Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

INR-NIE files

National Intelligence Estimate¹

secret
NIE 63/1

Washington, 1 December 1953.

[Extracts]

Probable Short-Term Developments in French Policy²

. . . . . . . .

7. In Indochina, we believe that even if the Laniel–Navarre Plan is successful the French do not expect to achieve a complete military victory in Indochina and probably aim only at improving their position sufficiently to negotiate a political settlement.

8. If no negotiations take place within the next 18 months, France would probably continue its effort in Indochina, provided that: (a) the US assumed virtually the total financial burdens of the war; (b) the planned buildup of Vietnam forces permitted reduction of French forces; (c) the Indochina states remained in the French Union; and (d) France continued to receive US support for its position in Europe and North Africa.

9. If the above French conditions were not largely satisfied France would probably propose UN intervention or direct military participation by the US. Failing in this, France would probably seek in time to negotiate directly with the Communists for terms which would permit withdrawal with minimum loss.

. . . . . . .

Probable French Policies in Indochina^*

37. The gradual deterioration of French will to continue the Indochina war had been checked at least temporarily by the Laniel–Navarre Plan and by the greatly increased US financial assistance. The French are reinforcing their own units, accelerating the buildup of Indochinese national armies, and seeking to regain the military and political initiative. Despite strong parliamentary opposition, the French are likely to implement their promises of independence for the three states, on the basis of voluntary association with France in the French Union. No French government could continue the war outside of this French Union framework.

38. However, the implementation of the Laniel–Navarre Plan will probably be the last major French offensive effort in Indochina. We believe that even if the Laniel–Navarre Plan is successful, the French do not expect to achieve a complete military victory in Indochina. They probably aim at improving their position sufficiently to negotiate a settlement which would eliminate the drain of the Indochina war on France, while maintaining non-Communist governments in the Associated States and preserving a position for France in the Far East.

39. In view of its strong desire for a reduction of its Indochina commitments and for a solution of the Indochina problem, France will continue to seek discussion of the Indochina issue in international conferences and will almost certainly favor a conference between the US, UK, France, the USSR, and Communist China on Far East issues. We believe that in such conferences, or in any direct negotiations with the Viet Minh if necessary to obtain an agreement, France would press the US to consent to French acceptance of terms which the US would regard as weakening the Western position in Indochina and thus in Southeast Asia as a whole.

40. If no negotiations take place within the next 18 months we believe that France will take measures to reduce its Indochina commitment. However, in spite of the burdens of the Indochina war, France recognizes that it derives substantial advantages from its presence in Indochina and would probably continue the war in Indochina, provided that: (a) the US assumed virtually the entire financial burden of the war; (b) the planned buildup of Vietnam forces permitted reduction of French forces; (c) the Indochina states maintained their association with France in the French Union; and (d) France continued to receive US support for its position in Europe and North Africa.

41. In the event that the above French conditions were not largely satisfied, France would probably propose UN intervention or direct military participation by the US. Failing in this, France would probably seek in time to negotiate directly with the Communists for terms which would permit withdrawal with minimum loss.

1. For full text of this report, see volume vi. Of the sections printed here, paragraphs 7–9 are from the conclusions of the report, while paragraphs 37–41 are from the discussion portion.

2. According to a note on the cover sheet, “The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this estimate on 24 November 3953. The FBI abstained, the subject being outside of its jurisdiction.

   “The following member organizations of the Intelligence Advisory Committee participated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation of this estimate: The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Joint Staff.”

3. For a more comprehensive statement of the situation in Indochina see NIE-91, “Probable Developments in Indochina through Mid-1954,” 4 June 1953; and NIE-63. However, these papers were published before the Laniel–Navarre Plan developed. The estimates with respect to French policy in Indochina contained therein are superseded by paragraphs 37–41 of this estimate. [Footnote in the source text. For text of NIE 91, see p. 592. NIE 63, “France’s Probable Future Role in the Western Security System,” Jan. 23, 1953, is not printed. (INR–NIE files)]