788.5/12–1554
No. 506
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy
Under Secretary of State (Murphy)1
During an informal and cordial after luncheon conversation at General Ridgway’s house, at which were present the Shah of Iran, Ambassador Entezam, General Ridgway and myself, there was a lengthy discussion of the strategic situation affecting Iran. General Ridgway, using a map of the Middle East, went over the major outlines of the strategic situation. The Shah spoke at considerable length regarding the exposure of his country to eventual Soviet invasion and the importance of his forces providing a holding operation. He emphasized the strategic value of the Kermanshah area where the most important resistant elements would be located, as [Page 1075] this area joins Iraq and Turkey. He described satisfactory relations now prevailing between Iran and Iraq, but was more reserved regarding the Turks. He pointed to the strong religious influences which affect the attitude of many of the tribes in Iran which make for harmonious relations between elements in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
On the question of Iranian participation in the Turkish-Pakistan alliance, the Shah said this alliance in its present limited scope really made no sense as the parties were separated by 2,000 miles. It could only be made an effective working relation with Iranian and eventually Iraqi participation. Iran, however, in its present unprepared and unequipped state is in a very poor bargaining position and until its military strength has been increased, it is inadvisable to think of Iranian adherence to the alliance.
There was lengthy discussion of the value of the oil resources of the Middle East area, the importance of the sea lanes, the strategic air possibilities, and the Soviet potential in land forces and air forces in the Caucasus and Turkistan areas.
General Ridgway stressed two or three times that of course he was only authorized to talk in terms of technical military matters and that the question of finance and allocation rested with the civilian branch of the Government. This, the Shah said, he fully understood. General Ridgway skillfully avoided any form of commitment.
I took occasion to refer to the importance attaching to an improvement in Arab-Israeli relations expressing the hope that the Shah would bring his influence to bear. He nodded assent saying he understood.
With reference to the combat training personnel which the Department of Defense is sending to Iran, General Ridgway said that the first elements would probably arrive in Iran sometime in January and that the total group would not reach Iran until June. The Shah said this was deplorably slow and he hoped that the schedule might be expedited.
- Copies of this memorandum were distributed to General Ridgway, Under Secretary Hoover, Jernegan, and Nolting of S/MSA.↩