751G.00/5–1052: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
2216. Rptd info Paris unn, Hanoi unn. Fol summary views of newly arrived dipl counselor, Min Offroy:
- 1.
- Principal task French is to find means reducing commitment and way break present deadlock Indochina. He impressed by fact that [Page 130] leaders both in and out of govt (he cited De Gaulle,1 Pleven, Mendes-France) all told him present sitn cld not continue. Before becoming Pres Council, Edgar Faure had told him that unless Amers wld help actively France cld not carry on. FonOff expects him make recommendations for FonOff policy Indochina. Offroy says no hope whatsoever of mil solution and uncertain that ground can be held against Commie penetration and subversion of not only Tonkin but SE Asia neighbor states. He not impressed by partial successes of recent clearing operations in Tonkin delta.
- 2.
- To break stalemate, psychological shock required. He thinks Letourneau has mandate to seek “du nouveau” in all his actions.
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Offroy’s own principal suggestion for getting politico-mil sitn off dead center is tripartite declaration by French, Brit, and US of community of aims in SEA. Three principal points wld be (a) achievement of independence of SE Asian countries; (b) security; (c) improvement living conditions and econ life.
Such declaration of aims need not necessarily imply prior agreement on guarantee of frontiers of SEA. Statement wld be in nature of Pacific Charter (cf Atlantic Charter) rather than Pacific Pact. Altho it might be prelim to collective security arrangements.
He has submitted long memo to Letourneau on this proposal.
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With respect internal Indochina sitn, Offroy subscribes to accelerated evolutionary idea. He has noted recent declaration and actions of Templer2 in Malaya and believes something analogous cld be attempted here. An evolutionary declaration confirming France’s desire give even greater autonomy to Associated States wld be desirable. In order get tripartite declaration of type described, Offroy feels French wld be willing go very far—indeed much further than Leg has considered that French sld be urged—in giving such assurances.
(Comment: When it observed to Offroy that it difficult to reconcile this analysis of French intentions with Letourneau’s insistence continuity in Fr policy, including March eight agreements, and Letourneau’s own identification with French policy, Offroy said it his personal opinion that need to revise sitn and demands French public opinion wld weigh more heavily.)
In any case, whether or not declaration forthcoming, Offroy thought concessions were to be made. He felt he did not yet know enough about Indochina however, to be sure that they wld have desired effect. This certainly also Letourneau’s view. For example, Letourneau had told him he wld like give Norodom Palace to Bao Dai but that it wld then become empty shell like Imperial Palace in Hanoi unless Bao Dai wld live in it.
- 5.
- Although he not anticipating US decision with respect to action in event Chi invasion, Offroy hoped that sitn in Indochina cld be internationalized to extent that token contingents of Occidental powers, including US, might participate in Indochina on pattern of Fr battalion in Korea. Letourneau had told him, however, that US infantrymen was thing “we wld never get in any circumstances”.
- 6.
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In sum, Offroy appears believe that best French can hope for is holding operation. Only hope of relief being polit solution and assault on VM morale, possibly to be hastened by tripartite declaration and symbolic internationalization of kind he proposes. He believes that French polit warfare and propaganda in Indochina has been wretched. Problem is, of course, difficult one since task of French is “to convince Viet that they going to stay in Indochina at the same time as they try to convince them they are going to get out”. In other words, Viets must be convinced that France and Huu not going to withdraw and leave country in lurch, but at same time Viets must believe that France is eventually going to give fuller independence to Vietnam than now stipulated in basic accords.
Another distant hope for relief of strain lies in revival of “Japan as a force”. By this he apparently includes both possibility of use Jap forces here, or development of Jap FE potentials which wld discourage Chi from fon adventure or dissipation of reserves in aid to SEA.
- 7.
- Offroy emphasized that these views of his provisional and exploratory and must be very closely held as it cld not be thought that he was pursuing “personal policy”.
In Legs views, attitude Offroy, Janot, Dannaud, young group now in principal advisory position, indicates desire to revise French policy even while French insist on necessity of maintaining rigid form of March eight accords.