Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 185

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor (MacArthur)¹

secret

Bermuda, December 4, 1953.

Participants:

• M. Laniel, Prime Minister of France.
• Mr. Douglas MacArthur II.

M. Laniel said he would like to see me alone for a few minutes, and accordingly I met alone with him at three this afternoon in his room. He said he first wished to bring me up to date on his thinking regarding Indochina in light of the recent Ho Chi-Minh overture through the Swedish press.

He said the Ho overture was obviously a propaganda move and should be treated as such. On the other hand, it had created a serious problem not only with regard to the French Parliament but the French Government. In particular, President Auriol was soft and spongy and had wanted immediately to send a message to Ho that France was willing to negotiate. Certain members of the French Cabinet shared this view. Laniel reiterated his own conviction that there was no basis for negotiation with the Communist Vietminh until the French had established a position of military strength in Indochina. He had complete confidence in General Navarre and believed that by April Navarre would be able to be in a very substantially better military position than at present. Therefore, France should continue its military effort in Indochina with all the resources at its disposal and should not be diverted by Communist propaganda. Once France had established a strong military position, Laniel did not exclude the possibility of some form of negotiation to end the Indochina conflict. Laniel said the French Government would only give “consideration” to a peace feeler from Ho if it came through regular diplomatic channels—for example, through some neutral. He added that if such a “feeler” were received, France would only consider it in conjunction with the Governments of the Associated States.

I said to M. Laniel that I was glad to hear his determination to continue the war in Indochina to a successful conclusion. I said the recent news emanating from France had been disquieting in this respect. In particular, if the French gave the impression that they were ready to negotiate with Ho Chi-Minh, which would in fact turn Indochina over to the Communists, the Associated States of Indochina would probably cease supporting the French effort there, which in turn would make General Navarre’s task impossible since military success in Indochina must depend on the Associated States bearing an increasing part of the burden and effort in prosecuting the war there. Any indication that the French were going to make a deal with the Communists would be substantial encouragement to the fence-sitters in Indochina who then would begin to think in terms of making a deal with the Communists. This would be a disaster for France.

M. Laniel said he could assure me that he himself would never do anything which would result in turning Indochina over to the Communists, and he hoped I would make known his feelings in this respect to the President and the Secretary.

1. This conversation occurred at the Bermuda Conference of the Heads of Government of the United States, United Kingdom, and France, Dec. 4–8. For documentation on the Bermuda Conference as a whole, see volume V. Briefing material for the conference, prepared on the various subjects which might be discussed, including Indochina, may be found in CFM files, lot M 88, box 166, and in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 181.