751G.00/4–754: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
niact
3756. Limit distribution. As Bidault had asked to be informed personally at any time during the night if a definite reply was received to [Page 1273] request in my 3738,1 I saw him first thing this morning and gave him Secretary’s message contained in Deptel 3512,2 as well as information that definite answer on my 3738 could be hoped for later today.
He then stressed to me that Navarre expected a renewed attack on Dien-Bien-Phu between middle and end of this week and that any additional help, to be fully effective, should be in place and in use before end of week.
(Comment: If US military should decide on alternative offer of lighter type planes, I believe it important that these planes start moving immediately toward Indochina without waiting for formal acceptance of offer by French).
Bidault then commented on paragraphs 2 and 3 of Secretary’s message and said that he could well understand necessity for congressional support and need to interest other nations in joint action in order to assure congressional support. He said, however, that Dien-Bien-Phu had become a symbol of war to Vietnamese, to Navarre personally, and to French people here. If Dien-Bien-Phu should fall he felt that it would be an irreparable blow to Vietnamese morale and probably also to Navarre’s morale and to French public opinion. In that event it would be most unlikely that either Associated States or France would be willing to continue war even with full American military support. Bidault said that personally he would do his best to prevent a French withdrawal and that he would personally never negotiate with Ho-Chi-Minh. He said that we must realize, however, that his personal views on subject were not typical of French public opinion or of government as a whole.
He then said that Navarre was becoming nervous and overtired because basis of all his planning had been upset by arrival in Indochina of Chinese men and material from Korea. This had upset and discouraged him almost to point of defeatism.
(Comment: This information regarding Navarre must be held in absolute confidence.)
In view of above, it seems clear that if Dien-Bien-Phu should fall we run grave risk of losing French and possible Vietnamese support for any future action which we might envisage taking in Indochina area.