751G.5/7–2453: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
163. Repeated information Paris 51. Re Paris telegram to Department 285 July 22.1 We have the following comment on Paris telegram 285 to Department of July 22.
Paragraph 1: I hope that every channel of influence that we can bring to bear on France will be employed to back up Navarre’s request for twelve additional French battalions for Indochina. It is incredible that, given the will, France cannot locate these extra troops. They need not be assigned out here for a regular term of service, but should be available during the next fighting season, October 1953–April 1954. This additional force is so important that, if necessary and at all possible, we should undertake to pay the transportation and other extra-budgetary costs in sending these troops to Indochina. It must be repeated that these troops will not be subtracted from the defense of France and the defense of Europe except temporarily.
Paragraph 3: We agree with Reynaud that in the long run the only key to success in Indochina is the creation of a strong Vietnamese army imbued with the proper nationalist spirit. No American, certainly not the O’Daniel Mission, will agree that for this purpose “the fewer French troops in IC the better”. One of the thoughts behind sending the O’Daniel Mission was that we must attempt to gain victory as soon as possible in this area since there is no assurance that time is on our side.
Accordingly, we need temporarily a small reinforcement of French troops, at the same time not neglecting to build up a Vietnamese nationalist army as quickly as possible. Insofar as IC public opinion is concerned, we see no immediate objections to declaration by Reynaud of plan to begin withdrawal in 18 months.
Paragraph 5: Press Saigon is reflecting faithfully the allegation Bidault returned from Washington conversations empty-handed.
Paragraph 6: From our understanding of MDAP practice, we do not turn over cash money to fill military budget deficits. Instead, as in the case of France, we undertake to pay for certain items which would otherwise fall on the national budget. Offhand, we can think of no Vietnamese military budget items which we could undertake to defray as being in the common interest such as European defense. The probable amount involved—$200 million—is, at present rate of exchange, at least 2½ times the total Vietnamese defense budget. Furthermore, our making money available directly or indirectly to Vietnam might [Page 697] tend to discourage the French in continuing a maximum effort in Indochina.
With regard to paragraph 7, a declaration by US would appear superfluous as Laos has already been invaded and Viet Minh troops are still active there.
Re paragraph 8, a prompt imaginative statement by DeJean on arrival Saigon of concessions freely made would be highly desirable, would have salutary effect, would help clear atmosphere and should be strongly encouraged, but real interest here is in forthcoming negotiations. We have no indication yet of actual arrival date of DeJean but believe that his arrival and concurrent statement of concessions before the commencement of negotiations might provide a propitious background for them.
With regard to extra aid, Embtel 60 of July 9 to the Department2 stated that Embassy had been informed that relatively firm French estimate costs of CY 1954 Plan de Campagne, taking account effect of devaluation and French screening, will be available Saigon September or October, and it was suggested, therefore, that any definite commitment made in Washington talks be subject verification facts in Saigon in coming months.