Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 110

Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

top secret
SCEM D–6/11

[Washington,] May 21, 1952.

Background Paper on Indochina for Discussions with the French and the British

1. The U.S. recognizes the fact that French efforts in Indochina are a major contribution to the defense of the Free World against communist aggression, to the security of the Far East, and to the common objectives of France and the United States.

2. The U.S. realizes that the role which France is now playing in Indochina is indispensable to the preservation of the area from Communist control and to the development of indigenous strength and stability in the Associated States.

3. The U.S. understands the burdens which France is carrying and the sacrifices which France is making in Indochina. The U.S. shares with France grave concern over the continued drain on French manpower and treasure arising from the Indochina struggle, and the difficulties which the French effort in Indochina places in the way of the development of military strength and economic well being in France itself.

4. The U.S. shares with France the determination that these French burdens and sacrifices will be alleviated by the development, under French leadership, of indigenous political capabilities, a sound economy and military strength in the Associated States.

5. We understand the difficulties which are offered to the development of the Associated States by: the slowness of the States Governments to assume the responsibilities which have devolved upon them from the French; the lack of strong indigenous leadership; the apathetic and “fence-sitting” attitude of the bulk of the population; the lingering suspicion on the part of the population of regimes which they conceive to be supported by their former colonial masters; the difficulty of training administrative personnel; the failure of factional and sectional groups to unite in a concerted national effort; and the lack of diplomatic support from other Asian governments. We also understand the difficulties in terms of shortage of officers, apathy of the population, recruiting problems, and training problems which must be overcome in building up the national armies of the Associated States.

6. We believe that the key to the development of the strength of the Associated States lies in the development of these Indochinese armies. We believe that political stability will in large measure flow from the development and maintenance of strong national armies. We believe such armies will represent an attribute of sovereignty and independence which will be most apt to capture the imagination of the indigenous population. And it is only through the development of such armies that the burden on French military manpower can be lightened and that the Associated States will eventually be enabled to maintain themselves without major external assistance.

7. We are therefore prepared to undertake a special program of assistance to the national armies with the objective of assisting the French to develop them at a more rapid rate to a level of increased strength. We conceive of this program as one which involves development of divisions over and above those presently programmed or planned for the national armies and which would involve U.S. assistance over and above that presently programmed for the French and Associated States effort in Indochina. Subject to Congressional action, we are prepared to contribute such assistance as can be usefully and efficiently devoted to such a program, to an upper limit of $250,000,000. We are prepared to undertake such assistance to the French in the training of the National armies, as, after discussions with the French and the Associated States, may prove to be appropriate and desirable. We will welcome French views as to the practicability of a program of more rapid development of the National Armies, the magnitude and rate of increase in strength which are feasible, and the best ways of proceeding with such a program and of applying U.S. assistance to it most effectively.

“Footnote: It is understood that we would be prepared, if necessary, to shift up to $250 million from other economic and military aid programs for fiscal year 1953, largely from Title I, to the Indochina program. The ultimate apportionment of cuts must be made after the NATO annual review.”

8. We believe that, to be successful, the increase of the National Armies must be supported and accompanied by progress in the general political, economic, and social development of the Associated States. We believe, and would like to be confirmed in our belief, that the French will give sympathetic consideration to such views as the U.S. may have to offer on the various problems connected with the general development of the Associated States. We would like to feel free to discuss with the French our views on such matters as: the possibility of further French statements on the hopes which France holds for the evolutionary development of the Associated States; the possibility of undertaking such changes in the organization of the French representation in Indochina as may be conducive to an increased feeling of responsibility on the part of the Associated States; further development of the March 8 and Pau accords; possible lines of development of the relationships within the French Union which have to do with Indochina, and ways in which the U.S. can cooperate with the French in publicizing developments in Indochina. We should also like to feel free to discuss with the French and with the Associated States such matters as the ways in which Bao Dai can contribute more effectively to the development of Vietnam; the possibility of early formation of an Assembly and a gradual increase of its powers; methods of increasing efficiency and decreasing corruption in the governments of the Associated States; methods of promoting land reform, agrarian and industrial credit, sound rice marketing systems, labor development, foreign trade, and capital formation. In sum, we would like to be assured that our views on any aspect of the Indochinese situation may be offered in the expectation that they will be given sympathetic consideration.

