Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 108
United States Minute of Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting With France and the United Kingdom at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, May 28, 1952, 10:30 a.m.1
SCEM MIN-2, Part One
Participants:
- France:
- U.K.:
- U.S.:
Subject:
- Indochina
Mr. Pinay: We welcome the foreign representatives and the French Government is happy to have an opportunity to study with them the problems under consideration.
Mr. Schuman: It has been agreed to begin with the discussions of Indochinese and Far Eastern matters. There are two problems relating to Indochina: (1) military and financial aid, which has been gone into previously, and (2) the general strategic problem, which should be examined now.
Mr. Pinay: Former Prime Minister Faure raised at Lisbon the question: Do our Allies consider Indochina a specific French problem or an international problem?
Mr. Pleven: The policy expressed yesterday in the EDC treaty15 calls for a rapid increase of French military power. What are the obstacles? The first is the size of the French effort in Indochina, which is not just for the protection of French interests but for the protection of a point of strategic importance in Southeast Asia. A rapid increase in French military power also faces financial obstacles. France can use only ⅔ of its military expenditures for European defense. 447 billion francs will be used this year in Indochina, leaving only 830 billion francs for Europe and North Africa. France must build up more divisions. Manpower is no problem but there is the problem [Page 159] of cadres. 8209 of our regular officers and more than 40,000 of our regular NCO‘s are in Indochina, thus immobilizing in Indochina 26% of our regular officers and 37% of our NCO‘s. If Indochina were defended purely for French interests, it would not be worth the effort. As is true of Korea, we are, however, defending an area of interest to the free world. France has tried to find solutions. I discussed these matters with President Truman when I was in Washington and Marshal de Lattre also discussed them during his visit to Washington.16 If it is not possible to find a total solution, we have tried to find at least a partial solution by the creation of Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian national armies, with, of course, the help of the French army. Our object is to build up national armies which would total 174,000 for Vietnam, 16,000 for Cambodia and 17,000 for Laos. There would be approximately 200,000 men in these armies. Progress has been made in this regard. However, almost the whole of the burden has been borne by France. United States aid has been greatly appreciated. Up to April 1952 US aid of an estimated value of 124 billion francs has been delivered to Indochina, but if this aid remains within these limits France cannot do more. The military situation is now comparatively satisfactory and Mr. Letourneau will give more details. The Indochina problem is intimately linked to the European problem and this raises the EDC question. French military strength must be increased and French forces must be equal to or greater than German forces. Therefore, Indochina is at the heart of the problem of European defense.
Mr. Letourneau: During the 18 months since the French have with Bao Dai worked on building up the Indochinese national armies, 40 Vietnamese battalions have been created. At present 20 of these battalions have more or less no French officers; 24 battalions have territorial responsibilities; and 11 battalions have engaged in combat operations. Their performance has been very satisfactory, including those battalions with only Vietnamese officers. Since the end of last year the Vietnamese General Staff has been formed with a Vietnamese General named as Chief of Staff. The following are the limits on French action in this connection:
- (1)
- Financial—The Vietnamese army in 1952 received only 17 billion francs from the Vietnamese Government and France must make up the difference between that and the 100 billion francs called for in the Vietnamese budget.
- (2)
- Cadres—The Vietnamese national army has 1449 officers and 6181 NCO‘s. It is calling up certain categories of students for reserve [Page 160] officer training. Vietnamese Government cooperation has been good and it has now extended this training period from four months to 12 months.
- (3)
- Arming and equipping the Vietnamese army—We are very grateful for United States aid, without which the Vietnamese army could not have achieved its present development. The 150th ship delivering United States aid recently arrived at Saigon and the amount of aid now delivered is above the figures given by Mr. Pleven.
France still has, however, the major military responsibility. We are pleased with the cooperation of the Associated States. The decision by Marshal de Lattre to build up these national armies caused some concern here but the risks have been overcome, at least for the present. Cambodia now has an army of 10,500 men including 90 officers and 850 NCO‘s, consisting of 6 battalions and one parachute unit. Laos has an army of 9,650 men, including 85 officers and 500 NCO‘s, consisting of 5 battalions and one parachute battalion. The chief problem is that of training higher officers; it is much easier to train the subordinate officers.
