790.00/2–453

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs ( Allison )

top secret

Subject:

  • Discussion of Far Eastern Questions

Participants:

  • Admiral Arthur W. Radford, USN
  • John M. Allison, Assistant Secretary of State

Admiral Radford called this morning and spent something over an hour in the general discussion of Far Eastern matters. The following [Page 385] is a brief summary by topics of the subjects upon which he expressed an opinion.

Indo-China. Admiral Radford stated that he had sent a highly qualified Marine Colonel, who was a graduate of the French Artillery School, to Indo-China recently with a small group of officers to make a study of the situation and to deliver to General Salan certain verbal communications which he did not wish to put in writing. These had mainly to do with questions as to why the offensive action, which General Salan had informed Admiral Radford during the latter’s visit to Indo-China last October would be forthcoming, had not taken place. As a result of this survey Admiral Radford has come to two conclusions, one of them optimistic and one pessimistic. The first is that under present conditions, with present material and manpower and if already obligated U.S. assistance continues, it should be impossible for the Vietminh forces to throw the French out of the Tonkin Delta. While French officers state that if the Chinese Communists should attack in force in conjunction with the Vietminh the French Union forces could hold out for 30 days in the Haiphong area, Admiral Radford and his staff believe that if there was a determined will to resist that the French forces could hold out almost indefinitely and make the situation very difficult for the Communists. This might require some American aid in the form of air and naval support, but in Admiral Radford’s opinion the French Union forces might be able to do it alone. The pessimistic conclusion to which the Admiral had come was that unless the French radically change their outlook and adopt a much more aggressive spirit than now prevailing, they would not be able to bring the present campaign to a successful conclusion. According to the Admiral, the Marine Colonel stated that two good American divisions with the normal American aggressive spirit could clean up the situation in the Tonkin Delta in 10 months. The French military apparently is dominated by a defensive type of thinking with the result that they do not take sufficient risks nor do they follow through when they have achieved some initial success.

Admiral Radford did, however, state that some fault lay on the American side, particularly with respect to the furnishing of airplanes and spare parts. Too often the United States had furnished planes and an initial supply of spare parts and then had forgotten about the matter with the result that a year later the planes again needed to be overhauled and new parts were not available. Admiral Radford suggested several possible remedies to this situation:

1.
The establishment in Indo-China of large replacement depots under skilled American direction;
2.
The manufacture of the necessary spare parts in Japan;
3.
The possible manufacture of some such parts in Formosa where the Chinese already have made considerable progress in this type ofactivity.

It was the Admiral’s belief that if the United States was to continue to pour in large amounts of assistance to Indo-China, it was essential that we take a more hardboiled attitude with the French in order to get them to adopt a more aggressive policy. According to the Admiral, some of the top officers in Indo-China were anxious to adopt such a policy but apparently are prevented from doing so by instructions from above, presumably from Paris.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]