751G.00/2–954: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
1410. Repeated information Paris 428, Hanoi unnumbered. General Navarre told me yesterday that next three months would be difficult. He expected to get through them without suffering some reverses but was by no means certain that this would be case. He obviously was less worried over possibility of losses themselves than effect they would have on Paris’ support of war. He regretted that Viet Minh had given up idea of attacking Dien Bien Phu where he had possibility of inflicting substantial if not decisive defeat. He regretted that unavoidable political considerations had caused him to disperse his forces to defend Luang Prabang. From a purely military standpoint it was “idiocy” to disperse his forces to defend Luang Prabang, but he well understood that if he failed to do so the outcry and consequences in Laos, and next door in Thailand, would be disastrous. He felt that Luang Prabang could be defended against attack of a single Viet Minh division now on its way there. If Viet Minh added another division, say 308th, to this attacking force, successful defense would be very difficult, although far from impossible.
Against considerable French criticism he was insisting on carrying on his operation “atlante” in central Vietnam. Cleaning out of Viet Minh in this portion of central Vietnam was an absolute necessity if Navarre plan was to keep its schedule and achieve decisive military victory in fighting season autumn ’54 to spring ’55. If Viet Minh were not cleaned out from there now, next fall they would mount an operation [Page 1027] against central Laos and Cambodia. He was much encouraged by results of “atlante” operation to date. Inhabitants really welcomed French and Vietnamese troops and they had been able to enlist nearly 1,000 of them as “partisan” auxiliary troops. He had given orders that force engaged in operation was not to yield any terrain since principal Viet Minh propaganda among villagers was that French did not intend to remain. He was also insisting that French troops and officers leave work of pacification to Vietnamese civil officials under Governor Giao. In all his communiques he was referring to “atlante” forces as Vietnamese Army, although as matter fact three-quarters of troops were French Union soldiers.
In conclusion, Navarre said, although he might encounter difficulties, even reverses, in next three months, he was more convinced than ever of essential soundness of his “plan”. He saw no reason to alter it nor did he see why he should not achieve decisive military victories in 1955.
Following our conversation he attended my luncheon for General Weyland, CINCFEAF, and General Fay, Chief of Staff French Air Force. General Fay was deploring losses of French officers in this war. Asserting that one of causes of French defeat in second world war was their officer losses in first war, he said that same thing was happening to French Army in its Indochina operations. He said flatly that France could endure these losses only one year more. Navarre took immediate exception to this. He said that if that were really spirit in which France was engaged in this war it had better pull out now.