Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.5/12–1852: Telegram

The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State

secret

Saigon, December 18, 1952—8 p.m.

1235. Rptd info Paris 192, Hanoi unnumbered. Cheysson, Fr dipl off whom Tam has chosen as polit counselor, returned yesterday from Paris. During Tam’s stay France Cheysson assisted him with his confs and speeches and after Tam’s departure conferred with Fr Min, polit personalities and Fr press. Cheysson came see me today and stated that:

1. There was no doubt that Fr budget IC wld be voted.

2. There was general agreement with Auriol, Pleven and officials of the Mins concerned that VN Natl Army must be increased by 30 to 40 battalions and that supplementary appropriations wld be voted during 1953, if necessary, to accomplish that increase, provided additional contributions were forthcoming from VN and US.

3. There was also general agreement that special milit effort wld be made clean up (next year) South VN, including Cochin China and central part of Central VN, of VM by middle 1953, with aim that by end of year only VN units completely VN officered wld be in control of area, Fr Union Forces being sent to north.

Cheysson said that there was general agreement re the necessity of both increasing VN Natl Army and cleaning up South VN, but that final agreement had not yet been reached with Fr High Command IC and Bao Dai.

Comment: Cleaning up South VN without delay is one Tam’s favorite projects. Salan said to me five months ago that, with any luck, he shld be able overcome organized Am [VM] milit resistance in south by end of 1953. Tam insists that it must be done earlier. My own view here is that it is more urgent clean up northern delta and that any mop-up operations in south should not take troops away or detract from milit operations in north.

4. It was almost certain that Letourneau will be replaced within next three months. Cheysson said there was general dissatisfaction with Letourneau’s being both Min for AS and High Commissioner. Cheysson refused speculate respecting the new High Comm, who, he said, wld have title of commissioner [garble]. He remarked that if RPF participated in present or a successor govt, someone, possibly General Koenig,¹ favored by RPF wld be chosen.

5. In few weeks, he felt, the present system of Fr representation in IC wld be changed. A commissioner general wld be named, with High Comms in each of three AS.

6. There was great deal criticism of and dissatisfaction with General Salan in Paris and distinct possibility that he might be replaced. Dismissal Gen Salan wld be unjust, Cheysson said, because he was thoroughly capable commander, but the feeling was general that the fall of Nghia Lo and failure to make progress in north were due to defective command. The real reason for latter was, of course, that Salan did not have sufficient reserve striking force.

Cheysson said that Tam and DefMin Tri had made very good impression in Paris. Cheysson was little worried that Bao Dai’s entourage was intriguing against Tam and asked my opinion on this point. I remarked that Bao Dai had told Tam that he still enjoyed his confidence and had agreed let Tam get rid of Giao and other elements of dissension or weakness in Cab. I also remarked that apparently Tam had been given permission hold local elections, altho Nguyen De, Bao Dai’s Cab director, had told me that he thought holding elections at this time was unwise. Cheysson said he understood that Bao Dai was against elections and Tam’s insistence on them was bold and, perhaps, rather dangerous step. If Tam were allowed carry on from local elections to elections of Natl Assembly, the authority and role of Bao Dai wld be inevitably reduced. Cheysson concluded by saying that he thought it essential for progress in VN that Tam retain the premiership for some time to come.

Heath

1. General of the Army Pierre Koenig, a member of the French National Assembly; a prominent Free French military commander during World War II.