Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.5/7–2253: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Paris, July 22, 1953—8 p.m.

285. Repeated information Saigon 44. I invited Paul Reynaud to lunch today with Governor Stevenson. Reynaud came direct from a meeting of Council of Ministers on Indochina, and we had long and detailed discussion of Indochinese problems. Reynaud’s views are:

1. Navarre stands very little or no chance of getting the twelve additional battalions he requested from France. These troops are needed in Europe for the defense of France and cannot be spared. As authority for the continuing military danger in Europe, Reynaud cited recent speeches by Ridgway and Gruenther.

2. Navarre will probably get a significant number of additional officers and non-coms who could be used to help train and form Vietnamese units.

3. The only key to success in Indochina is the creation of a strong Vietnamese army, and the development of a nationalistic spirit among Vietnamese military units. For this purpose, the fewer French troops in Indochina, the better. There should be a definite plan, publicly announced, for the withdrawal of French units from Indochina as soon as Vietnamese units are ready to take their place. Reynaud suggested that the withdrawal begin in 18 months and be at the rate of 20,000 men every two months thereafter.

4. Reynaud was very pessimistic re prospects in Indochina, because he said France simply did not have the financial means to put up any more money for the Indochina effort and, in fact, should be reducing its expenses in Indochina. Despite the NATO resolution of past December on Indochina, France was still carrying 60 percent of the financial cost and 100 percent of the manpower effort. This obviously was unfair. He particularly pointed out that France was, in effect, fighting to protect free world and, in particular, British sources of raw materials in Southeast Asia which Britain was apparently not interested in defending herself. When we commented that Britain was also fighting in Malaya, he pointed out that there were 5,000 Communist troops in Malaya compared to 400,000 Communist troops in Indochina, he also stated that if a referendum were held in France today as to whether or not France should withdraw immediately and completely from Indochina, there would be a 90 percent vote in favor of immediate withdrawal.

5. Reynaud said that opinion in the French Cabinet was that Washington talks on Indochina had been a very disappointing failure as United States apparently did not consider Indochina of enough importance to put up the necessary funds to carry on. I pointed out clearly to him that we had never received a definite request for any specific amount of dollar help, and I said that I hoped that they would tell us what they needed before taking any unilateral action to cut back the expansion of the Vietnamese armed forces. Reynaud said that the expansion of the Vietnamese forces would require about 45 billion francs, and that additional French expenditures of 25 billion francs (or a total of 70 billion francs additional) were required by Navarre plan. France could under no circumstances put up any part of these additional funds. The decision of whether or not Indochina could be adequately protected had passed from French hands. It was for the other NATO countries to decide whether or not they had enough interest in Indochina to put up the required money.

Comment: We had previously heard from first-hand reliable US source that Reynaud had said that US had rejected Bidault request for additional US aid for IC, which is in keeping with picture given in some sectors of French press that Bidault returned from Washington empty-handed. This may bear some relation to inner-political sparring within French political circles, although it is difficult to understand just why Reynaud should try to give such impression to me.

6. Reynaud inquired whether it would not be easier for US to make money available directly to Vietnam. Governor Stevenson replied that, in his opinion and for domestic political reasons, it would definitely be easier to obtain funds in this way from the US. This seemed to satisfy Reynaud.

Comment: In view previously very strong French aversion to having US deal direct with Vietnamese, Reynaud’s statement is somewhat surprising. It may stem from his desire to proceed with transfer increasing powers and independence to Vietnamese, as well as from realization that extension direct US financial aid to Vietnam would establish more clearly US assumption of share of IC burden, which once assumed would with difficulty be shifted elsewhere.

7. Reynaud stated that he feared a renewed Viet Minh attack on Laos in the fall and asked me to ask Washington if it would be possible for US to state publicly that an invasion of Laos, a free country, would be a matter of concern to US and would cause a reaction by US. Governor Stevenson and I pointed out to Reynaud that an invasion of Laos was really a UN problem, not just a US problem. He said he agreed, but that he feared the UN would merely debate the problem and never take action. What was needed was action, which could only come from a US declaration. He again asked me to inquire of my government as to possibilities of such a statement which I said I would do although I felt that it was very unlikely that we would make any such unilateral declaration.

Comment: Reynaud, while not favoring UN action, does not take strong stand against it. His views are thus completely contrary to those of Bidault. Reynaud is, in effect, by this suggestion moving into Bidault’s field of foreign affairs, and we should handle this one gingerly. At any rate, it is somewhat strange that we should now be asked to make public statement in anticipation possible invasion Laos, when French Government has taken such strong stand against UN action in anticipation such an attack. It seems to me that our reply should be that this continues, in our view, to be problem for UN. Please advise how I should answer Reynaud.¹

8. Reynaud said that when De Jean reached Saigon, he would promptly make a number of conciliatory moves, such as the return of the Norodom Palace to Vietnam. Reynaud also stated that Gautier would be replaced very shortly by a less colonial-minded individual.

Conclusions: I feel Indochina problem is rapidly reaching a crisis here. A definite understanding of what amount of extra aid we are prepared to put up is needed promptly. To be sufficient to carry out the basic elements of the Navarre plan, something like $200 million extra will be required. I suggest that we tell Reynaud that US is deeply concerned over situation in Indochina and, therefore, would be glad to receive him or his representative in Washington to discuss specific figures on aid for Indochina as soon as he is prepared to talk. I feel it would be much preferable if Reynaud should come himself. Department should realize that this may not be solely a question of money, but that what French may have in back of their minds is assumption by US of substantially larger share of Indochinese burden, possibly even including a share of the responsibility if things should not work out to our satisfaction in Indochina.

Dillon

1. Telegram 306 to Paris, July 27, read as follows:

   “Reference paragraph 7 Embtel 285, you should inform Reynaud we do not see our way clear make unilateral statement re possible future invasion Laos. You may further inform him that if France could alter her opposition UN consideration Laotian problem, US would explore with other UN members idea of obtaining resolution by UNGA along lines French desire, noting existence of threat to Laos and stating any action of aggression against it would be ‘matter of concern’. We remain convinced such UN pronouncement would have greater weight than unilateral statement any single member.” (751G.5/7–2253)