Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

Secretary’s Letters, lot 56 D 459

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Drumright) to the Secretary of State

secret

[Washington,] December 26, 1953.

Subject:

• Renewed Invasion of Laos

The Situation

Over the past few days, there have been indications of a renewed Viet Minh invasion of Laos.¹ According to press reports, that invasion has now taken place in considerable force (there may be more than one division of enemy troops involved). The immediate target is central Laos rather than northern Laos as was the case last April. As of 10:00 a.m. Saturday morning, December 26, the following are the known elements of the situation according to press and radio reports:

(1) French Union forces have evacuated and the enemy has occupied Thakkek on the Mekong River, directly across from Thailand. This means the cutting of land and perhaps also river communications between Northern and Southern Laos. It does not pose an immediate threat to the capitals of Laos (Luang Prabang and Vientiane). Vientiane is over 400 kilometers up stream from Thakkek. The nearest French Union base of any importance is at Seno which is some 80 kilometers south of Thakkek. It is understood that this position has been reinforced recently.

(2) The Laotian Prime Minister, Prince Souvanna Phouma has broadcast an appeal to “the conscience, the judgment of all the free nations” and has stated that “the Laotian Government with the help of its friends, shall employ all its forces with unfaltering will to safeguard the integrity, liberty and independence of the Kingdom”. The statement states that the invasion is to “impose the communist ideology upon a people which refuses it and will always refuse it.”

(3) According to the radio, the Thai Government has declared a state of emergency in its northern provinces. The Thai Ambassador here has indicated to Mr. Landon this morning that he expects instructions from his government to approach the U.N. regarding the developing threat to Thailand.

(4) According to the radio, the Moscow Radio has denounced Thailand for “interfering in the Indochina war on behalf of the United States.”

We have been in touch with the Laotian Minister and with the French Embassy here this morning. They have had no information from their governments.

The decisions which face the Department are the following:

(1) Whether to make any public statements regarding the renewed invasion of Laos. You made a statement on May 1, 1953 (Press Release No. 238 attached).² We could draw attention of press to this statement as indicating our continuing attitude. We should probably not make a further formal statement at least until the French Government has made a statement. We might consider the possibility of a message from the President or from yourself to the Laotian King or Prime Minister assuring them of continued support etc.³ (There is no indication as yet of any emergency as regards military supplies.)

(2) Whether again to take up with the French, as you did last April, the question of placing the invasion of Laos before the U.N. You will recall that Mr. Bidault strongly opposed such a move at that time. We should in the near future receive some indication of present French thinking on the subject. A Laotian appeal to the U.N. with French support has seemed highly desirable to us. The French have, however, been unconvinced of its advantages and highly sensitive to the criticism of French “colonial” policies which might ensue without producing any concrete help for France or Laos from the U.N.

(3) Whether to take any position regarding a possible appeal to the U.N. by Thailand on the basis of the possible threat to the Thai peace and security resulting from the invasion of Laos. You will recall that the Thais, in part with our encouragement, were on the verge last spring of making such an appeal but did not do so when the invaders seemed to be withdrawing from the advanced position they had reached in Laos. The French were strongly opposed to any such appeal by the Thais and were resentful of the encouragement they believed we had given the Thais. Under the circumstances, and pending a clarification of the Thai and French attitudes, there is probably no position we can usefully take in this matter other than to recommend informally to the Thais and the French and the Laotians that they exchange views before reaching decisions in the matter. (A Thai appeal to the U.N. without suitable French and Laotian support might well prove of little positive value and might on the other hand focus attention on some of the weaker facets in the free world position in Southeast Asia generally.)

1. The numerous early reports and analysis of the invasion from Saigon, Vientiane, Bangkok, and Hanoi are largely located in file 751J.00. Bonsal addressed briefing memoranda on the subject to Drumright on Dec. 24 (751G.00/12–2453) and Dec. 30 (751G.5/12–3053). In telegram MG 2117 to the Army Chief of Staff via CINCPAC, Dec. 29, General Trapnell, Chief of MAAG Saigon, stated that the initiative was now clearly in the hands of the Viet Minh. (751G.5/12–2953) In a memorandum of Dec. 29 to Robert Bowie, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Edmund Gullion of S/P stated that the invasion was not a serious threat to the overall French military position, but that it could be countered only at a heavy cost to the French strategic reserve and at the expense of operations elsewhere. (PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Gullion”) The invasion was discussed inconclusively at the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting of Dec. 28 (Secretary’s Staff Meetings, lot 63 D 75), and at the 178th Meeting of the National Security Council on Dec. 30 (Memorandum of discussion, Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file). Regarding the initial French reaction, see telegram 2425 from Paris, Dec. 28, infra.
2. For text of the press release, see telegram 2116 to Saigon, May 2, p. 536.

3. At his press conference of Dec. 29, Secretary Dulles addressed the matter of the Viet Minh penetration of Laos. He stated that it was his impression that public accounts had exaggerated the seriousness of the situation, that the invasion should not upset the timetable of General Navarre, and Viet Minh “peace feelers” had not been affected since they had not been sincere in the first place. For text of Dulles’ remarks on the subject, contained in Press Release No. 678, Dec. 29, see Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 11, 1954, p. 43.

   For text of a note handed to the Ambassador of Laos on Dec. 29, see telegram 13 to Vientiane, Dec. 30, p. 935.