Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751J.00/5–353: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Paris, May 3, 1953—5 p.m.

5766. Repeated information priority Saigon 244, London 1210, USUN New York 58. Embtel 5755.¹ I saw Bidault at 7 Sunday [Saturday] evening² at his request. He asked me to forward to the Secretary his heartfelt thanks for the Secretary’s public statement on Laos³ and for arranging to make available the six C–119s with civilian crews.⁴ He then told me that the French Government for reasons given in full in an unsigned memo, translation of which follows by airpouch,⁵ did not wish to take the case of Laos to the UN. He stated that Mayer and Auriol were both in full agreement with this decision.

Summary of memo follows:

1. The debate could not be limited and would stray far afield. Many members of the UN like to bring cases against states having overseas responsibilities i.e., administration, protection and tutelage. It would not seem desirable to give free rein to this sort of debate on a question that is solely one of security.

2. A condemnation of aggression by a majority of the Security Council that was only obtained with difficulty would be of dubious value.

A later appeal to the Assembly would either not receive a favorable majority or if it did would pose the question of sanctions the imposition of which would raise many problems and could not help but aggravate international tensions in a way that would probably help the Viet Minh. This would be so because it could cause an increase in aid from China, an increase that as in Korea could even lead to open and effective intervention.

3. Soviet opposition to an appeal to the UN on behalf of Laos, would force the Soviets to harden their present foreign policy and take a firm position on Indochina. It would be better not to force them to this course now in the hope that after an armistice in Korea, the Indochina problem could be taken up as part of an over-all Far Eastern settlement.

4. The difficulties mentioned above could be avoided and the same results achieved by the issuance of a declaration by the 16-powers now fighting in Korea. Alternatively this declaration could be made by the 35 powers that have recognized Laos but Bidault foresaw more difficulty in obtaining unanimity from the 35 powers than from the 16 so he is inclined to prefer obtaining the declaration from the 16 powers now fighting in Korea. Suggested wording of declaration follows:

“We, members of the UN who participate in the action in Korea, approve the efforts which are now being carried on toward the conclusion of an armistice, the first step toward the restoration of peace in the Far East.

We consider however, that this peace is indivisible and we cannot conceal the apprehension (nous ne saurions taire l’apprehension) caused us by the events of which Laos is the victim. Disapproving of this aggression, we affirm our solidarity with Laos, in the struggle, which aided by the forces of the French Union, it is carrying on for the restoration of peace and security on its territory.” (Note: Suggestion re possible use of 35 powers came from Bidault orally and was not part of memo.)

French Government also suggests that as a practical matter the recommendation of the Honolulu Conference re the establishment of a “staff agency” for Southeast Asia should be immediately implemented and that the question of cooperation with Thailand in the Laos situation should be submitted to this staff agency on a priority basis.

Bidault then repeated with great deliberation and seriousness his own personal feeling that the situation in Laos while of course serious was not as direly serious as many people both in the military and political fields seemed to think.

Dillon

1. Dated Apr. 30, p. 528.
2. Sunday was May 3.
3. For text, see telegram 2116 to Saigon, May 2, p. 536.

4. In telegram 5470 to Paris, May 1, Secretary Dulles directed Ambassador Dillon to pass the following message to Premier Mayer: “My dear Mr. President: Last Sunday [Apr. 26] you mentioned your need for C–119 aircraft in Indochina. I looked into this matter immediately upon my return to Washington and I am now pleased to inform you that we have been able to overcome the difficulties which I had told you about. Six of these aircraft will be made available with arrangements for civilian pilots to operate them until French military pilots can be trained. The details of the arrangements will be worked out between your military authorities and our Military Assistance Advisory Groups in Paris and Saigon.” (751G.5/5–153)

   Telegram 5457 to Paris, Apr. 30, indicated that Assistant Secretary of State Robertson had advised French Ambassador Bonnet of this decision on Apr. 30. (751G.5/4–3053)

5. The text and translation of the French memorandum were transmitted to Washington in despatch 2397 from Paris, May 4, not printed. (751J.00/6–453)