790.00/12–2052: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
1248. Rptd info Paris unn, Hanoi unn. Fol is my comment on numbered parts of abbreviated text “Bukit Serene conference” conclusions and recommendations transmitted Deptel 1250, Dec. 17.1
- 2.
- It is true that Fr have for time being lost initiative northern areas outside delta, but I do not believe it is likely that gen situation will “develop badly.” The original plan for the present campaign season was not alone to bring enemy against prepared defense in Tonkin delta, but also to take advantage increased capacity to drop parachute troops obtained by loan 29 Fr and 21 Amer C–47s to force enemy units outside delta perimeter to battle against parachute battalions dropped in their rear flank and motorized mobile groups thrusting [Page 326] out from delta. The loss of Nghia Lo faced French with problem of abandoning Thai country or digging in at Na San, the only good point in area which cld be manned and supplied by airlift. It was decided to try hold Thai country and Na San defenses were quickly built up to resist mass VM attack. In fact, VM attacks were bloodily repulsed Nov 24, Dec 1 and 2. Linares’ estimates of 3,000 VM dead and 6,000 casualties in operations from Nghia Lo to the unsuccessful assaults on Na San may be somewhat high, but it is certain that VM losses relatively heavy. Na San now is so competently and heavily fortified that under present conditions VM cannot take it and it is unlikely will now attack it. Of course, decision hold Na San ties down ten of best battalions of Fr mobile reserves. On other hand, operation also tying division or thereabouts of VM troops on guard against sorties or evacuation from Na San. If VM reduces this watching force in order strengthen present movements against delta, they wld risk sorties from Na San against the guarding force, which aided by Fr air monopoly might succeed in causing severe losses to them—or Fr cld reduce Na San garrison which cld always be restrengthened. I do not believe that Fr reserves inadequate to “achieve success” in Na San operation, altho it is now clear that to achieve any early decisive victories against total VM forces in north, Fr-Viet forces must be considerably and rapidly increased.
- 3.
- It is, of course, true that, if Na San were lost, the polit and mil consequences wld be serious, but not fatal. The Thai country wld be lost and Laos open to invasion. It is not clear what is meant by statement that, if Na San is held, it wld likely be only at great cost. It is quite unlikely that holding Na San wld result in any heavy casualties for Fr-Viet forces. It is true that airlift to Na San imposes cost in gas, mechanical depreciation French transport planes. French must increase aviation maintenance crews and US shld and can contribute to solution this problem. It is also true that important element Fr forces may remain tied up in area, but it also ties down there VM troops which will have some supply difficulties.
- 4.
- There is no question but that Fr require reinforcements. Merely to restore situation, one division shld be at least sufficient, since it wld compensate the battalions now garrisoned Na San. If Fr had had two extra divisions (see Joint Weeka 47, Nov. 22 [23],2 they wld not have had to break off their thrust at Phu Tho. They wld have remained in that area athwart VM supply lines and forces VM to attack against superior fire, possibly resulting in quite decisive VM defeat. There is no question but that an increase in air effort, which means [Page 327] more planes and crews, wld be extremely valuable. With more pilots and maintenance crews, the Fr cld almost double effectiveness of their present air fleet.
- 5.
- It is not our understanding there is any firm Fr governmental decision withdraw Fr Union forces in late 1954 to extent of dissolving Indochina command and withdrawal all but garrison forces for Fr Union def. I do not know where the Bukit conf got that idea. Some Viet units will be passed to Viet Natl Army, but we know of no intention effect any important reduction in Fr Union forces in 1953 (only two battalions, not of first quality, slated to be withdrawn according most recent info available to Emb). As far as I know, no statement or decision has been made to turn supreme command over to Viet in 1954, nor has any such advance request been estimated by Viet govt. At present latter is thinking only of obtaining autonomous area commands of Viet forces but always under Fr High Command. Bao Dai and DefMin and Viet Chief of Staff quite thoroughly realize that Fr Union forces and Fr High Command are necessary as long as chance of Chi invasion persists. Viet army by mid-1954 will consist almost entirely of infantry with inadequate armor and artillery, practically no aviation or naval forces, and thus completely unprepared to withstand modern Chi army, or probably even modernized VM army if latter equipped with armor, artillery, and aviation.
It is true that in the short term, if by that is meant few months, reinforcements cld only be supplied by France but over a somewhat longer period the troops can be supplied by the Viets, provided Fr lend field grade offs and a stiffening of Fr NCOs. Both Fr and Viets are now thinking of an additional increase of Viet Natl Army by thirty to forty thousand men during next twelve months or so (over and above the 13 new battalions already scheduled) with part of increase ready for action in second half 1953. In addition, Gov Tri in north desires to increase local militia from 24,000 to 40,000 and this has been agreed to in principle by Fr HICOM. The situation wld be more than restored and indeed decisively altered if the Fr cld send two additional divisions now, taking them back when substantial part of the thirty or forty thousand additional Viet troops now being considered wld be ready for action. It is realized, of course, this wld involve conflict with present Fr official opinion and temporary non-fulfillment of Fr requirements under NATO, but NATO has recently passed res indicating that maintenance of Fr effort in Indochina is in line with NATO aims. The Fr cld supply a division or two if they wld abolish their prohibition against ordering Fr conscripts to serve abroad. Our draftees serve in Korea and there is no valid argument against Fr conscripts serving in Indochina. The foregoing has been shown to Gen [Page 328] Trapnell and has his general approval, and to service attachés who are still studying situation.