Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/5–853

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant)¹

top secret

[Washington,] May 8, 1953.

Subject:

• Connection between Korean and Indochina settlements and the possibility of a negotiated settlement in Indochina.

Reference is made to your memorandum of May 5² on the above subject. The views of FE are as follows:

(1) There is no commitment on the part of the U.S. to establish a connection or necessary relationship between on the one hand, a Korean armistice and political settlement, and, on the other hand, a settlement of the present Indochina conflict.

(2) No commitment made to Mayer and Bidault when they were here would in any way influence the conduct of the U.S. in the period before or after a Korean armistice, provided the Indochina conflict remains qualitatively as it is at present, i.e., provided there is no influx of Chinese Communist “volunteers”. (The appearance of a Vietminh air force might, if we so desired, be considered a qualitative change even in the absence of Chinese elements on Indochinese soil.)

(3) The Secretary told Mayer and Bidault in effect that he regarded an overt Chinese Communist aggression against Indochina before a Korean armistice as highly improbable, adding that such an eventuality should in no way diminish our efforts toward victory in Indochina. As to an overt aggression by the Chinese Communists after an armistice in Korea, an aggression presumably made possible by such an armistice (this was the main French concern), Mr. Dulles said that this would be viewed with the gravest concern by us and that it would in our view strike at the very basis on which we had entered upon the armistice. (He, of course, made no commitment or statement on behalf of the other participants in our side in the Korean conflict.)

(4) The statements made about the interdependence of the struggles in Korea and in Indochina (cited in the reference memorandum) are, therefore, restatements of the obvious orchestration from one central point of all the assaults on the free world. They involve no new commitment other than that arising for the U.S. in the event of overt Chinese Communist aggression in Indochina after a Korean armistice. (In this connection, the French have, so far as FE is aware, made no attempt to link the invasion of Laos to the current armistice negotiations in Korea.)

(5) It is certainly an objective of U.S. policy to end the struggle in Indochina and to restore peace there, but there is no commitment to link U.S. policy toward Korea and U.S. policy toward the present struggle in Indochina, i.e., we would no more hold up a settlement in Korea because the present struggle in Indochina is continuing than we would, presumably, hold up a treaty for Austria until we got Berlin straightened out, even though both situations are integral and therefore interdependent parts of the Communist attack against the free world.

(6) From the Communist side there is apparently some desire for an armistice in Korea; there can be none for a settlement in Indochina except on terms that we could not accept. Korea is costing the Soviet Union considerable matériel and for the Chinese Communists it represents a drain in both men and matériel. Indochina costs the Russians and Chinese very little while it is bleeding France and is a heavy burden for the United States. The war in Korea is in stalemate; that in Indochina is characterized by enemy initiative and a depressed morale on the anti-Communist side in France and in the Associated States.

(7) There is an obvious advantage for France in giving to the Indochina conflict an international status and sanction which it does not now have. The invasion of Laos is a splendid opportunity to secure such a status through the U.N. under the most favorable possible conditions: the French should be urged to take it. But such action would not, could not and should not involve injecting Indochina into the U.N. Korean negotiations (any more than Formosa). There is no chance, in accordance with the above reasoning that the parties with whom the U.N. is dealing in Korea would accept any talks on Indochina or indeed that our U.N. partners would support a demand on our part that we refrain from an armistice or from a peace settlement in Korea until hostilities cease in Indochina.

The reference memorandum also raises the question of what would be “an honorable settlement” in Indochina—a subject which is further developed in Mr. Knight’s memorandum of May 6 to Mr. Merchant.³

On the basis of the present state of political and military forces in Indochina, any negotiated settlement which the Communists would accept would be a triumph for them since it would leave control of the country to Ho and his eight well equipped divisions of regulars with the immense prestige of their seven years war against the French ending in the withdrawal of the latter from all or part of the country. Such a settlement could hardly be called an “honorable” one since it would leave to the not doubtful mercies of the enemy a good many thousands of people who have thrown in their lot with the free world on the basis of French and of U.S. assurances of a determination to guarantee them from Communist enslavement.

A vastly improved military situation is the necessary basis of any settlement which our side could honorably accept. (Eventually, any truly national government of Viet-Nam will have to include Vietminh elements but we would hope that the opportunity for the wise statesmanship required to bind up the wounds of what has been, in part, a civil struggle, might be in the hands of the anti-Communist elements depending for their authority not only upon a maximum degree of popular support but also upon a national army with a record of participation in victory over the Communist armies.)

Much more probable than any actual direct negotiation at this time between Ho and the Associated States and/or France would seem to be the probability, if the war continues more than a few months longer without any improvement in the status of our side, of the growth of a movement for peace in Viet-Nam on a basis which would have great appeal to the people of the country. The people of the country are weary of war; they would like to see the last of the French Union troops (French, North Africans, Senegalese and Foreign Legionnaires). Such realization as exists of the importance of the French armies in defending the country from Communist enslavement will not continue to grow and will probably decline rather rapidly in the face of a continuance of a military situation in which the armies of Ho are running the armies of Salan and Linares ragged. Therefore, there may well develop in the next few months with covert support from the Vietminh and perhaps overt leadership from some “attentiste” personalities a movement for peace on a democratic basis: elections, departure of foreign troops, disarmament of other levies and so forth. Such a movement might be expected to develop great popular appeal. The weary French and the no longer hopeful followers of Bao Dai and Tam could yield to it without, in appearance at least, having surrendered to Communism. A certain amount of intrigue in the Oriental manner would help. But the result would be to fasten Communist control, perhaps disguised at first, on the whole of Indochina.

The key to the problem remains prompt and vigorous military action by our side with U.S. material support leading, in as short a time as possible, to a serious curtailment if not an elimination of the military potential of Ho’s regular divisions. There are, of course, political factors involved. The recommendations of FE on the subject are contained in a memorandum dated May 4 addressed to Mr. Matthews.⁴ A decision that such vigorous military action (with its political concomitants) is either unfeasible or undesirable from our point of view would face us with the necessity of recognizing a serious defeat for the free world in Indochina—I do not believe it will come to that.

1. Drafted by Philip W. Bonsal, Director of PSA.
2. Ante, p. 540.
3. Ante p. 544.
4. The memorandum of May 4, “Evaluation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Letourneau Plan for Military Operations in Indochina,” not printed, was drafted by Bonsal and transmitted by Assistant Secretary Robertson to Deputy Under Secretary Matthews, with distribution to other interested areas of the Department of State. This 11-page document traced interdepartmental consideration of French strategic plans, discussed recent military and political developments in Indochina, and urged that both military and political talks be initiated with the French with a view toward increasing French flexibility in relations with the Associated States and intensifying the French military effort. (751G.00/5–453)