751G.5/12–2853: Telegram
The Chargé in France (Joyce) to the Department of State
secret
Paris, December 28, 1953—8
p.m.
2425. Repeated information Saigon 245. Foreign Office official stated following today on basis telegram received from DeJean who accompanied Navarre Savannakhet December 27:
- 1.
- Viet Minh drive across Laos to Thakhek of limited military significance. Do not consider it as posing any serious threat Savannakhet since only eight or nine Viet Minh battalions involved in “raid” and in view length supply line and difficulties terrain. In meanwhile, Savannakhet being strongly reinforced. As far as claim Viet Minh have cut north-south ground communications, this of little import since military supply to north Laos (Luang Prabang and Vientiane) has been accomplished by air for some time. Viet Minh Laotian drive indicates they not in position now mount any large-scale offensive Tonkin Delta.
- 2.
- Consider Viet Minh drive as principally political move designed bring pressure on French Government and public on eve four-power conference1 to negotiate. This connection, no official confirmation Ho [Page 934] “peace offer” received as yet. Discount as unrealistic press speculation interpreting Viet Minh move as attempt create Korean-type division Indochina near Sixteenth Parallel. Viet Minh will probably establish contact sympathetic Vietnamese elements Thai border.
- 3.
- French position opposition internationalization Indochina conflict remains unchanged. If internationalized, consider this would only cause entry Chinese Communists. Laotians in agreement this score. French Government of opinion events will show no need consider internationalization conflict at this time.
Secretariat Associated States officials report following today:
- 1.
- On basis news available impossible form any military conclusions as yet. They remind us that offensive has been awaited since October 15 and fact that it should be directed toward Mekong not entirely unexpected. Although they do not seek belittle Viet Minh strength, they reassured by complete confidence in Navarre and his command organization as well as knowledge preparations to meet offensive have been extensive.
- 2.
- In their opinion possible but not likely that Ho peace feelers and offensive have been coordinated. Rather believe it fortuitous circumstance which is bound to serve Viet Minh psychologically and hamper Buu Loc’s task of establishing government.
- 3.
- Secretariat is watching Siamese reaction with interest. They are conscious of possibility Siamese may raise matter in UN if Viet Minh are stupid enough to give them cause (i.e., violation Thai territory), which they doubt.
- 4.
- Officials deplored extreme sensitivity French public and press to any news from Indochina, particularly bad news. This reflected in sensational headlines and interpretations current French press. In fact whether offensive is serious or not will not really be known for at least week when true Viet Minh strength and objective become more evident and ability of French Union Command to bring men and matériel to area and put them into action is proved.
Joyce