Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 177th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, December 23, 19531
eyes only
[Extract]
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About Indochina we must talk optimistically; we have put good money in, and we must stick by it. However, the pessimistic side will [Page 930] be spoken here. The Communists have a sense of history, and time is on their side. The Communist liberation army, or whatever, may have suffered military defeat by the spring of 1955, but we should not base our policies on the assumption that the Communist movement, and the necessity for us to put in very large sums of money to deal with it, will have been dissipated by that time. We will have a situation like that in Malaya, only on a greater scale, for many years—just as long as there is an aggressive China on the border. The key to Indochina is China. If China withdrew its support, the local Communists would not last three months. A present military defeat of the Communists does not mean that the problem cannot again be stirred up by the Chinese.
I have no illusions about the training program there; it is not going well. General Trapnell and others say that the training program, at the present level and at the present rate, will not succeed. The French Generals simply have no confidence in independent units of natives, and the natives don’t want to fight under French leaders. The reason the French earlier had success was that the previous French commander (De Lattre de Tassigny) had faith in the Vietnamese. This the present commander does not have. Another point related to metropolitan France is the fear that the war will be settled in Paris. The effect on morale will be serious when the negotiation talks take place. We have no real leaders in Vietnam. Malcolm MacDonald thinks a great deal of Bao Dai, that he may become a great leader, and that he is not a stooge of the French. General Templer was asked about Indochina, what do they need? He said, “I hate to admit this, because he’s a real S.O.B., but what they need there is a Rhee.”
There are factors on the plus side, and matters could be worse. The Navarre plan is a tremendous improvement. Navarre said we could expect military reversals, but there have not been as many as were expected. The French troop morale is excellent, a lot better than realized. The French are giving the Cambodians, Laotians and Vietnamese real independence in the French Union. They are doing this in fact, but not selling the idea by propaganda to the people.
To sum up: There is a definite need to stiffen the French at home. I am convinced in my own mind that what happens in Indochina is more important, from the standpoint of strategic interests of Europe, than what happens in Korea. When you consider military and economic aid, doubts should be resolved in favor of this. Navarre is getting everything he needs, he says. If all our eggs are in one basket, it won’t do any good to put in eight hundred million dollars unless the military people on the scene, and outside advisers, are convinced, on the basis of what is sent, that that is enough to do the job, as well as having enough men to do the job. Navarre indicated that the problem, from his standpoint, was not equipment, but men. This brings up the problem of training Vietnamese. The French resent suggestions that [Page 931] their training tactics could be improved on. We should try to convince the Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians that they will have and can have independence within the French Union. They realize that if the French get out the Communists will take over. They want to stay within the Union, but also have the feeling that they have not as yet been offered full independence. An offer of independence within the Union might be helpful in selling the idea.
Bao Dai’s thinking is of interest, because it indicates his ability to analyze the dangers. He said, “I am opposed to negotiation for four reasons: One, the Communists (we can knock off that reason because of disagreement); two, what can we do? If we divide the country, we will eventually lose; three, if we invite the enemy into the conference we will lose; and four, we can invite these people in and continue as a minority party.” If there is negotiation now, the only thing that will result is Communist domination. If the French get out, the only capable leadership at the present time in Vietnam is Communist leadership. The anti-Communist Vietnamese leadership is not built up to this point, and the Communists are stronger militarily. Negotiation should not take place until the Vietnamese power and leadership is built up. The problem is to find a way to handle the negotiation talks, and to prosecute the war. In conclusion, I am convinced that negotiation at the present time would be disastrous.
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- This memorandum was prepared by S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the NSC, on Dec. 24. At this meeting, Vice President Richard M. Nixon reported on his recent trip to the Far East, South Asia, and the Near East. The extract printed here constitutes the remarks of the Vice President on Indochina. On Dec. 23, Nixon reported to the nation on his trip over national radio and television. For his comments on Indochina, see Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 4, 1954, p. 12. On Jan. 8, 1954, Nixon briefed certain officers of the Department of State on the areas which he had visited, including Indochina. The transcript of that briefing is in file 033.1100 NI/1–1854.↩