751J.00/5–853: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France1
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5542. In advising FonOff substance Secretary’s conversation with Thai Ambassador (Deptels 5506 and 5514)2 on possibility Thai action in UN, make clear this was in response initial question from Thai Ambassador. We of course wish avoid impression with French that US, having failed to persuade them to agree take case UN, is now seeking induce others do so contrary French wishes and without their knowledge.
Tell FonOff we were advised late yesterday informally by Thai Ambassador he has recd instructions to raise Thai case in UN. He will be discussing problem with Dept and USUN this P.M. While Dept prepared give Thai initiative suitable support, we will strongly recommend Thai Govt have discussions with French and Laotians before proceeding with formal action in UN so maximum of coordination may be achieved.3
In view Thai Govt’s decision, Fr may wish consider desirability concerting with Thais and Laotians on some appropriate coordinated Laotian-Thai presentation of matter UN, with of course strong Fr support.
While we should make fully clear to Fr we respect their great responsibility and understand Govt’s difficulties with Fr public opinion re attacks in UN against so-called Fr colonialism, we believe we shld point out long term possibilities in present situation. Indeed coordinated Thai-Laotian action with Laos fully supported [Page 556] by ancient and long independent Asian state wld vastly contribute to demonstrate in SEA extent sovereignty now enjoyed by Laos and serve to cut ground from under Arab-Asian attacks against French Union policy.4
- Drafted by Philip W. Bonsal (PSA), Ward P. Allen (EUR), and Ridgway B. Knight (WE). Repeated for information to Bangkok as telegram 2105, to Saigon as 2177, to London as 7275. and to USUN at New York as 425.↩
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Telegram 2078 to Bangkok, May 6, repeated to Paris as telegram 5506, summarized a conversation between the Secretary of State and Pote Sarasin, the Thai Ambassador, on May 5. The telegram read in part as follows: “Thai Ambassador inquired possibility U.N. resolution dealing threat from Laos. Secretary indicated Thai Government might desire itself raise question of threat to Thailand under Article 34 at this time before actual aggressive action against Thailand on grounds (1) Thailand would derive maximum possible benefit by focusing attention world on Thailand’s position which might act as deterrent and (2) if Thailand waits until after aggression occurred damage already done.” (751J.00/5–653)
Telegram 2084 to Bangkok, repeated to Paris as 5514, May 6, not printed, summarized a Dulles-Sarasin conversation of May 6. (792.5 MSP/5–653) The conversations of May 5 and May 6 concerned military aid to Thailand as well as the question of action at the United Nations. For the memoranda of the two conversations, see volume xii.
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Ambassador Sarasin met with John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs, on May 8 to discuss procedure. Hickerson assured the Ambassador of full U.S. support for Thai action in the United Nations. The meeting is recorded in Hickerson’s memorandum of conversation of May 8 and in telegram 2124 to Bangkok, May 11. (751J.00/5–853; 330/5–1153)
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In telegram 5879 from Paris, May 9, Ambassador Dillon reported that the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been approached regarding the possibility of Thailand bringing the Laotian case to the United Nations. He summarized the French position as follows: “Foreign Office attitude on this question is not one of all-out opposition to Thailand taking case to United Nations but it is unmistakably clear that Foreign Office continues to believe under present circumstances disadvantages outweigh advantages and strongly hopes Thailand will not take such action.” (751J.00/5–953) On the same date, Dillon also transmitted telegram 5884, which read as follows: “During meeting with Mayer this afternoon he discussed with me question of possible Siamese appeal to United Nations. In view of present military situation with Viet Minh forces in Laos withdrawing, he does not feel an appeal by Thailand would be appropriate. On the other hand, if Viet Minh forces had reached the Mekong and established themselves there, he said an appeal by Thailand would obviously have been called for and it would have been strongly supported by France and Laos.
“He then said that the decision whether or not to appeal to the United Nations had been a difficult one and that he had finally agreed with Bidault that appeal should not be made because of fear that it might very well have led to more active Chinese intervention.” (751J.00/5–953)
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