Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.5/6–352: Telegram

The Chargé at Saigon (Gullion) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Saigon, June 3, 1952—11 p.m.

Unnumbered. Pass for action to OSD; info to CCFS (attn G–2), CNO, CGUSAF, Chief MAAG France, CINCPAC Pearl Harbor. Mr. John Allison (Asst Secy State) for Min Heath.¹ From Chief MAAG Saigon IC. Cite MG–3618 A. CSA attn G–2. Chief MAAG sends signed Brink.

1. The issue of mil opns in IC is still in doubt but conditions have improved in the past yr as US mil aid has arrived in time and in sufficient quantities to prevent the Viet Minh from moving into power. Moreover US mil aid has placed the Franco VN forces in a pos which assures the safety of the principal cities and critical areas of IC from Viet Minh seizure.

2. The Franco—VN forces are now in possession of both power and mobility as a result of receiving US tanks, arty trks, air and naval craft, and radio equip brought into IC during the past year. It appears that no Viet Minh unit, up to even div strength, particularly within the Tonkin Delta, can withstand the concerted attack of such equivalent Franco—Vietnamese forces with the equip now avail, without being destroyed.

3. The prob now is create troop strength which must be provided by the further development of the size of the Assoc States armies. It is a slow process but it is being done. To achieve internal peace it is estimated that the Fr and Assoc States forces must be increased to the troops strength which served as the basis for the FY ’53 program, i.e. France 221, 505, Vietnam 155, 829, Laos 14,443, and Cambodia 13,412. A strictly mil solution to the whole IC prob does not appear possible. The probs are combined mil, polit and social. The govts of all three states are young, comparatively weak and lack experienced administrators in all echelons. Complete polit autonomy is yet to be achieved and all three states are in part dependent upon France financially. Polit unity has not been achieved in Vietnam. These in turn seriously affect the development of Assoc States armies.

4. The rainy season is just beginning in Tonkin, Cochin China and most of Cambodia. The characteristics of weather and terrain will be unfavorable for extensive mil opns there for approx five months. Overland movement of troops and mil equip will be difficult during the wet season and wheeled vehicles will be gen confined to improved roads. This period is usually one of reduced mil activity and has been generally a period limited to small scale actions. The full support of the combat and transport air forces cannot be employed during this period and the use of naval craft for transport and fire support becomes more valuable. The Fr now will be better able to operate in the wet weather compared with last year because of increased numbers of US water craft. However, increased use of naval mines by Viet Minh forces cld materially reduce this advantage in naval craft. Ground troops are for the most part canalized on roads and dikes but will be able to operate in conjunction with naval craft during the rainy seasons. Such conditions may be unfavorable to the Viet Minh because guerrilla tactics of infiltration are neutralized and units must concentrate in villages surrounded by water which renders them vulnerable to artillery fire, naval fire and air attack. They can, however, recruit and train in their villages.

5. No large-scale operations by either the Viet Minh or the French Vietnam forces are to be expected during the rainy season either in the Tonkin Delta area or the lowland areas of Cochin China and Cambodia. However, limited operations can and probably will be conducted by both the Fr Union and the Viet Minh forces. The Fr Union forces will be in a superior position as stated above. Because heavy rains will not start in central Annam and plateau area until September, continued enemy action there may be expected.

6. Various clean-up operations by the Fr—Vietnam forces in the Tonkin Delta area since the withdrawal from the Hoa Binh area in Feb 1952 have been reasonably successful in clearing the Delta of Viet Minh large regular forces. Two Viet Minh separate regiments and four battalions from regular divs are now inside the perimeter. Other factors such as weather, troop fatigue and movements to base outside the delta have reduced the number of Viet Minh units within the delta. These clean-up operations have greatly reduced the Viet Minh threat to the vital Hanoi—Haiduong—Haiphong line of communications.

7. The Fr—Vietnam withdrawal from the Hoa Binh area slightly reduced def perimeter, re-established the Fr—Vietnam mobile, reserve and placed these forces in position to strike within the delta or meet an attack against the perimeter elsewhere. The Hoa Binh withdrawal however also released the Viet Minh 308th and 312th divs from combat and they have had over three months to recuperate, refit, recruit and train. They are now located northwest of Hanoi and in a position to strike from either the north or west against that city. One or both of these divs cld move eastward to support the 316th div now north of Hanoi in acting as a screen for an attack by the CCF. Both the 308th and 312th divs are now rated as combat ready. No info is available as to their plans of action.

8. Troop strength of the opposing forces in the Tonkin Delta area are approx equal but the Fr and VN are better trained, equipped, fed and have better medical facilities. The Fr control the air. There is no Viet Minh airforce or navy. However in recent months Viet Minh anti-aircraft fire has increased somewhat in the Tonkin Delta area both in quantity and accuracy. This new factor may force the Fr to modify their tactics for both air transport and bombing and strafing. The Fr navy controls the seacoast of IC but is unable to definitely stop all smuggling and troop movement by sampans, junks and other small craft. Some beginning of resistance by peasants to Viet Minh infiltration, conscription and rice collection in the Tonkin Delta area is reported. The morale of the Viet Minh troops however is still high.

