751G.00/2–1054: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
[Received 2:50 p.m.]
1417. Repeated information Paris 433. We much appreciate fact all top level elements our government are giving serious and constructive attention to Indochina problem. (Deptel 1400.)1 Present military situation is disappointing in that probability of any substantial French victories during remaining three months of dry season seems not bright. On other hand, it is doubtful that Viet Minh can win substantial military victories this season although possibility of their temporarily taking Luang Prabang cannot be dismissed. Nevertheless, on balance, provided Communist China does not step up aid or intervene militarily, it would seem that strategic advantage is on our side, as Viet Minh forces cannot get much stronger numerically, while our forces are every month increasing in numbers and experience. I believe Navarre’s estimate of situation and prospects as given in my 1410 of February 9 (Paris 428) is sound. However, in race against time and French public opinion, possibly this unspectacular improvement of the strategic situation will not suffice to retain that continuing and energetic support by France which is essential if this conflict is to be won.
Answering Department’s specific questions, we have following comments:
- (1)
- It seems doubtful if French can take additional political measures unless some means can be found of persuading Cambodians and as result Vietnamese to go to Paris to negotiate terms of independence under declaration of last July 3. I fail to understand the question whether declaration granting self-determination as to membership in French Union would be helpful locally. Three Associated States can invoke that right as of today in response to French declaration of last July 3. For French or for US to state this fact publicly now might well tend to encourage irrational nationalists to use this offer as springboard to a wild leap into “complete independence” which would really land them in lap of Ho Chi-Minh. Once local politicians commence to orate, they will very likely stampede and come out against membership in French Union, as they did last October in National Congress, and this would most certainly result in French public opinion deciding to wash hands of further effort in this war.
- (2)
- It is possible to secure more active and dynamic conduct of other Vietnamese leaders, but difficult to point of impossibility with Bao Dai. Any improvement in Bao Dai’s performance in these respects will only come about very gradually and partially. Deficient as he is in providing dynamic leadership for a nation at war, it must be remembered [Page 1031] that he has recently been much more active, and effective, in shaping policy and public opinion and in trying to install a government tending toward national union. He is highly intelligent, patient, recondite, Jesuitical, a master of oriental intrigue, and, by his lights, devoted to a national cause which coincides with his own interest. However, in light of these qualities, he is not a man on horseback, and no communication from President Eisenhower or anyone else can change his character. However, at some future time perhaps not far removed, it might be well for the President to send a personal message and in that event, we would be glad to indicate the occasion and suggest some of its content. A more profitable line of endeavor would be to encourage Defense Minister Quat, who shows signs of original and strongminded thinking, and perhaps even young General Hinh, who has energy and courage, if not long years of experience, to produce a truly national Vietnamese army kindled with martial spirit. However, the rallying point here will not be Bao Dai, but possibly Quat, possibly Hinh, possibly Tri.
Most important political measure which could be taken internally, and which would divert attention from monotonous imprecations against France, would be to encourage political energies in preparation for step-by-step development to national elections, a national assembly, a national constitution. Such a program has in fact been announced by President Buu-loc but Buu-loc’s step-by-step progression to that end is probably slower than situation demands.
One other thing that might be done would be return of Empress and Crown Prince at least to Vietnam, latter to take an officer’s course at military school at Dalat and to share to some extent life of armed forces. After a year of such training and service, he could return, if necessary, to higher studies in France or continue them here.