PSA files, lot 58 D 207, “Hanoi Correspondence”
The Consul at Hanoi (Sturm) to the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal)
[Extract]
Dear Phil:
. . . . . . .
I was much struck by your telegram1 reporting conversations in Paris. What you had to say of Reynaud reminds me that he was Premier at the outbreak of the war. How humiliating that we should have to contemplate getting down on our knees to ask the French to stay here, considering all the water that has flowed under the Pont Doumer! But on the other hand, if I may return to one of my old themes, there is no particular point in our paying the French to remain here if they will remain only on conditions which tend to preclude the attainment of our objectives. These I take to be the successful conclusion of the war and the establishment of a stable regime which, with help, may resist pressures from the North. It has been demonstrated that French Union forces alone cannot win the war: as their firepower has increased, so have the skill and equipment of the Vietminh grown. The balance must be turned by an enlistment of the whole-hearted support of the people on this side of the lines. As long as the people retain their doubts of the French, they will not fully cooperate, regardless of what we say. After all, they are not interested in our foreign policy objectives, except as the latter touch them.
I have detected in various of my Vietnamese friends (Quat, for example) a growing tendency to ask searching questions as to our policy toward Vietnam. It is getting harder and harder to give them satisfactory answers. The truth of course is that we want the French to stay here because we do not think we could undertake to replace them militarily. But to induce them to stay here, are we to refrain from urging them to adopt policies of liberalism which might gain the cooperation needed to win a victory? It strikes me that by following that course we stand not only an excellent chance of losing the war but also, before that unhappy day, of destroying the illusions regarding us that these people still cherish. I think it would be a crippling blow to our position in the Far East, and consequently to the cause we represent, if we became identified in any degree with the colonialist idea. (Parenthetically, I believe most non-Communist Vietnamese are fully prepared to grant the French trade preferences and military [Page 693] bases. What they will always resent are attempts to direct their internal policies and dictate the choice of persons to fill political positions.) How do we coat the pill you are asking us to administer to the Vietnamese? Remember that I in the North far more than the Embassy have to deal with the critical part of the population.
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Sincerely yours,