With respect to the military situation, in January and February the situation in the north was a cause for concern. The Hoa Binh evacuation was not understood in the international press. French Union troops there were immobilized and the Vietminh were able to infiltrate the Delta. The purpose of the evacuation was to permit the use of these previously immobilized troops. At that time there were 25,000 regular Vietminh Troops in the Delta. All the Vietminh regulars in the Delta have now been more or less cleared up and the “Bataille du Riz” is turning in favor of the French Union forces. In central and south Vietnam and in Laos and Cambodia the situation is less disquieting and there are no Vietminh regular units of any size.
With respect to Communist China considerable aid is still coming to the Vietminh and the Vietminh are unable to recuperate in Chinese territory. Vietminh cadres have been trained by Chinese Communists. The Vietminh forces now show signs of weariness. They are finding it difficult to replace their losses and their troops are now of an inferior quality and include many new young soldiers. The French command feels that the present situation is favorable to inflicting further losses on the Vietminh but with Communist China in the background we cannot foresee the possibility of any decisive military action in the near future.
Mr. Pleven: There are two points in the Indochina problem which I wish to raise. Do our Allies regard the French effort as one for French national considerations or for Allied interests? Do our friends feel that the French sacrifices for the defense of this area are justified by the political and strategic importance of that part of the world? [Page 161] We have obtained no clear reply to these questions although they have been previously brought up, for example, by General Juin at Washington. If it is felt that the global strategic effort should continue, France cannot continue to bear alone such a considerable share of this burden.
Mr. Schuman: It is not a question so much of how much aid and support France might receive. It is now not just a matter of aid but of cooperation and association in a common cause, a distribution of the burden and of strategic responsibility.
Mr. Pinay: Could we have a reply to Mr. Pleven‘s questions?
The Secretary: To repeat Mr. Pleven‘s question: Do France’s Allies regard the French effort in Indochina as purely in French interests or in general Allied interests and What is the strategic importance of Indochina. I can say for the United States that there is no question in our minds. The French effort is not made in purely French interest but in the general international interest. The same is true of the United States effort in Korea and the British effort in Malaya and Suez, which has caused difficulties with Egypt. They are all made in a common interest and all have great consequences in international terms, all intimately affect the efforts of each in other parts of the world. In each situation the initial responsibility lies with the United States in Korea, with France in Indochina and with the United Kingdom in Malaya and the function of the Allies is to aid and support in all possible ways. “Does the United States regard the French effort as of great strategic importance?” The answer is “Yes”. It is essential for our security not just in the Far East but also in the Middle East and Europe. Failure would have important repercussions in Japan, Korea, Indonesia, India and perhaps in the Middle East.
Mr. Eden: I am impressed by the French efforts to create the Vietnamese national army. There is a close relation between, the United Kingdom situation in Malay and the French problem in Indochina and I am pleased that Mr. Malcolm MacDonald has had close contacts with Mr. Letourneau. These are parts of the world-wide struggle and the United Kingdom must also keep open lines of communication as of vital importance to all these efforts. The Malayan problem is essentially a Chinese problem. The United Kingdom accepts the importance of Asia. Each of us must carry some burden in addition to our European burden—the United States in Korea, the French in Indochina and the United Kingdom in Malaya and Suez—and each must aid the other to the extent possible.
The Secretary: The United States thought it a wise decision when it was decided to create the Vietnamese national army and we have in the past given vigorous support. We would be happy to go into the question of increasing our aid to the Associated States armies. [Page 162] (Discussion at this point indicated that the French objective was to create 8 Vietnamese divisions and that the Vietnamese now have six divisions.) These armies are not an immediate solution but they point to the road to follow, the creation of forces to maintain their independence and to relieve the French forces in Indochina. We are impressed with the importance of the Associated States national armies and will be willing to go into the question of increasing our aid with Mr. Letourneau in Washington. It should be noted that deliveries of aid are already constantly increasing. I am not able today, because Congress is now considering the bill for aid, to discuss figures. If the bill gets through Congress—although it may be reduced in amount, we will use every effort to hold down the reductions. I believe it will permit an increase in this aid. There are two matters for discussion: (1) What will be the nature of the aid—that is what is to be furnished. and (2) the amount. We can talk in Mid-June better than now and should have some figure to deal with, although it may not be final.
Another matter we might discuss with Mr. Letourneau is whether our MAAG is effective and how it can be improved. Mr. Heath and General Brink will be in Washington during Mr. Letourneau‘s visit and we would be interested in having Mr. Letourneau‘s suggestions in this regard.
Mr. Pleven: This raises the question of legislative flexibility and of the form of the bill in Congress and whether the American administration can increase the aid. It seems that in the past one hindrance to aid to the national armies has been the legislative restrictions. It is impossible for France to increase its effort in Indo-China and the French Government desires to free the appropriations for Indo-China for use in Europe.
