Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/6–352: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State

top secret

Paris, June 3, 1952—8 p.m.

7532. Dept pass Saigon. Repeated info Saigon 419, London unnumbered. Saigon tels 2218, May 10 and 2224 May 12 and Deptel 6843 May 9[19] (Saigon 1789).

1. Emb agrees with Heath on necessity action revitalize IC situation as we are otherwise likely to face merely continuation present drain on French, accompanied by ever present danger Fr decision cut losses in IC. Program suggested by Heath should, however, be viewed against background Tunisian and Moroccan situations and what appears to be fairly widespread Fr resentment against “US intervention”. Program carries with it danger further Fr resentment of what might be considered another instance “US intervention”.

2. Emb is of opinion that if we are to be able to influence French to carry out program along lines suggested by Heath, with which we are in general agreement as means revitalizing situation to common benefit, we should propose such action at same time we discuss with Letourneau at Washington question increased US aid. As stated in Emb‘s comment on Department’s position papers on possible Fr request for additional aid and background paper on IC (memo handed to Ridgway Knight at time recent tripartite talks here),¹ Emb believes we should have frank exchange views at time increased aid discussed and not repeat previous procedures of piecemeal approaches to Fr on IC policy questions. By linking discussion Heath‘s suggested program with discussions increased assistance, we are more likely obtain some acceptance our views and thus make them more palatable to Fr Govt and Natl Assembly. If Fr accept our suggestions for program of this nature, our responsibility as result of our having taken lead will be considerable and one of our major tasks will be make every effort insure Vietnamese do their share and not look upon Fr actions as signs weakness calling for efforts obtain further concessions.

3. While specific question was not raised by Fr during tripartite talks here, Fr Govt may have in mind possibility both material and financial aid IC national armies and this may have occasioned their interest in problem flexibility US legislation.

It will be recalled that in past Fr have suggested possibility US financial assistance pay maintenance costs IC natl armies.

4. Re specific points in Heath‘s suggested program, Emb believes following observations pertinent to situation:

(a) On basis record to date Bao Dai does not appear capable stepping out in front and revitalizing Vietnamese efforts by his own activities. Burden, therefore, must fall on members his govt and newly-formed govt² may represent genuine nationalist elements who, it is hoped, will subordinate internal rivalries to larger interests their country and concentrate on real enemy instead of on emotional criticism of and opposition to French, Bao Dai‘s influence over and open support such elements could be decisive contribution. There is, of course, danger excessively independent action vis-à-vis French in order enable Viet Govt show it is truly independent. While this is in sense unreal in view essential Fr mil and financial responsibilities for keeping IC out of Commie hands Fr might be persuaded to give Viets more flexibility of action in order achieve revitalization needed if they, and we, are to succeed in IC. This would logically require Fr commitment go much further than in past toward evolution position Assoc States in Fr Union, as well as concrete action as evidence their intentions. Some of points suggested by Heath for Fr program would tend achieve this result.

(b) Vietnamese already for obvious psychological reasons put too much emphasis on their international position. Paucity first-rate Vietnamese and expense involved argue against their increasing their dipl representation abroad unless clearly in natl interest do so. Aside from US, UK and Vatican, only countries where Vietnamese would actually gain by representation are Asian.

(c) Emb believes we should go slow on emphasizing formation popularly elected Assembly. It would have to be clear advantages outweigh disadvantages. Latter include possibility mere trappings democratic forms with none of substance in period when firm hand and minimum bickering needed. While popularly elected Assembly might provide emotional outlet and have psychological benefits, it might degenerate into mere debating forum for irresponsible criticism of both Vietnamese Govt and Fr and end up by paralyzing rather than facilitating action. Similar caution should be exercised in case trade unions in view their possible infiltration by Viet Minh adherents and use as powerful and potentially explosive weapon against govt.

(d) Question use US advisers is most delicate. Department will recall Article IV of March 8 accords (Auriol—Bao Dai exchange letters) which gives priority Fr Union nationals as advisers, technicians and experts. This point would have to be approached very gingerly as Fr likely view introduction US advisers as wedge US economic penetration and as this might revive apparently dormant Fr fears US intention supplant Fr in IC.

In conclusion, it should be remembered Fr have, in official public statements and press comment, given impression France bears IC burden alone although IC conflict is one of common interest to western world. If we are to ensure continued Fr effort IC and at same time suggest to Fr Govt program which could be construed at Paris, particularly in Natl Assembly and Fr press, as a form of “US intervention” in a scene where France bears burden almost alone, we must be prepared for Fr expectation that we are as ready to give assistance as we are to offer advice.

From conversations with FonOff and Min Assoc States officials, we have received impression favorable Fr reaction to tripartite talks with particular emphasis on 2 points: Possibilities increased aid for nat armies and prospect further polit-milit talks, accompanied by re-examination conclusions ad hoc committee by which Fr set great store.

Dunn

1. Document SCEM D–5/1c concerning a possible request by France for additional aid is described in footnote 4, p. 156. For SCEM D–6/11, the background paper on Indochina, May 21, see p. 150. The memorandum handed to Ridgway B. Knight (Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, who accompanied the Secretary of State on his trip to Bonn and Paris) has not been identified in Department of State files.
2. On June 2, Chief of State Bao Dai dismissed the government of Tran Van Huu and designated Nguyen Van Tam, Minister of the Interior, as the new Premier. For information on the new government, see telegram 823 from Hanoi, June 10, p. 177, and telegram 2532 from Saigon, June 15, p. 188.