751G.00/2–954
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal)1
eyes only
Dear Phil: I am most grateful that you have taken time from your busy existence to bring us as fully up-to-date on developments in the Indochina field as you did in your letter of January 22.
We await with considerable impatience your information as to the results of top level conversations on whether the general military approach here is sufficient and as to whether preparations can or should be made in the event of a failure of the “enterprise.” We used to say that the war would be won or lost in Tonkin. Now it seems that it will rather be won or lost in Paris. And yet I find it difficult to believe that defeatism and lassitude will so increase in Paris as to cause the French Government to accept some preposterous “peace [Page 1028] offer” of Ho Chi-Minh. Our influence surely should be sufficient to prevent such an occurrence. What is needed right now is what was needed last spring—two extra seasoned combat divisions. If Navarre had them, he could throw them into Thanh Hoa and Vinh, an absolutely key territory for the Viet Minh. The landing of two divisions in that sector would force the Viet Minh to scurry back from their descent on Luang Prabang and probably force them to withdraw their battalions from central Laos. They might be forced into a fairly decisive battle with the Franco-Vietnamese forces, which the latter with their air power and superior fire power desire. But there is no possibility of suddenly producing these necessary two divisions. The untrained, “unblooded”, new battalions of the Vietnamese National Army will not be up to such an operation for some months to come. I suppose it is hopeless to think of a two divisional increase from France, although General Lauzin2 told Rob McClintock that Navarre would request an extra division of Metropolitan troops from Pleven, who arrived here today.
Judging by the Viet Minh military campaign to date it seems that the Viet Minh are anxious not to become involved in a major military engagement during the present dry season. On the contrary, they are apparently, and all too successfully, making the French disperse their forces and thus preventing them from forcing such an engagement. I draw the conclusion, therefore, that the Viet Minh war plan is presently more political than military and more aimed at French governmental and public opinion that at military victory. It is a campaign of attrition carried on in the hope that France will lose the will to continue the fight. It is for these reasons that I stress the need of additional ground troops to force the Viet Minh into action on other than their own terms.
A possibly practical suggestion is, I think, Dejean’s, viz., that the Foreign Legion be increased by six regiments, mainly from Germany, through a stepped-up recruitment program. This would require, as I said in previous telegrams, that Adenauer3 look “the other way” while the recruiting was going on. Neither we nor the French are ready to throw American or Korean battalions into the breach at this time. Yet if we all had the nerve to take this action, this war could probably be brought to a fairly quick close. I do not think China would intervene militarily, and from my personal point of view, if she did, so much the better. We would then take up the war where we left off with the unfortunate armistice in Korea, and we would win it. That is, we would put Chiang Kai-shek back on the mainland in southern China and shake, maybe even destroy, the power of the Chinese Communist [Page 1029] Government, which is only stalling for time to march on, later, to the absorption of Southeast Asia.
To pass on to other matters in your letter, … during the past year the French have increasingly accepted advice and equipment and are training—not as fast as we should like perhaps—guerrilla or counterguerrilla units. The Vietnamese Defense Ministry might before long be able to use help in developing unconventional warfare, but as the Defense Ministry and National Army stand they have about all they can handle at present in forming new regular battalions. I might add that French efforts at training guerrilla or counterguerrilla units are concentrated on the hill tribes, the Thais, Muongs, etc. Because of distrust and unfortunate past experiences, they are not yet trying to develop unconventional warfare units among the Vietnamese. Some units were formed, but they were either no good or were infiltrated by the Viet Minh.
I agree there should be a general review of the national strategy with reference to the entire area. I think that that should be done regularly. There is now, however, no rabbit which we can pull out of a hat. …
I very definitely agree with you that we must not try to force the French to attempt any large scale program of unconventional warfare, particularly when these programs are not practical under the peculiar conditions of warfare here. My telegram no. 13814 tells of Navarre’s irritation over O’Daniel’s attempt to sell him a team of twenty American psychological warfare officers and a remarkable scheme of ringing the Delta with a Maginot line system of barbed wire and additional small posts. When we have some sound and completely practical advice to offer, I don’t think we will have any difficulty in persuading Navarre to accept it. He has, for example, given Colonel Belleux great encouragement in developing guerrilla bands in the Thai country and other places. … Belleux is making good, if far from spectacular, progress. Navarre’s predecessors, De Lattre and Salan, both were very cold to such projects.
I was amused at Joe Alsop’s pessimism. He is an emotional young man. You are quite right in retaining your confidence in the courage and good sense of Navarre, Bodet, Gambiez, Cogny, Castries and company.
Again many thanks for your very valuable letter. Never has an American diplomatic mission had more intelligent and helpful backstopping than that which SEA under your direction has provided this Embassy.
Sincerely,