Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 154
United States Minutes of Meeting at the White House, May 7, 1953, 12:15 p.m.1
Participants
- u.s.
- President Eisenhower
- Secretary of State
- Assistant Secretary of Defense Nash
- Assistant Secretary of State Merchant
- canadian
- Canadian Prime Minister
- Secretary of State for External Aifairs Pearson
- Canadian Ambassador Hume Wrong
[Here follows discussion of subjects other than Indochina.]
The President stated that the situation in Laos gives pause and in many respects poses a more serious threat than Korea. He said that whereas the public has an instinctive desire to win the war in Korea he knows of no responsible US official who wants to risk extending hostilities and added that for the moment the wisest course to pursue is that which we are now following and that we should explore to the last corner the possibility of genuine Soviet intentions to reduce tension, though he had no thought that there was any permanent change in the long-term objectives of the Soviet. He remarked that in 1945 Stalin had told him of the need for internal relaxation from the sustained war effort and suggested that possibly the new Soviet leadership believed that relaxation of internal tensions was necessary.
The Secretary of State agreed that the Russians were no doubt encountering difficulty in adjusting their internal machinery to Stalin’s death. He noted that the Russians might calculate that an Armistice in Korea might well sow seeds of division among the Western nations. He [Page 552] went on to say that the development in Laos was disturbing and that he had talked twice in the last two days to the Thai Ambassador. The Thais are concerned and anxious to ask the Security Council to study the situation, a project in which he saw certain advantages. Secretary Dulles then described briefly the situation in Thailand and South East Asia in general.
Secretary Pearson asked if he considered favorably the proposed creation of a Peace Observation Group.
The Secretary of State replied that he was considering such a proposal which seemed to him suited to the situation and noted that the idea had originated with him in the General Assembly of 1950.
Secretary Pearson commented that the French were trying to create the impression that Indochina and Korea were two facets of the same front. Whereas he agreed that militarily they might be, he doubted that this was the case politically since one was a UN operation and the other had some of the characteristics of a quasi-colonial situation.
The President at this point interjected that the French should make an unequivocal declaration of their intentions with respect to the Associated States after the conclusion of military operations. He expressed the belief that the only chance of preserving South East Asia lay in making sure of the support of the native peoples. He went on that regulars can’t win against guerrillas who have indigenous support and added that many years ago that fact was proved in the case of General Braddock. He added that his impression was that the Vietnamese were in part indifferent to the struggle and got some enjoyment from seeing the French kicked around. He also thought the French should send an outstanding military commander who could inspire the effort as de Lattre had and concurrently the French should announce to the world their post hostilities intentions.
The Secretary of State remarked that we have been pressing the French to let Laos raise the issue of aggression in the UN, that he had discussed it in forceful terms in Paris but that the French were reluctant possibly being fearful that they thereby might be forced into making a declaration of broad commitment.
There were some further exchanges in which there seemed to be agreement that time was lacking for gradualism in Indochina and that the French should not take counsel of their fears over the effects elsewhere in their empire of a forthright political declaration with regard to Indochina.
[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]