751G.00/2–453
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of VietnamLaos-Cambodia Affairs (Hoey)
Subject:
- Current Developments in Indochina
Participants:
- DMS—Messrs. Tannenwald and Paul
- MSA—Mr. Bunting1
- S/MSA—Mr. Martin
- S/P—Messrs. Ferguson and Stelle
- FE-Mr. Allison
- PSA—Messrs. Bonsal, Hoey, Laukhuff
- Brig. Gen. Trapnell, Chief, MAAG, Saigon
During a discussion on February 2, 1953, General Trapnell, who has been on short consultation in Washington, and who is returning to Indochina February 3rd, discussed various aspects of the Indochina situation.
General Trapnell spoke in an optimistic vein regarding the general situation, making the points that the Franco-Vietnamese forces, particularly if increased by new units now under consideration, would probably have the capability of breaking the back of the Viet Minh within about eighteen months. He characterized French tactics as being “too conservative”, but felt that the increase of approximately 40,000 men in the Viet-Nam National Army now being considered should enable the Franco-Vietnamese forces to achieve substantial victories. He further believed that while success in Indochina would not be achieved solely through military means, military successes would be a necessary prerequisite to political progress.
He said that it had been apparent for some time that additional Vietnamese forces would be required in order to achieve victories and that at least three different plans for enlarging the Viet-Nam National Army had been developed. General Trapnell did not know what the final plan would be, but stated that it was to have been pouched [Page 383] from Saigon on the 28th of January2 and should be in Washington shortly. He mentioned that this plan would be tentative in that it had not yet been approved by the French military authorities in Paris. General Trapnell believed that there would be sufficient funds in the FY 1953–54 MDAP Program to supply all of the armament for the contemplated forces, but he felt the cost of paying and maintaining the troops would be beyond the combined abilities of France and Viet-Nam and that the United States would be called upon to supply funds toward that purpose. He did not know how this could be arranged, but hoped that a solution could be found. He contemplated the additional forces would be approximately 40,000 men organized into 57 battalions with 19 heavy weapons companies.3
He discussed the difficulty in finding suitable officer candidates for the Viet-Nam National Army and drew a parallel with his own experience in Korea. He said that the Korean Army had expanded from 50,000 up to 250,000 in a comparatively short time even though qualified American Army officers a few years ago had stated that Koreans could not be made into soldiers. He referred to the fact that in the Korean Army there were Corps commanders in their 20s. Under questioning he made the observation that he did not feel the United States should participate in the training of the Viet-Nam National Army. In the first place, he was sure that the French were better equipped, due to language facilities and experience in Indochina, to do that job.
When questioned as to whether or not a political solution would not first be necessary before a military decision could be successful, he replied in the negative. Military victories, particularly if participated in by units of the Viet-Nam National Army, he felt, would have, as he stated in his opening résumé, a desirable political result which would tend to draw the country together. It would attract persons not now supporting or participating in the Government of Viet-Nam.
He stated that he was not informed in advance of French tactical operations, except sufficiently in advance to be on the spot when they took place. This usually meant a day or two in advance.
When questioned as to his views on the MSA Program in Tonkin, he expressed the general view that it seemed an excessively expensive method of protecting the population (he referred here to Governor Tri’s for fortifying villages). He said even if you could put 300,000 people into fortified areas, you still had a total population of 7 million to worry about.
He felt that the Vietnamese made good soldiers and that many units of the Viet-Nam Army had fought well. He mentioned that desertions [Page 384] from the National Army had been more heavy in areas of the South where they were not engaged in combat than in the combat areas in Tonkin.
He felt that there would be a distinct advantage to having French officers visit Korea in order to observe American and ROK training methods and that General Allard had favored such a visit. He had not mentioned to General Allard, however, the inclusion of any Vietnamese officers in such a survey party. He mentioned that there were very few Viet-Nam National Army officers of field grade.
He referred in generally complimentary terms to General Hinh, but stated that General Hinh had had little opportunity to demonstrate any administrative ability.
General Trapnell agreed with views expressed by participants that the stalemate worked to the advantage of the enemy and that it would be necessary for the French High Command to adopt more aggressive tactics in order to achieve successes during calendar 1953–54, rather than planning long range operations beyond that date.
He mentioned that the French Air Force in Indochina operated at about one-half the capacity of similar U.S. Air Force units but did not know if this was the usual comparative ability of French and U.S. units say, for example, in Europe. He strongly felt that an addition of about 3,000 pilots and crews over and above the present 10,000 personnel ceiling in Indochina might almost double the capacity of the existing U.S. aircraft which we had provided for Indochina. He felt that such personnel additions should be made by the French. He mentioned that in Korea a typical U.S. airplane would have two crews assigned and would fly over 100 hours a month; in Indochina, .9 crews were assigned per airplane and 40 hours was considered a high number of flying hours per month.
Mr. Allison concluded the meeting by expressing the appreciation of all the participants for General Trapnell’s comprehensive and frank appraisal of the situation in Indochina.
- Frederick H. Bunting, Chief of the China-Indochina Division, Mutual Security Agency.↩
- Not identified.↩
- General Trapnell’s views on the expansion of the Vietnamese army were set forth in his letter of Dec. 20, 1952 to Gen. J. Lawton Collins, the Army Chief of Staff; for text, see United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 9, pp. 2–3.↩