PSA files, lot 54 D 190. “Indochina”
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
Subject:
- Connection between Korean and Indochina Settlements
In considering the US response to the French refusal to take the matter of aggression in Laos before the UN and their suggestion for a declaration by the 16 nations now fighting in Korea against the Communists, EUR believes that we must clarify our thinking as to our intentions regarding the “interdependence” of the Korean and Indochinese conflicts and their settlement—a clarification that requires early consideration in its own right. The argument to be reiterated that would have the most effect on the French would be that the UN action must be taken so that the Indochina war would have status enabling its international negotiation. The implications of an approach to the UN powers would also require clarification in our own minds of this “interdependence” and what the US intends to do about it.
The principal ray of light in a most discouraging situation which the French see and therefore which perhaps is likely to be the main factor contributing to their willingness to continue efforts in Indochina is the possibility that through some connection between peace talks in Korea and the war in Indochina an honorable settlement of the Indochina war might be achieved. At any moment that it may become clear that hostilities have ceased in Korea and that they may indefinitely continue in Indochina, even without open Chinese intervention, it is quite likely that the French would decide to “throw in the sponge” by the initiation of separate negotiations with Ho Chi Minh with a view to insuring their evacuation.
We have made statements during the past few months that have become more and more specific and which the French would interpret as a commitment:
- 1.
- In the State of the Union Message2 President Eisenhower stated:
“In this general discussion of our foreign policy, I must make special mention of the war in Korea.
“This war is, for Americans, the most painful phase of Communist aggression throughout the world. It is clearly a part of the same calculated assault that the aggressor is simultaneously pressing [Page 541] in Indochina and in Malaya, and of the strategic situation that manifestly embraces the island of Formosa and the Chinese Nationalist forces there. The working out of any military solution to the Korean war will inevitably affect all these areas.”
- 2.
The communiqué issued after the talks with Prime Minister Mayer included the following:
[Here follows the extract of the Communiqué of March 28, 1953, printed on page 436.]
- 3.
- Lastly, the President’s message of April 163 specified that:
“The first great step along this way must be the conclusion of honorable armistice in Korea.
“This means the immediate cessation of hostilities and the prompt initiation of political discussions leading to the holding of free elections in a united Korea.
“It should mean—no less importantly—an end to the direct and indirect attacks upon the security of Indochina and Malaya. For any armistice in Korea that merely released aggressive armies to attack elsewhere would be a fraud.
“We seek, throughout Asia as throughout the world, a peace that is true and total”
If Korea and Indochina are not linked immediately at least in US Government positions, it may be for all practical purposes useless to do so subsequently. If there should be an armistice which would be followed by discussions limited to a political settlement for Korea and not including a general Far Eastern settlement the Chinese during the period of discussions could be freed to intervene with “volunteers” in the Indochinese theater and in a few weeks achieve a fait accompli with de facto Red occupation of Indochina except possibly for French pockets at Hanoi, Haiphong and Saigon.
One of the main difficulties facing us in linking immediately Indochina with Korea in any negotiation involving the UN would be the extreme reluctance of a majority of members of the UN to do so. While the factors that influence this majority would widely differ they would, nevertheless, represent compelling reasons:
The Arab-Asian bloc would be adverse to intervening in a “colonial war” and could be expected to object to “pulling French chestnuts out of the fire”; furthermore public opinion in the majority of the nations participating in the fighting in Korea (in particular in the US) would be gravely concerned about the introduction of any additional problem which could prolong the fighting in Korea.
Because of the situation outlined above, we should make up our minds just as soon as possible concerning the following:
- 1.
- How do we propose to implement the statements which we have made concerning the “interdependence” between the struggles in Korea and in Indochina?
- 2.
- If we think the Indochinese situation should be introduced into possible future UN talks on Korea, when should this take place. Before the armistice, after the armistice, or precisely at what stage?
Assuming we have reached a decision on the above general principles we should decide:
- a.
- With whom in the UN and how would we go about obtaining agreement for our point of view?
- b.
- Should we not make clear to the French that Indochina must be formally put before the UN before we can attempt the above?
- c.
- When and where do we discuss this with the French: Paris, Washington, New York, or a combination of the above?
- d.
- What kind of a “political solution” do we envisage for Indochina? Thoughts on this will be the subject of a separate memorandum.4
- Drafted by Ridgway B. Knight, Deputy Director, and William D. Fisher of the Office of Western European Affairs.↩
- For information on the President’s State of the Union Message, Feb. 2, 1953, see editorial note, p. 376.↩
- For information on the President’s “Chance for Peace” speech of Apr. 16, 1953, see editorial note, p. 472.↩
- Reference is to the memorandum from Knight to Merchant of May 6; for text, see p. 544.↩