751.563’51G/5–253
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Bonsal) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Knight)
Subject:
- Possible French Decision to Withdraw from Indochina
I agree with much that you say in your memorandum of May 1 on the above subject.
I should appreciate your judgment of the effect on French thinking regarding Indochina of our conveying to the French Government “the necessity from the US point of view of improving French political and military leadership in Indochina” (NSC Action No. 773)1 or, in the words of General Vandenberg, to tell the French that they must change by 180 degrees their political and military handling of matters in Indochina. It seems to me that no matter how tactfully this is done, it will produce a feeling of resentment and discouragement which will not help the few people in the French Government who wish to persevere in Indochina and who are already, as you point out, under heavy attack.
I agree with you that what is needed now are evidences of our continuing support. However, I do not know just how that support can be pledged to the French, beyond what has already been done, in the absence of some knowledge of what we will have available in fiscal 1954.
We must consider not only the French frame of mind but that of the Vietnamese, Cambodians and Laotians. Under present circumstances I think that these people as well as the French would be extremely vulnerable to a proposed solution of the Indochina situation [Page 538] on a “democratic” basis the result of which would be to leave civil controls in the hands of whoever controls the armies of Ho Chi Minh, i.e., the Communists.
I think that all the efforts of the French and ourselves at the present time should be devoted to building up as much military strength as possible in Indochina by October 1, 1953 when the new fighting season begins in the north. We and the French should consider added forces from the French Union. Before entirely rejecting the possibility of sending American forces there (perhaps only air) we should face and answer the question of whether the situation can still be saved through the unaided efforts of the French and the Associated States. We cannot afford to cloud our thinking on this subject by insisting on mirages of miraculous transformations of the military and political conduct of the French and their local allies in the next few months.