The Secretary: Mr. Nash17 says that he believes that the present bill has increased flexibility and that we can move in that direction, away from purely military items. Petroleum products, for example, might be possible.
Mr. Letourneau: Before I proceed to Washington and in order that may be prepared for discussion, can the American Embassy at Paris keep me informed regarding the measure of legislative flexibility and regarding what items we can discuss in Washington?
The Secretary: That can be done. I suggest that Mr. Letourneau tell us what items the French Government has in mind.
The next question is what should be the attitude of the three powers if the situation becomes worse and the Chinese Communists take a more active part in the IC conflict. As I said to Mr. Schuman and Mr. Eden at Lisbon, the United States Government would work to [Page 163] clarify in its own mind its position preparatory to discussion with the UK and France. We are now prepared to go forward with discussions, politically, militarily or in any other way, for working out a joint position. Tentatively, it is the U.S. position—and we agree with the French and the British that the important thing is to prevent rather than act afterwards—to issue a joint warning to the Chinese Communists. We can later discuss whether it should be public or private. We think it important to talk about what we should do if the warning is disregarded and that it is dangerous to issue a warning without knowing what we would do if it were disregarded. We would agree that whatever conclusions are reached they should be kept secret in order to leave the enemy in doubt. I suggest in a preliminary way that what we do not be limited to resisting, for example, in Indo-China a Chinese Communist attack. Action should be taken against the Chinese Communists. We cannot necessarily agree on all action in all eventualities but initial action at the outset should be considered. For example, attacks on lines of communications contributing to the attack on Indo-China and naval action. We should first discuss these matters in political talks and then in military talks, perhaps at Paris. While not wishing to anticipate the military talks, the United States would not be able to contribute ground forces for Southeast Asia but would expect to bear a considerable share of the air and naval effort. It is essential that no leaks occur regarding the fact that we are considering such a warning.
Mr. Eden: As I stated at Columbia University, Chinese Communist aggression in Indo-China should be considered as comparable to that in Korea and the United Nations would take measures in that event. We could not be committed now regarding military action to be taken by the United Nations. I hope that no such aggression takes place and the question of issuing the warning needs further discussions. I reserve my position and would wish to discuss this matter with my colleagues.
Mr. Schuman: I thank Mr. Acheson for what he envisages in this connection and agree in the main. This problem is independent of things we have discussed in the past. Like Mr. Eden, I hope that no such aggression will occur but sudden aggression is not impossible. The Ad Hoc Military Committee at Washington18 studied this question but the other Governments’ views are not known to us. It is very wise to prevent action but the timing and form of the warning should be discussed as it might provoke an attack. It should not enable the enemy to use such a warning as a pretext to extend the conflict.
[Page 164]Mr. Letourneau: The French Government approved the conclusions of the Ad Hoc Committee about one month ago but we do not know the political views of the US and the UK. If the US and the UK could examine these conclusions and tell us, it would be useful to know their political conclusions. Mr. Eden referred to United Nations action, but as the Minister responsible for Indo-China I would like to note the permanent danger we face there—although not immediately probable. We must prepare our defense in the event of aggression. The United Nations procedure is lengthy and in the meantime we would face mortal danger to our troops and civilians. Therefore, the political and military talks should include immediate measures along the lines of the Ad Hoc Committee recommendations.
Mr. Eden: As I said at New York, United Nations action is envisaged. I cannot personally commit my Government now. But Mr. Acheson has suggested that all these matters be included in the talks.
Mr. Pinay: With respect to the principles set forth by Mr. Acheson, I am in agreement. Each of us—the United States in Korea, the UK in Malaya and France in Indo-China—has its individual problems and responsibilities but each is part of the overall and we must note the disparity of our means. France has fought in Indo-China for six years and we feel that we are justified in asking for aid.
The proposed warning to the Chinese Communists might start or extend the war. China is a huge country with hundreds of millions of people. As in the last war bombing did not end the conflict but only a massive landing rid us of the Germans. Air action is not enough and there seems no possibility of ending the war. Korea proves this. I should like to ask if the US and the UK have considered whether negotiations might possibly end the war.
Mr. Eden: I agree regarding the desirability of being ready to negotiate, but the example given by Korea is not promising. The US has been very patient and the concessions have all been made on the United Nations side. Mr. Acheson suggested the issuance of a warning for consideration and it is worth considering and examining the possibility.
