120.4382/5–1454
No. 212
Paper Approved by the Chiefs of
Mission Conference at Istanbul, May 11–14, 19541
Conference Statement on Middle East Defense Commenting on OIR Contribution to NIE 30–54, May 3, 19542
The Conference of Chiefs of Mission held at Istanbul May 11–14, 1954 considered in considerable detail the problem of defense of the Near and Middle East against a Soviet aggressor and in some respects, [Page 511] the generally prevailing opinion diverged from the conclusions embodied in the OIR contribution to NIE 30–54, May 3, 1954.
The Conference held the view that the current plans intended to insure Middle East defense should be considered as having their inception in the programs of aid for Greece and Turkey inaugurated in 1947 and that the abortive MEC and MEDO proposals in 1951 and 1952 were further moves in the same direction. The MEC and MEDO proposals failed in large part because they over-emphasized Western initiative. The view of the Conference was that in the Turk-Pakistani accord this over-emphasis had been alleviated and that expansion of the pact held out promise of organizing worthwhile forces within the area for its defense.
To achieve this end, the Conference believed that adherence of the other states of the “Northern Tier” i.e., Iraq and Iran, was of primary importance, and that adherence of certain other states was desirable in varying degrees. Those states were Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Afghanistan and Libya. It was not believed that Israel should adhere to the pact in the foreseeable future. The view was also held that U.S. and U.K. cooperation would be essential to the success of the organization as would U.S. military assistance.
General consideration of the problem of Regional Security in the Near and Middle East and the conference views thereon are given in another paper, and the following remarks deal primarily with the prospect of securing the participation of states of the area in an expanded Turk-Pakistani pact.
In addition to the desire for greater security, states of the region generally wish to enlarge or to improve their military establishment and so would be attracted in a greater or lesser degree by the prospect of U.S. bilateral grant military assistance.
Iraq signed a military aid agreement with the U.S. on April 21, 1954. The King, the Crown Prince Abdul Ilah, Nuri Pasha, and other Iraqi leaders are known to favor adherence to the Turk-Pakistani pact, and the extent and nature of the U.S. aid actually extended to Iraq will be affected by Iraq’s attitude. The Conference was of the opinion that Iraq would adhere to the pact eventually, though some time might be required for the preparation of Iraqi and Arab public opinion for such a move.
Iran has a military aid agreement with the U.S. of several years standing. The Shah and General Zahedi both favor Iranian participation in the Turk-Pakistani pact. The Conference expected them to wait, however, until the Iranian forces were better able to assist in area defense and until an agreement had been reached re Iranian oil. Additional and effective military aid to Iran, in the opinion of the Conference, would be likely to hasten Iranian adherence.
[Page 512]Because of Afghanistan’s exposed position, the Conference did not expect Afghanistan, despite any Afghan desire to participate in regional defense, to adhere to the Turk-Pakistani pact until progress could be made toward a settlement of the Pushtunistan issue with Pakistan.
High Lebanese officials have indicated that Lebanon will ask for certain military aid from the U.S. and will be prepared to follow Iraq in adhering to the pact. The Conference therefore believed that Lebanese adherence can be secured by the time it would have any practical value.
An offer of grant military aid was believed to be prerequisite to Syrian participation in the pact. The extent of the aid required, it was believed, might vary according to political developments in the region.
Jordan, in the opinion of the Conference, could be brought into the pact by British influence, if its participation were desirable.
The Conference held the view that Saudi adherence to the Turk-Pakistani pact in the near future was unlikely, but that the U.S. by strengthening its present arrangements with Saudi Arabia, could secure all the support of which that country was capable.
While Egypt would initially dislike the idea of adhering to the Turk-Pakistani pact, a settlement of the Suez Canal issue with the British and U.S. military and economic aid, combined with the participation of other Arab League states might act as inducements to Egypt to eventually follow suit if no other defense arrangement more attractive to Egypt were available.
It was the consensus that Libya could be induced to adhere to the Turk-Pakistani pact, if that were desirable, by a grant of economic and/or military aid.
The Conference did not believe that Israel is now in a position to be integrated into any area defense plan now under consideration.
Members of the Conference were unanimous in the opinion that effective U.S.-U.K. cooperation would be necessary to the establishment of a regional defense organization, and that the U.K. would endeavor to protect its special treaty positions while providing for defense. They were likewise unanimous in the belief that France will be of little assistance in such a project, but that in view of the French position elsewhere, France must be consulted on important matters.
In summary, the Conference believed that expansion of the Turk-Pakistani pact offered a feasible method of setting up a regional defense organization, that progress might be slow, but that none of the obstacles now discernible by their nature preclude achievement of the project.
- This paper was prepared by James S. Moose and adopted by the participants at the Chiefs of Mission Conference at Istanbul. It is Annex C to the Summary Record of the Conference. (120.4382/5–1454) For details of the Conference, see Document 210.↩
- Document 209. NIE 30–54, is Document 215.↩