751G.00/12–2252
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
Indochina
On Thursday afternoon, December 18, 1952, in Paris, Mr. Schuman asked Mr. Eden and me to meet him alone at the Quai D’Orsay at 7:00 o’clock. We met in Mr. Schuman’s office. He had present Mr. Letourneau, an interpreter, and an official of the Foreign Office to take notes. Mr. Schuman made a short introduction and Mr. Letourneau then took over. He spoke for about three-quarters of an hour, but his three points may be summed up as follows:
- 1.
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Mr. Letourneau’s Idea of the Viet Minh Strategy for the Coming Winter.
He said that the French believed that the attack on NaSan and the heavy concentrations in that area indicated that the Viet Minh intended this year to conduct an intensive campaign in the Thai country and against Laos for the purpose of overrunning the latter area. He believed that they intended to do this because they believe, first, that it is the most difficult part of Indochina for the French to defend on account of the long distances, difficult communications, small local forces for resistance. Second, it would open a new frontier with China and, most importantly, it would open a considerable frontier with Thailand. He believed that the Viet Minh believed that the reduction of Laos would accomplish a considerable part of their purposes in Indochina and exert strong pressure against Thailand without having to come to grips with the French Union Forces in the Hanoi Delta. This analysis led to his second point.
- 2.
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French Plans for Raising Troops.
The French had two plans for raising considerable numbers of lightly armed troops for the purpose of relieving combat divisions of security duties and allowing a concentration of forces to take part in offensive operations against the Viet Minh in the Thai country. The first plan was to raise what he described as militia regiments of between [Page 324] forty and sixty thousand men, who would be lightly armed and would require a number of French officers and NCO’s.
The second plan, as I recall it, was very much the same, except that the forces would be sort of auxiliary units to the regular Viet Nam army. Whichever line of development they choose would raise, so far as we are concerned, the same questions—which are additional equipment, arms, general assistance. He wanted urgently to discuss this with us.
- 3.
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Development of Recommendations Made by the Five-Power Conferences.1
He discussed at some length the recommendations of the Five-Power Conference to set up some sort of a liaison group, chiefly stressing the fact that the French regarded the recommendations as having considerable binding force.
As the hour was growing late and I had only a short time to get to the plane, I asked if I could make a brief statement and leave. I said the following:
I had no comments on the military strategy situation, which was obviously for others to consider.
On point 2 we would be very glad to send a working party after Christmas to Paris consisting of a State Department official, who would probably be Mr. Bonsal, a military officer, and an officer from Mr. Harriman’s outfit, all of whom would sit down with the French and develop full information regarding the situation in Indochina. I said that we were very dissatisfied with the information which we had, which was spotty, incomplete, and not current. We thought that General Trapnell was not getting much, if any, information, outside of supply matters. I urged Mr. Letourneau to take some steps to remedy this situation. The important thing, however, was to have a thorough and quick review so that we would know what the situation was and what we were doing if, as, and when we took any further steps. Mr. Letourneau and Mr. Schuman greeted this suggestion with enthusiasm and suggested that the mission might go to Saigon where the information was. I said that I was very firm about the fact that the mission was going to go where Mr. Letourneau was because I wanted him present to instruct people under his authority to give us the information, so that we would not be struggling with inferior officers without him present. I said that if he was in Saigon, we would send the mission to Saigon. If he was not, we would either not send it or send it to Paris. He agreed to this and said that he would let us know promptly where he would be. The next move is up to him.
[Page 325]On the third point, I said that instructions had been issued to Admiral Radford to detail an officer who would confer with the British and French officer and to set up a liaison group. I wanted it clearly understood that what Admiral Radford would discuss was the sort of liaison group which would operate under field conditions. We did not want a committee; we did not want secretaries; and we did not want minutes. All that was necessary was to have competent officers, who would exchange full information, so that the commanders of all three forces would be in touch and would be informed. I gathered from him that this was the sort of arrangement which he had in mind, although he did not commit himself in any detail. However, he said that what he contemplated in the first instance was a meeting of the commanders to work out the arrangements. Mr. Eden intervened to say that General Harding2 had instructed the British commander in Southeast Asia to meet at any agreed point. I said that this was a new idea to me and that I did not altogether see why Admiral Radford, who had just been in the Far East, should return there when some deputy might be adequate. However, I was not in a position to speak further on the subject, except that I could not commit Admiral Radford in person. I would report this suggestion to Washington and would then communicate with the Foreign Office as to whether Admiral Radford himself would be willing to meet or would send one of his staff officers.
The meeting then closed, apparently with general satisfaction.