The Secretary: Sudden large scale intervention is probably not likely, but increased US aid may be followed by increased Chinese Communist aid. It might, therefore, be advisable at some point to say to the Chinese Communists that this must stop.
Mr. Pleven: I wish to ask again regarding the US and UK views regarding the conclusions of the Ad Hoc Committee. These are extremely important if sudden aggression should take place. We have the problem of evacuation of civilians. There has been no Vietminh air force to date but an armistice in Korea might free the Chinese Communist air force. Creation of the national armies decreased the [Page 165] chances of Chinese aggression by lessening the propaganda value to them of having white Europeans to attack. It removes a weapon from them in terms of propaganda.
Mr. Eden: I cannot comment on the Ad Hoc Committee conclusions except to say that they have been examined.
The Secretary: The Ad Hoc Committee actually presented no recommendations but reached different conclusions. No political guidance was given to the military members of this Committee. We might give tentative guidance or suggestions under certain hypotheses to the Committee and then the Ministers could later examine these problems in their ensemble.
Mr. Schuman: The psychological point is very important—aid could be foreseen if aggression occurred—but it is important to know plans are being made.
Mr. Pleven: The constant preoccupation of the military in Tonkin is the possibility of a flood of Chinese across the border. The means of transportation and the evacuation of civilians are important and there are points in the Ad Hoc Committee’s conclusions regarding the use of ports useful in organization of evacuation.
Mr. Letourneau: I suggest that we reach agreement on these conclusions of the Ad Hoc Committee, which did not give rise to differences of opinion, and for further progress political guidance should be given and an exchange of views should take place to that end.
The Secretary: It is best to examine the Ad Hoc Committee conclusions again. We can pick out certain points and say proceed with these and on other parts we could prepare tentative guidance for the military and thus clear up the difficulties. We will get up something and submit it to London and Paris to serve as guidance for the military.
Mr. Pleven: We have the responsibility of defending the EDC Treaty before the National Assembly and, if we are not able to show increased French participation, we will have difficulty in obtaining ratification, in obtaining approval for the military budget and for continuation of the effort in Indo-China. It is essential that our friends know that we must have a reply with respect to increased aid for the National Armies as quickly and as generously as possible.
Mr. Pinay: The French Government is unanimously behind Mr. Pleven in this statement. You must realize that the French public is weary and tired of the Indo-China war.
Mr. Schuman: There is considerable apprehension regarding the EDC in France and Germany does not have the Indo-China burden, thus establishing a disequilibrium. Germany will receive US aid without having to apply it to Indo-China. These are questions which will be raised in the National Assembly.
[Page 166]Mr. Pinay: We have exposed our views very frankly and have explained our concern. Mr. Letourneau will be able to proceed further with these questions in Washington. I ask that you take into account the political difficulties that Messrs. Pleven and Schuman will have to face in the National Assembly.
- Secretary Acheson was in Paris from May 26 to May 29. Other conversations in which he participated, dealing with European problems and Southeast Asia, are documented in the appropriate compilations in volumes V, VI, and XII. The discussion on Indochina was summarized in telegram 7415 from Paris, May 28, not printed. (751G.00/5–2852)↩
- Henri Queuille, Vice-Premier of France.↩
- French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.↩
- Guy Le Roy de la Tournelle, Director General of Political and Economic Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.↩
- Felix Gaillard, French Secretary of State for Finance.↩
- Jean Sauvagnargues, Officer in Charge of German Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.↩
- British Ambassador in France.↩
- Deputy Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office.↩
- William Hayter, British Minister at Paris.↩
- Frank Roberts, Deputy Under Secretary of State (German Affairs), British Foreign Office.↩
- Charles Shuckburgh, Private Secretary to Eden.↩
- George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.↩
- Theodore C. Achilles, Minister at Paris.↩
- Ridgway B. Knight, Acting Deputy Director, Office of Western European Affairs.↩
- The Treaty establishing the European Defense Community was signed by the Foreign Ministers of six European nations in Paris on May 27. For documentation on this subject, see volume V.↩
- Documentation on the discussions on Indochina which occurred during the visits to the United States of René Pleven (then Premier) in January 1951, and of General de Lattre de Tassigny in September 1951, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1951 vol. vi, Part 1, pp. 332 ff.↩
- Frank C. Nash, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.↩
- The report of the Ad Hoc Committee of military representatives, Feb. 5, and related documentation are included in material on general United States policies with respect to the East Asian-Pacific area in volume xii.↩