751G.00/5–753
Memorandum of Conversation, by Edmund A. Gullion of the Policy Planning Staff
Subject:
- Discussion of Indochina
Participants:
- Mr. Justice W. O. Douglas
- Senator Mansfield, Ohio [Montana]
- Senator Kennedy, Massachusetts1
- Mr. Newton, American Friends Service Committee
- Mr. Costello, Columbia Broadcasting System
- Mr. Edmund Gullion, Dept. of State
- Mr. Gene Gregory, Dept. of State
- [Name deleted]
- M. Ngo Dinh Diem, Catholic Vietnamese Nationalist leader.
The above were present at a luncheon at the Supreme Court Building arranged by Mr. Justice Douglas. During lunch and for about an hour afterwards, [name deleted] and Mr. Diem discoursed on Indochina and answered questions, chiefly from Mr. Douglas and Senator Kennedy.
In general, Mr. Diem believes that nothing less than an immediate promise of Dominion status will satisfy the Vietnamese populations that they have something to fight for in Indochina. He and [name deleted] believe that the French are now showing a tendency to grant more concessions but that these are “too little and too late”. (Diem used the English phrase.) Diem insisted particularly and at length on the character of the French Union and its governing bodies in which Associated States sovereignty was specifically circumscribed.
. . . . . . .
Diem took a less charitable view of Ho Chi Minh. He thought there could be no liberty under the Communists. He did not believe that Ho Chi Minh [Page 554] was free to make decisions and he was not even sure that he was alive. The trouble in Vietnam was, he said, that there was no rallying point in between the Communists and the French. In response to questions, he said the Vietnamese still needed French troops. If they were withdrawn, the Vietnamese could not look forward to any liberty under Communist domination, but the fault would be attributable to the Franco-Bao Dai regime, which had balked at building up an army or government and would leave nothing behind which could offer the Vietnamese real protection and sovereignty.
Diem recounted his relations with Ho Chi Minh: In 1946, Ho Chi Minh had “isolated” Diem in a tribal mountain village. After six months, he asked him to join his government. Diem says he told Ho Chi Minh that since he knew Ho was a Communist, he would require assurance that he would be privy to all decisions and get full information. The Vietnamese people did not want Communist control. Diem’s supporters required that Diem be given the Interior Ministry and charge of Police in the Ho Chi Minh Government. Ho hesitated before this request for some weeks, but on the advice of his colleagues, eventually refused.
Both Vietnamese at the luncheon expressed a poor opinion of Bao Dai, who they thought had little influence or respect. Premier Tam was “honest”, but he had very little popularity, he was a “Frenchman” and as a Southerner, he had little credit in the North.
In response to questions, Diem said that he expected to go to France shortly where he would find understanding among some French groups, who had begun to be puzzled and resentful of France’s failures in Indochina. Once in France, however, he was not sure that he could get an exit visa for Vietnam. The Communists had sworn to assassinate him in Vietnam, but he was equally aware that many others would like to be rid of him. He denied that this was his reason for staying away; what he lacked was a platform of any political context in which he could do useful work for his country.
He thought that the French military understood the problem better than the French civil Government. In any case, the French could not beat the Communists and would have to rely on the Vietnamese to do it. They could not get the Vietnamese to undertake the task, however, unless the Viets had more freedom.
Both men expressed admiration of the declaration recently made by the King of Cambodia to the New York Times.
Both men thought Vietnam would have had a better chance to gain its independence under General DeLattre than under M. Letourneau.
- On May 7, 1953, Sen. John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts addressed a letter to Secretary of State Dulles concerning Indochina. Senator Kennedy expressed concern regarding the deterioration of the situation. Contending that the French had not succeeded in mobilizing the support of the native population to any significant degree, he stated that “the American people want in exchange for their assistance the establishment of conditions that will make success a prospect and not defeat inevitable.” He enclosed a list of 47 questions on the situation. Thruston B. Morton, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, replied to the Senator on May 13 with regard to the general outlines of U.S. policy toward Indochina. By letter of June 12, 1953, the Assistant Secretary responded to the 47 specific questions. This unclassified correspondence is in file 751G.00/5–753.↩