751G.00/12–353: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
958. Repeated information Paris 277. Comments in two recent telegrams from Paris (2113 to Department repeated Saigon 2081 and 2115, repeated Saigon 210)2 have occasioned us some puzzlement.
In paragraph one of Paris telegram 2113, Jacquet is quoted as saying that Bao Dai “undoubtedly knew of proposed démarche in advance and will become more attentiste than ever”. Likewise, Roux is quoted in Paris’ 2115 as reaffirming this view and indicating that Bao Dai’s alleged wait and see attitude was already apparent in his failure to get on with Franco-Vietnamese negotiations and to replace Tam government.
My recent telegrams will have dispelled, I trust, notion that Bao Dai was privy to Communist thrust as represented in Ho Chi-Minh statement to Stockholm Expressen, although two weeks ago he expressed to me his fears lest French official references possibilities negotiations with Viet Minh would provoke phony armistice offer from Ho Chi-Minh. I am convinced that he was taken entirely by surprise. As for assertion that Bao Dai will become more attentiste than ever we find absolutely no evidence here to sustain this thesis. On contrary, Bao Dai plainly told me that if French were now going to sell out to Viet Minh he would leave country and bide his time for an eventual future come-back.
My top secret 942 to Department, December 1, already indicates Bao Dai’s attitude re formation of new government.
As for statement in Paris’ 2113 that Jacquet is the French official in Paris closest to Indochina problem and best qualified to pass judgment concerning it, we know many experts on Indochina who would be quick to challenge this appraisal. Although he handled himself well during his recent tour in Indochina, his last three successive public statements have been resented by Vietnamese opinion. In two statements made here he broadly implied that present Vietnam Government is incapable and needs to be changed; criticized Vietnam armed forces; and, in his comment on Ho Chi-Minh overture, aroused widespread doubt throughout Associated States re French intentions.
As indicated my telegram 952 yesterday,3 it would seem to us that Paris Foreign Office could better devote its energies to devising means of using Viet Minh declaration to more constructive ends, such as impelling Vietnamese to enter negotiations more promptly, than merely [Page 897] wringing its hands and complaining of disastrous effects of latest Communist démarche. Furthermore, on military plane, as General Trapnell points out, time when enemy talks of armistice is time to hit him with everything we have.