Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/5–2352: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

top secret

Washington, May 23, 1952—7:06 p.m.

Telac 2. For the Secretary.¹ Fol is text of memo addressed to you by FE² which failed to receive concurrences of G and SP until after your departure: Subj White House Conf on May 19 with Pres, Mr. Lovett and Gen Bradley re Indochina and Berlin. Text fols:

It is believed that for purposes of reconciling the various briefing and background papers pertaining to IC which have been prepared for your forthcoming discussions in Paris and Bonn it wld be useful if the fol résumé was submitted for your guidance.

It is our understanding that at the White House Conf referred to above it was agreed that the subjs to be discussed with the Fr and Brit re IC cld be reduced to four major topics:

(1) We are in favor of further development of the natl armies of the Assoc States and are prepared to furnish further assist toward that end.

(2) The Fr and Brit shld be informed that we are in favor of the issuance of a warning to Commie Chi concerning further aggression in SEA and wish to work out the context, time and method by which specific internal changes in IC except as they re financial aid to Fr This means, among other things, that we will agree to take part in the tripartite mil conversations which will undoubtedly be proposed.

(3) As large a measure of agreement as is possible shld be reached re the reaction to be anticipated from the Peking regime fol the issuance of the warning and the courses of action open to the US, UK and Fr if the warning statement is ignored.

(4) We will seek to avoid engagement with the Fr concerning specific internal changes in IC except as they re financial aid to Fr for development of the natl armies and form a basis for the discussions to be held in Wash with Min Letourneau in June.

No reference was made at the White House to the possibility that you might be faced with a request from the UK that we agree to bilateral mil conversations with them prior to the trilateral conversations.

It was stated that you wld avoid ref to any specific sum in referring to additional financial aid to be provided to the Fr.

It was also stated that you wld seek to avoid any detailed discussion of the mil aspects of retaliation, referring such matters to the proposed trilateral mil conversations.

Aside from the above observations, the briefing papers included in your book dealing with this subject

1. SCEM D–5/2b “Southeast Asia” (as amended May 20)³

2. SCEM D–5/1c “Possible Fr Request for Additional Aid” (as amended May 20)⁴ are to serve as negot papers, and the background paper

SCEM D–6/11, May 21, “Background Paper on IC for Discussions with the Fr and Brit” (as amended May 20 fol receipt of views and comments of the JCS)⁵ as a background paper.

Bruce

1. Secretary of State Acheson left Washington on May 22 for Bonn. He was in Paris from May 26 to May 29, returning to Washington on May 30.
2. This communication was directed to the Secretary of State by John M. Allison, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, on May 21.

3. SCEM D–5/2b read in part as follows:

   “Position to Be Presented:

   “It is recommended that the Secretary advise the French and the British that the U.S. Government will be prepared to continue military staff discussions of these problems [measures for the defense of Southeast Asia] at an early date on a tripartite basis (probably at Paris). He may add that U.S. participation in these discussions is agreed to. He may add that, as both British and French Governments already know, it is the intention of the U.S. to make the largest contribution in the military (short of the use of ground forces), political and economic sense to the stabilization and defense of Southeast Asia consistent with its great commitments elsewhere.” (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 110)

4. SCEM D–5/1c, not printed, recommended that in view of the interest of the United States in French fulfillment of their NATO commitments and in the continuation of the French effort in Indochina, the Secretary of State should indicate, should the French raise the issue, that the U.S. was willing to consider with France what means might be available to increase aid in calendar year 1952, in connection with the development of the national armies of the Associated States. An annex to the paper summarized the existing status of the national armies. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 110)
5. Supra.