Office of the Historian

Ridgway papers

Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, United States Army (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret
[Washington,] 6 April 1954.

Subject:

  • Indo-China.
1.
Currently approved United States Government objectives would regard:
a.
The passing of the countries of southeast Asia into the Communist orbit as of grave concern to the United States, and
b.
The loss of Indo-China to the Communist orbit as leading to the loss of the other countries of southeast Asia to the Communist orbit.
2.
The attainment of the United States objective of keeping Indo-China out of the Communist orbit is, therefore, of grave concern to the United States and to the free world.
3.
The problem now confronting the United States and the free world is how to attain this objective.
4.
The JCS have a responsibility for stating the military measures which in their opinion it would be necessary to take to attain the foregoing objective.
5.
Such military measures should be on as broad a multi-national basis as possible. Only under the most extreme circumstances, if at all, should the United States take such military measures alone.
6.
Moreover, while the retention of Indo-China on the side of the free world is a major objective, it does not follow that the military measures required to attain that objective would find any decisive objectives in Indo-China itself.
7.
The immediate and major source of Viet Minh military power is Communist China. With that source destroyed or neutralized, the Viet Minh would cease to present a major military problem to the French in Indo-China.
8.
It therefore follows that consideration of the military measures required for the attainment of the objectives stated should go far beyond consideration of mere intervention by armed forces, both United States and allied, in Indo-China. Such use of United States armed forces, apart from any local successes they might achieve, would constitute a dangerous strategic diversion of limited United States military capabilities, and would commit our armed forces in a non-decisive theatre to the attainment of non-decisive local objectives. The greater the United States military forces so employed, the greater would be the advantage to the true sources of Communist military power—Communist China and the USSR. I can see no adequate military justification for such action, nor for the greatly increased risks of general war so incurred.
9.
On the contrary, if the United States Government should determine the existence of a situation in which the loss of Indo-China and in turn the rest of southeast Asia to the Communist orbit requires the use of allied armed forces, including our own, in order to avoid such loss, then I would conclude that:
a.
The United States Government, with the concurrence and support of as many of its Allies as it can obtain, should inform Communist China and the world of its intentions to employ its armed forces to destroy or to neutralize the sources of Viet Minh military power, unless Communist China halts military aid to the Viet Minh.
b.
The United States enlist fullest possible military support of its Allies.
c.
Initiate mobilization and supporting actions, unless the response of Communist China is thoroughly satisfactory.
10.
I recommend that these views be noted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the accompanying memorandum1 forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.
M. B. Ridgway
General, United States Army
  1. The accompanying memorandum is not attached to the source text and has not been identified.↩