751G.11/12–153: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
943. Repeated information Paris 272, Hanoi, Vientiane, Phnom Penh unnumbered. When I took Congressman Judd and Subcommittee House Foreign Affairs Committee1 to call on Bao Dai yesterday, latter did not appear much disturbed over Ho Chi-minh interview in Stockholm Expressen. Remarked merely that these continual references to eventual possibilities negotiations with Viet Minh which Laniel, Jacquet and other French leaders had made for French political effect had, as he had warned me two weeks ago, produced an inevitable result. Ho Chi-minh had come back with a meaningless offer to negotiate which was good propaganda for his side and which put the French “in a hole”. Bao Dai did not then seem too much worried about Vietnamese reaction to this offer and agreed laughingly with Judd that if offer had been made to him instead of to French, he would have replied to Ho Chi-minh, “Fine. Lay down your arms and surrender and we will give you an armistice.”
Bao Dai recalled on eve of his signing basic accords for Vietnamese independence of March 8, 1949 Viet Minh had sent emissaries French Government who said in effect, “Why give away all these concessions? We will sign another armistice with you along lines of our armistice of 1946” (which allowed French to keep Cochin-China as a colony). Bao Dai suggested that present interview was partly inspired by fear [Page 893] that his government and French were about to come to durable harmonious new arrangements.
When I saw Bao Dai today, he was in a much more pessimistic mood. He had just seen General Hinh, Vietnamese Chief of Staff, and had read Jacquet’s unfortunate comment on Ho’s interview which he took as proof there was some serious intention in French Government to conclude an armistice. Bao Dai spoke rather bitterly of Jacquet’s recent statements on an armistice and other matters which he said had been inept. He went on to say he had never really been able to determine in just what groups real political power in France rested. In spite of recent changes in government, there had been a certain continuity in French foreign policy. Was it due to influence of big business, the big bankers or certain political groups? He implied if he could only determine what these forces were, he could negotiate with them in realistic terms for continued French cooperation with Vietnam. In regard to armistice, he said he would rather abdicate than to agree to any armistice which would divide country, afterwards starting a movement from outside which would reconquer all Vietnam. He asserted that armistice talk had already had some deleterious effect on morale of certain French expeditionary units who were asking why further sacrifice was necessary if there were going to be an armistice. (We have had no confirmation of any such reaction). He asserted again there was a very real understanding throughout Vietnam of the necessity of association or rather an alliance with French, provided it were on terms of equality. He declared that, properly formulated, such a union or alliance would gain an overwhelming majority of votes in a Vietnamese plebiscite. French should understand this and make some effort to make a “French union” or preferably an “alliance”, attractive to Vietnamese aspirations of independence and equality.
I told Bao Dai that while I was without instructions, I felt certain that any American influence with France would be exerted against any armistice which would leave door open to eventual Communist conquest of Vietnam. Personally, I could see no basis for an armistice and no reason for it since Franco-Vietnamese forces had a good plan and support and were on road to victory. Bao Dai agreed but said it would be a little difficult for America to exert effective influence because of our action in accepting an armistice in Korea. He realized thoroughly that situation was quite different in Korea, but nevertheless our action in Korean truce made it difficult for us to push for fighting on to victory.
- The following members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee visited Indochina from Nov. 26 to Dec. 1: Walter H. Judd of Minnesota, Marguerite Stitt Church of Illinois, Clement J. Zablocki of Wisconsin, and E. Ross Adair of Indiana. Their observations were set forth in Special Study Mission to Southeast Asia and the Pacific (Committee print), 83d Cong., 2d sess., January 29, 1954.↩