9. The present Fr airlift capabilities are still inadequate. By assembling all their transport type aircraft they can achieve a one-flight two battalion lift, providing they cease all other essential transport activity. Additnl air transport for a one-flight lift of a combat team, the equivalent of four small battalions seems essential to achieve surprise as to time, place and strength for the destruction of weaker Viet Minh units. The presently programmed C-47’s and proposed movement of JU–52 aircraft from France will finally provide the additional planes needed.

10. The aircraft carrier Arromanches and its escort the destroyer Malin have returned to France for overhaul during the rainy season bringing a reduction in air strength and mobility. Absence of the aircraft carrier will materially reduce naval effectiveness particularly in off shore surveillance and combat air action. The date for return of these vessels is not known.

11. The development of the Assoc States armies is progressing but not at the rate originally scheduled. Progress has been delayed by lack of funds and training cadres for these armies. Originally the Vietnamese planned to org four additional divs during 1952 but later reduced this schedule to two for budgetary reasons.

12. Vietnam now has infantry battalions sufficient for four divs and has five additional battalions assigned to the fifth and sixth divs which are now being formed. Equip for these latter two divs is included in the FY ’52 program and delivery is expected before the end of 1952.

13. Native units are being used as both static troops and as part of mobile striking forces. Their use as static troops releases Fr forces for mobile opns. The VN bns in the Tonkin Delta area have proven to be competent combat units, particularly when working with Fr units. An increasing number of platoons, companies and bns are being officered by VN. Lack of trained senior officers with senior command and gen staff training and experience continues to be the major bar to the development of independent Assoc States armies. No service school has yet been estab to provide such training.

14. Consideration of info avail from all sources here in IC at this time leads to the fol conclusions:

a. Fr Union forces can continue to hold the areas they now occupy in IC during the next six months and can conduct ltd local opns. Barring CCF intervention this shld be a period of relative inactivity, particularly in the all-important Tonkin Delta area.

b. By the end of the rainy season (Oct), if US and Chi aid to the combatants continue at the present rate, the Fr Union forces will have a relatively slight advantage and can possibly launch a moderately large opn.

c. If the Chi materially increase their aid to the VM during the rainy season with no increase of VM strength, to include a minimum of anti-tank weapons, anti-acft arty and mines the Fr Union forces shld still be able to hold their present occupied areas.

d. Contd Chi aid to the VM under either “b” or “c” above for one year wld not seriously affect the relative capabilities of the combatants. Increasing MDAP deliveries and increased development of the Assoc States armies wld more than off-set such CCF aid. For decisive action the CCF wld be forced to bring in several divs and attack in mass. At present in face of a Franco—VN attack the VM forces avoid combat by breaking up into small groups and dispersing rapidly, disappearing in the night and later reorganizing at a predesignated place. As long as they continue this method they will be difficult destroy.

e. The addition of a VM airforce comparable to that now used by the Fr Union forces wld not be decisive. Such resistance wld, however, materially reduce the freedom of air movement now enjoyed by the Fr Union forces but a VM airforce similar in size and composition cld not attain air superiority. Loss of freedom of the air wld force the Fr Union forces to materially change their combat and supply tactics. To date wide use has been made of Fr air for movement of mobile striking forces and for resupply. Tactical support and bombing wld be similarly affected since a greater percentage of fighters now used for ground support wld be employed in their primary role as fighters. The Franco—VN forces have developed a high degree of mobility particularly in the Tonkin Delta area, extensive use of parachutists, movement by fast naval craft and truck units. Introduction of an airforce by the VM wld seriously reduce this mobility. Ground troops might be forced move in more dispersed formations.

f. The addition of a VM airforce of comparable size to the present French force, but incl MIG–15’s wld result in loss of air supremacy to the Fr. The Fr forces now possess no air units capable of effectively intercepting jet type acft. If the Viet Minh, aided by the CCF, commit MIG–15’s it will undoubtedly be by surprise concentrated attack on the Tonkin Delta installations. The Fr VN forces do not possess adequate air warning system to give quick warning of such an attack. The effect of such a surprise attack might be to neutralize Fr airforce and at least partially destroy army, navy and airforce installations. Over the past year there has been a continual improvement and expansion of army, navy and airforce installations incl large supply and ammunition bases and two additional airfields, in the Tonkin area. The bulk of all US army and a considerable portion of the navy and airforce MDAP equip is located there.

15. The present Fr Union forces in IC have the fol capabilities in case of a CCF intervention in the Tonkin area in conjunction with the present Viet Minh forces.

a. Against a force of not more than three divs supported by air incl MIG–15’s they may be able to hold the Haiphong and Hanoi perimeter areas with great difficulty and at the same time hold all other areas now occupied in IC.

b. Against a force of five divs supported by air, incl MIG–15’s they wld be unable to hold the Tonkin Delta area. Such an attack, launched with speed and surprise, wld probably result in the isolation of Hanoi, except by air, by cutting the vital Hanoi-Hai Duong-Haiphong line of communications and the capture of both Hanoi and Haiphong. Evacuation of mil personnel wld be virtually impossible and the bulk of mil equip in Tonkin wld be lost.

16. Tonkin is the key to IC and the main def against CCF invasion. With its fall the loss of the bal of IC wld only be a question of time.

Gullion

1. On June 2, Minister Heath departed from Saigon for consultation in Washington, arriving June 10. He visited Paris en route.