751H.11/7–2553: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
priority
171. Repeated information Paris 54, Hanoi unnumbered, Phnom Penh unnumbered. I went to see the Cambodian King this morning at Siem Reap, arriving two hours after Penn Nouth who had brought with him from Phnom Penh the text of the French reply to Cambodian proposals.1 Stopping at Phnom Penh en route I had been able to read the note.
The King received me in a very friendly manner and I immediately observed that according to my information the “victory” of his ideas had been complete; the French had granted all of his demands. In fact, the French had gone much further in meeting his demands than I had thought possible.
The King agreed that in both tone and substance the French note was very gratifying. There was only one particular in which it fell [Page 698] short. After unconditionally stating Cambodia’s independence, French willingness to meet the proposals put forward by Cambodia and conceding the King full military command in Cambodia the penultimate paragraph of the note, nevertheless, announced that the French would reserve temporarily operational command in the area east of the Mekong River until the military situation improves. If the French had asked for this provisional command instead of bluntly stating they intended to keep it, the King would have granted it without question since he realized that competent defense of this area was necessary for the protection and communications of Laos and the defense of south Vietnam.
I said that I felt certain that this point could be amicably settled by talking the matter over with HICOM Risterucci. The language of the French note might be changed or that paragraph eliminated and handled separately in a “gentleman’s agreement” or the King in replying to the note might put that matter straight. In any case I felt certain that the matter could be amicably adjusted.
I went on to say that I had been very struck by the calm and friendly understanding of the King’s purpose displayed by Risterucci and General De Langlade. One could almost say they had been advocates of the King’s essential proposals. I suggested that he talk the matter over with them.
The King warmly agreed with my description of Risterucci and De Langlade, adding that while he wished to speak no ill of Risterucci’s late predecessor, De Raymond, the latter had in fact been partly responsible for recent difficulties in Franco-Cambodian relations.
The King said he would promptly send a delegation to Paris “to explore, but not to negotiate” with the French.
Comment: I did not feel that the first visit after my return was the occasion to take issue with this last statement. Possibly this decision to “explore” rather than enter immediately into negotiations was announced because of the presence at our talk of Tiou Long and Penn Nouth who are more distrustful of the French than the King himself.
Penn Nouth spoke up and said there was one other point in which the French note was unsatisfactory: It had not replied to the seventh point in the Cambodian note “asking the French Government to liquidate under its own responsibility in favor of the States” the assets of the former Indochina Federation. Chargé Montllor immediately spoke up and said that the question of distribution of the assets of the former Indochina Federation (which are practically all in Vietnam and include certain Saigon port works and Hanoi University) had nothing to do with the question of Cambodian independence but was a matter for negotiation.
[Page 699]Comment: The Cambodian demand that France alone liquidate and share the proceeds of the joint assets of the three States is an impossible proposal. These assets are not French assets but the assets of the three States. For the French unilaterally to order and conduct their liquidation would be a violation of the sovereignty of the State where the assets are located.
I asked the King when he would return to Phnom Penh. He appeared embarrassed by the question and said he preferred to remain in Siem Reap and Battambang “where he was away from Cambodian politicians”.
Comment: I believe the King is sufficiently intelligent and well disposed to France to realize the very great, not to say complete, capitulation of the French to his demands.…
- Reference is presumably to a French note of July 22 which is included in French-Cambodian correspondence, July 3–Aug. 3, in Cambodia, Livre Jaune, I, pp. 133–146.↩