-weapons, properly employed, would be sufficient to smash the Vietminh effort there.²

This study in turn raised in Admiral Radford’s mind the question of whether in the event of establishment of a coalition in Southeast Asia, in which the US participates and commits forces, we could use atomic weapons on the Vietminh if this seemed the best means of smashing them and cleaning up Indochina.

In the event we are successful in forming a coalition in Southeast Asia, Admiral Radford wondered whether we could not go to the French and get their approval for using atomic weapons in Indochina if this became necessary when the coalition was participating in operations. His feeling was that if we could get French acceptance of the principle of the use of such weapons, the whole conception of gaining acceptance of their use would be assisted. Furthermore, if we got French approval in principle after the coalition was formed but before we actively committed forces to Indochina, we could later use such weapons when our forces (air) were engaged.

Admiral Radford had discussed this briefly with Secretary Wilson, who said Admiral Radford should lay the matter before Secretary Dulles and seek his views.

Captain Anderson on a personal basis asked me if I had any reactions and I said that it raised in my mind very serious questions affecting the whole position of US leadership in the world. My own frank guess would be that the French Government would not agree or accept the responsibility for using an A-bomb. Furthermore, if we approached the French, the story would certainly leak and become public knowledge. The fact that we were considering such steps in Indochina would in turn cause a great hue and cry throughout the parliaments of the free world, and particularly among some of our NATO allies, notably the UK. This in turn might result in parliamentary pressures on governments to seek assurances from us that we would not use A-weapons without consultation, particularly in those countries that were joined with us and had forces contributed to collective defense arrangements such as NATO. Furthermore, in addition to the Soviet propaganda, many elements in the free world would portray our desire to use such weapons in Indochina as proof of the fact that we were testing out weapons on native peoples and were in fact prepared to act irresponsibly and drop weapons of mass destruction on the Soviet Union whenever we believed it was necessary to do so. The state of mind in the UK, at least, on this general subject had been demonstrated in the parliamentary debate of last Monday. Finally, I said that if there were collective effort in Indochina and the Chinese Communists then intervened overtly, that would be a different matter, but the proposition which was in Admiral Radford’s mind to use these weapons in Indochina itself obviously raised questions which the Secretary would have to consider and inform Admiral Radford of his views. I emphasized, of course, that the above reactions were purely my own personal reactions to the proposition.

It was left that when the Secretary could see Admiral Radford he would let him know.³

Because of the sensitivity of this matter, I made only this original of this memo and one copy (which is in the hands of S/S). I have asked that the copy in S/S be shown to the Under Secretary, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Merchant, Mr. Bowie, and Mr. Robertson on a hand-carry eyes only basis.⁴

Douglas MacArthur II

1. Reference is to the Joint Advanced Study Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The records of the Committee have not been found.
2. In his memoirs, Richard Nixon writes the following: “In Washington the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under their Chairman, Adm. Arthur Radford, devised a plan, known as Operation Vulture, for using three small tactical atomic bombs to destroy Vietminh positions and relieve the garrison. Both Eisenhower and Dulles, however, felt that nothing less than overt Chinese Communist aggression would be sufficient provocation for our going into Vietnam in any such a direct and unilateral way.” (Memoirs of Richard Nixon, p. 150)
3. The source text is accompanied by an undated handwritten note by O’Connor of S/S to MacArthur which read as follows: “Sec did not want to raise this now with Adm R—& the latter I gather did not raise it with the Sec.” The source text is attached to a memorandum for the file by MacArthur dated Apr. 9, which read as follows: “I called Captain George Anderson (Special Assistant to Admiral Radford). I said I was leaving with Secretary Dulles for Europe tomorrow and wanted him to know I had passed on to the Secretary the information Captain Anderson had given me (see attached memorandum). I said that the Secretary had said an opportunity to talk to Admiral Radford about this would undoubtedly occur some time and I thought we could leave it to the two of them to get together when appropriate.”
4. Chits accompanying the source text indicate that a copy was transmitted to Under Secretary Smith on Apr. 7 and had been seen by Murphy, Merchant, Bowie, and Robertson by May 5.