611.51G/5–2052
The Secretary of Defense (Lovett)
to the Secretary of
State
top secret
Washington, 20 May 1952.
Dear Mr. Secretary: There is inclosed a memorandum
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which sets forth their views and comments on
the State Department Draft “Postion Paper on Indochina for Discussions With
the French and the British”, dated 15 May 19521
I concur with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, I should like
to make it explicit that the concurrence of the Department of Defense in
Paragraph 8 of the basic paper is without prejudice to the further
development in the National Security Council, in connection with NSC 124,2 of a more
constructive long-range United States policy toward Indochina.
Sincerely yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the
Secretary of Defense (Lovett)
top secret
Washington, 19 May 1952.
Subject:
- State Department Draft Position Paper on Indochina.
- 1.
- Reference is made to your memorandum of 16 May 1952,3
forwarding a Department of State draft position paper on Indochina.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied this position paper and their
views thereon are set forth below.
- 2.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff, although concurring generally with the
basic paper, consider that it contains certain statements which
[Page 148]
could be taken as an
implication that the United States would accept the basic French and
British military concept of operations to meet overt aggression by
Communist China in Indochina. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
find two United States military commitments which they feel should
not be accepted without qualification. In addition, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff note that the paper contains certain material of an
intelligence nature which cannot be wholly supported and which
therefore should be amended. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
feel it to be necessary to suggest certain specific changes in
language which follow (changes indicated in the usual manner):4
- a.
Change the fourth sentence of paragraph 7 to read:
“We will undertake to make
every
effort
to provide the
necessary military equipment for such a
program.”
Reason: It would be injudicious to
convey the impression to France and the United Kingdom
that the United States will make “every” effort to
provide such equipment inasmuch as our efforts will of
necessity have to be consistent with our commitments
world-wide. As originally written, the statement implies
strongly that a program for Indochina might receive a
priority as high or higher than Korea and United States
defense needs;
- b.
Change the fifth sentence of paragraph 7 to read:
“We are prepared to undertake such assistance to the French in the
training of the national armies as, after
discussion with the French and Associated States,
may prove to be appropriate and desirable.”
Reason: To remove any implication
that the United States is assuming French
responsibilities in this area.
- c.
Change the third, fourth, and last sentences of
paragraph 10 to read:
“We do not believe that the USSR is ready
willing to accept the
grave risks of general war which could grow out of
such a Chinese Communist action. We believe, therefore
for these and for other
reasons, that a Chinese Communist attack on
Indochina now is
improbable. We also believe that development of
the general strength of the Associated States with the continued support of the
Western Powers can eventually diminish the
possibility of such an attack.”
Reason: (1) The Joint Chiefs of
Staff doubt if current intelligence would support the
statement quoted above as to the readiness of the USSR
for general war. On the other hand, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff would not object to a statement as to the probable
unwillingness of the USSR in this regard;
(2) The change in the fourth sentence recommended above
is made in the interest of accuracy. For instance,
despite the importance of
[Page 149]
Indochina, it is unlikely that its
present economic and strategic importance both to
Peiping and Moscow is great enough to dictate a
large-scale Chinese Communist invasion;* and
(3) The last sentence could be taken to imply that the
indigenous peoples of the Associated States could
develop sufficient general strength which of itself
would be a deterrent to aggression. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff consider that the importance to the Western World
of Indochina is such as to require a clear understanding
of the necessity of rendering continued political,
economic, and military support to insure the integrity
of that area;
- d.
Change the second sentence in paragraph 13 to read:
“The United States would expect to provide the
major force for the latter two tasks but would
expect its Allies to
render
such
assistance
as
might
be
practicable
to provide at least token
forces therefor and to render such other
assistance as is normal by allies.’
Reason: The Joint Chiefs of Staff
consider that participation by France and the United
Kingdom in all phases of the action against Communist
China is necessary in order to give proof of the
military solidarity of the Western World and to avoid
the implication of unilateral action on the part of the
United States against the mainland of China. Further,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff would expect that United
States forces would be accorded the right to use certain
British and/or French bases and facilities as
appropriate to or necessary for the conduct of the
operations against the mainland.
- e.
Change the first sentence of paragraph 14 to read:
“The U.S., in the event of a Chinese Communist
attack on Indochina, would, together with its
Allies, undertake what it believes to be the
minimum necessary reaction to such an attack, but
would have no intention
of
undertaking
desire to undertake
general hostilities against Communist China.”
Reason: The original statement is
categorical as to United States intentions and if taken
out of context would tend to commit the United States to
a policy of refraining from general hostilities against
Communist China under any circumstances. The recommended
change will bring the sentence into consonance with the
remainder of the paragraph;
- f.
Insert a new second sentence in paragraph 14 to read:
“However, as long as hostilities continue in
Korea, the strategic relationship between Korea
and Southeast Asia must be recognized.”
Reason: In order not to overlook
the fact that a direct connection exists between
operations in both areas.
- g.
Change the last sentence of paragraph 15 to read:
“We believe that the USSR will be less likely to
make war on
the
Western
powers over China
alone to the degree that the
Western Powers refrain from the conduct of
operations against
[Page 150]
China are
designed
to
strike
against
Chinese
Communist
capabilities
to
wage
war
in
the
particular
areas
involved;
i.e.,
to
minimize
or
avoid
provocative
attacks
on
in areas of China
proximate to the USSR, and
to
the
degree
that
the
USSR
does
not
believe
that
the
Peiping
regime
is
threatened
with
destruction.”
Reason: As originally written the
sentence is so broad as to be subject to diverse and
contradictory interpretations. Taken together with the
preceding sentence, it can be construed as inhibiting
any action on the part of the Western World other than
that confined to the battle area, a restrictive concept
which is wholly unacceptable from the military point of
view. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the
British and French could rationalize this sentence as
unqualified support of their concept of operations in
Indochina, which is limited to a resolute defense in the
battle area. In any event, as originally worded it is an
assertion of Soviet intentions which can be made
self-serving according to whatever interpretation is
placed upon it.
- 3.
- Subject to the modifications set forth in the preceding paragraph,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the basic paper is
a suitable statement of the United States position with respect to
Indochina.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N.
Bradley
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff 