751G.00/6–152: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
2371. Rptd info Paris 734, Hanoi unnumbered. I saw Bao Dai at Banmethuot yesterday.
He was pleased over his Hanoi trip. He had ordered that school children shld not be turned out for his arrival thereby gaining blessings of parents. He had also ordered Gov not to round up “lot of peasants” to line streets and he had stipulated that route he wld follow from airport shld avoid main streets. He also ordered no welcome banners or posters be displayed. Nevertheless, people turned out in great numbers and enthusiasm then [than] on his previous highly organized visits. He was pleased with Gov Binh and thought latter was making good progress.
He was extremely dissatisfied, however, with governorship of Ly1 in Annam who was “bien pauvre sire” (a weak type) whom he wld shortly get rid of. Security had gravely deteriorated in Annam. To some extent this was due to fact that regional militia no longer had local tactical autonomy as they had in time of Gov Giao but it was also due to inability of govt to influence and advise Fr Commander in Annam.
It was great mistake (1) for Fr to exercise exclusive tactical local command and (2) to expand reg army at expense of equally needed expansion of regional militia and police. It was true that Viet had no “grand strategists” and there was [in] sufficient consultation on level of Bao Dai and Def Min on plane of high strategy. But in local tactical situations Vietnamese counsel and command participation were urgently required.
I remarked that his Chief of Staff, Gen Hinh was opposed to expansion of militia and suggested that Bao Dai shld work out that problem direct with Hinh. Bao Dai said that it was true that Hinh still saw things too much from Fr mil angle and there was an actual conflict of views between Hinh and latter’s father, Interior Min Tan [Tam] over use of militia and police. It was only Viet troops, militia [Page 167] and police who cld effectively undertake “pacification” of liberated area. The Fr African troops shld not be stationed in such areas since they cld not be effectively restrained from pillage and rapine. Fr seemed unwilling or unable to enforce discipline in this respect in their colonial troops and it was sad fact, that Vietnamese troops entirely under Fr command were now committing the same excesses as did African soldiers.
Reverting to his Hanoi trip, Bao Dai said he had been greatly disappointed in Tri. He had “dangled” before the latter the prospect of prime ministership. Tri had replied the only solution was an ultranatl govt and according Bao Dai had intimated that unless he, Tri, were entrusted with formation of such govt, there wld be disaster by end of year. Bao Dai said that attitude of people like Tri and Ngo Dinh Diem was utterly unrealistic and defeatist. Fr were carrying fin and mil burden and must continue to do so for two or three years. The urgent requirement was therefore to get along with Fr. Both Tri and Nguyen [Ngo] Dinh Diem were intoxicated with illusion of their personal popularity. Their popularity was not real. Tri had predicted that Tonkin wld fall apart if he were removed as gov. Nothing of the sort had occurred. Huu was also making vague threats about what wld happen if he were removed. Actually nothing wld happen. Bao Dai here interjected that he wld probably make a brief trip to France in June. I inquired whether govtl changes might be expected before his departure. He indicated that there might be but did not directly commit himself.
In talk later with Nguyey [Nguyen] De, the latter was confident that there wld be govt changes before Bao Dai‘s departure but he also avoided stating what changes wld be beyond saying that he felt sure “his” candidate for Min of Info, ex-gov Giao would be in office within few days.
De reiterated Bao Dai‘s statement re the prime necessity of working for Fr stating that when Fr and Western influence were withdrawn process of disaggregation wld begin immed in Vietnam. Viet had bright future but it now needed Fr and Western help.
Bao Dai‘s Adjutant who returned with me in plane volunteered same thesis on beneficence of Fr contribution and influence and stupidity of so-called natls who thought Vietnam cld be saved without Fr help.
I was rather struck with fact that De and Adjutant who in past frequently expressed criticism of Fr action to me are now, as has Bao Dai in my last two interviews insisting on necessity of “getting along” with Fr.
- Tran Van Ly, Governor of Central Vietnam.↩