751G.5/2–653: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
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1566. Eyes only Allison from Heath. No distribution outside Dept. Deptel 1606, February 3.1 In my opinion, there should be absolutely no reduction in transport plane availability in Indochina during next few months at least. After May and through October, there will be the rainy and flooded season when it would be impossible for French to effect simultaneous parachute drop of three battalions. But until the end of May (during which month operations in south Viet may still be feasible, possibly involving all available transport planes) the opportunity may present itself for General Salan to execute advantageously a simultaneous three battalion parachute drop probably to recapture Dien Bien Phu. With Lai Chau and Nasan now strongly fortified, the recapture of Dien Bien Phu would enable him to dispute Viet Minh control of Thai country and protect Laos. Other opportunities may also present themselves in north and center in next two months for maximum parachute operations.
To be sure, Salan can give no certain assurances that there will be operations involving the simultaneous use of the 100 transport planes of which he now disposes. He is not fully utilizing these planes at present moment. Nevertheless, if our policy is for French to work toward [Page 387] decisive victory in Indochina as soon as possible, they should not be short the necessary armament, of which transport planes are a most important item.
It will be recalled that last fall we loaned 21 extra C–47’s and helped persuade the French to lend another 29 on Salan’s statement that he needed them to undertake offensive airborne operations in early November. Viet Minh, however, got jump on French by initiating operations in Thai country resulting in fall of Nghia Lo and Dien Bien Phu. Salan was therefore unable to make the offensive use of the transport planes he—and we—had hoped. Instead he elected to fortify the airstrip at Nasan. Nasan was almost entirely manned and supplied by airlift and during the days preceding the attack, during the attack and for a short time thereafter, all French transport planes, including the 50 additional ones, were in constant use, one should say in overuse. These planes can be said, therefore, to have made possible the defensive operation at Nasan and they actually saved Nasan against Viet Minh attacks which were quite bloodily repulsed.
However, General Salan figures that he will probably not be able to get an extension of the loan of these 50 planes and is willing to settle for keeping 30 of them. Of the 29 C–47’s furnished by French, 20 are committed under NATO and 6 of them have recently been sent back. The other 9 planes are needed for pilot training in France. French have ordered him to return all 29 planes by end of February, although there has been some indication he might retain 4. General Lecheres, Chief of Staff French Air Force, has just arrived and Letourneau arrived this morning. Salan is going to endeavor to persuade them to cancel the order for return of these planes but realizes that he may be unsuccessful, since French Defense Ministry which, he says, is more “NATO-minded than Indochina-minded” may prove adamant. He knows also that French cannot take away or fail to return matériel which is committed under NATO with [without] the consent of other NATO members, particularly the US. American Air Force has also called for return of 21 planes it lent on grounds, I understand, that they will be needed in Korean operations. I venture opinion from here that in present quasi-stalemate in Korea those planes are not needed by Air Force. For example, the Air Force has under charter several planes of CAT. Since they have to use these a minimum number of hours per month, they have grounded certain Air Force planes because there is not enough transport duty to use latter. Of course, if Korean operations are to be intensified or expanded in the immediate future, it might well be that the return of these 21 planes would be necessary.
[Page 388]Any decision to extend the term of the loan of these planes may meet with the opposition of the Air Section of MAAG which is inclined, I think, to take a rather narrow attitude toward French requests. The Air Section of MAAG quite properly points out that when USAF lent these planes to French, it was on the understanding that French would furnish sufficient pilots and maintenance crews. French furnished first but have been unable, and probably will be for some time, to furnish full maintenance, according to American standards, of the transport planes they now have. At the present time, in fact, to repair and overhaul the planes now used we have had to fly in a temporary maintenance group of 25 Americans now operating at Nhatrang. Air Section of MAAG estimates that the French maintenance forces can only maintain a total of about 65 transport planes in addition to its work of keeping up French fighter and bomber squadrons. They are inclined to make invidious comparisons of relatively full utilization of our transport planes in Korea with what they term “under-utilization” of transport planes by French Indochinese Command. General Trapnell and I both agreed last summer that the Air Section of MAAG seemed rather to miss the point. Our support of the loan of extra planes to French was not in expectation that they would be used steadily, but that they would be available when good opportunities for maximum parachute troop and supply operations presented themselves. The question of insufficient maintenance according to ideal standards is a secondary one. It could be solved by keeping on for awhile the American maintenance group temporarily detailed here or by making arrangements with a commercial company for maintenance. CAT, for example, for two years has suggested leasing both planes and maintenance facilities here and their offer still stands. Since CAT is too tied up in the French mind with Nationalist China, Willaue of CAT is quite willing to form a Delaware corporation under another name to provide up to say six planes and maintenance facilities and crews (the latter would be mainly Chinese, however, from Formosa). CAT states that crews and facilities could be in Indochina in 6 months if Defense Department gives priorities for certain articles of machinery.
I suggest you get in touch with General Trapnell who at present is still on consultation in Washington where he can be reached care of General Eddleman, G–3,2 Department of Army.
Foregoing telegram has not been shown to MAAG or Service Attachés.
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Telegram 1606 to Saigon, Feb. 3, 1953, read as follows:
“Eyes only Ambassador Heath from Allison. Arrangements under which additional C–47 transport planes were made available last fall for use in Indochina are expiring and desirability of extension if possible must be considered. Trapnell familiar with recent information available to MAAG and Defense. Please discuss with him and let us have recommendation on basis local situation.
“Should we contemplate reduction in transport plane availability in Indochina at this time?” (751G.5/2–353)
↩ - Maj. Gen. Clyde D. Eddleman, Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3, Operations, U.S. Army.↩