9. We have no doubt that the French Government is firm in its intention to continue to carry out the mission with which it is charged in Indochina. We believe that official and public reassurances by the French that they have no intention of abandoning or compromising their mission in Indochina would be useful in removing the unwarranted suspicions of possible French negotiations with the Vietminh which might otherwise handicap the development of confidence on the part of the Associated States, and lessen the effectiveness and possibilities of U.S. assistance.

10. We recognize the dangers to the French and Associated States and to the British position in the Far East which are inherent in the existence of a hostile and aggressive Communist China and in the possibility of Chinese Communist aggression. We estimate that it is highly improbable that the Chinese Communists would undertake large scale action against Indochina without having the firmest assurances of support from the USSR. We do not believe that the USSR is willing to accept the grave risks of general war which could grow out of such a Chinese Communist action. We believe for these and for other reasons, that a Chinese Communist attack on Indochina now is improbable. We also believe that development of the general strength of the Associated States with the combined support of the Western Powers can eventually diminish the possibility of such an attack.

11. We believe that the possibility of Chinese Communist aggression against Indochina would have the gravest of consequences, that such aggression would be met by immediate and resolute action on the part of France, the United Kingdom, and the U.S., and that it may not be possible to limit the scope of such action.

12. The U.S. is prepared to join in such a warning. It believes that such a warning will lessen the possibility of a Chinese aggression against Indochina. It must be recognized by the French and the British, however, that the delivery of such a warning by the three powers, would carry with it the obligation to take necessary action in the event, however unlikely, that the warning was disregarded by the Chinese Communists. In this event the U.S. would feel obligated, and would hold its allies obligated to undertake the necessary actions.

13. The U.S. believes that the minimum necessary reaction to a Chinese Communist attack on Indochina would include: a resolute defense of Indochina itself to which the United States would provide such assistance from its Air Force and Navy as might be practicable but no ground forces; air attack on Chinese Communist communication lines; and possibly a naval blockade of the Chinese Communist coast. The United States would expect to provide the major force for the latter two tasks but would expect its Allies to provide at least token forces therefor and to render such other assistance as is normal by Allies. The U.S. believes that there should be a common view between it and its Allies as to what would be involved in the minimum necessary reaction to a Chinese Communist attack on Indochina before the three powers join in delivery of a warning against such an attack.

14. The U.S., in the event of a Chinese Communist attack on Indochina, would, together with its Allies, undertake what it believes to be the minimum necessary reaction to such an attack, but would have no desire to undertake general hostilities against Communist China. However, as long as hostilities continue in Korea, the strategic relationship between Korea and Southeast Asia must be recognized. It is obvious, however, that if hostilities were to arise out of overt Chinese Communist aggression there could be no guarantee that the Chinese Communists might not, by their own actions, make it necessary for general hostilities to be undertaken in counteraction to Chinese Communist measures. It is necessary that there be understanding between the Allies that if such general hostilities become necessary it would be incumbent upon all three Powers to take common action.

15. The U.S. is no less reluctant than the French or the British to undertake actions which might lead to USSR intervention. Even if general hostilities with Communist China become unavoidable the U.S. will still, to the degree that it may be feasible, follow a course of action designed to minimize the likelihood of USSR intervention. We believe that the USSR will be less likely to make war over China alone to the degree that the Western Powers refrain from the conduct of operations against China in areas of China proximate to the USSR.

1. This paper was one in a series prepared as background information for the use of the Secretary of State in discussions with the British and the French during his forthcoming trip to Europe (May 22–30) in connection with the signing of contractual agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany. The paper was a revision of the draft prepared by Charles C. Stelle of the Policy Planning Staff, dated May 15, which is described in footnote 1, p. 144. The covering memorandum of explanation accompanying the source text states that this paper had been approved by the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Office of the Director for Mutual Security. It had been amended in accordance with the views and comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (see JCS memorandum of May 19, supra). (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 110)