Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

INR–NIE files

¹

No. 215
National Intelligence Estimate²

secret
NIE 30–54

Washington, June 22, 1954.

Prospects for Creation of a Middle East Defense Grouping and Probable consequences of such a Development³

the problem

To examine, with special reference to the “northern tier”^* approach, the problems likely to be encountered in the development of a Middle East defense grouping, and to estimate: (a) the prospects for adherence of other states to a loose grouping based on the Turk-Pakistani agreement; (b) the probable political and military consequences of such a development; and (c) the probable reactions of other countries.

scope

This estimate focuses primarily on the prospects for creation of a loose Middle East defense grouping through a “northern tier” approach. This would involve initially adherence of Iraq and Iran to the US-sponsored Turk-Pakistani agreement. At a later date, it might involve the adherence of other Middle Eastern states, and possible eventual expansion of such a grouping into a formal regional defense organization. We recognize, however, that various factors such as US or UK policy, the attitudes of various Middle East states, or the Soviet reaction might dictate alternative approaches to meet individual country problems as they arise. For example, some Middle East states might be unwilling to adhere to the Turk-Pakistani agreement but might be willing, in return for US aid, to cooperate in regional defense through a grouping of their own or some form of bilateral relationship with the US and/or UK. We briefly assess some of these alternatives.

The military portions of this estimate concern themselves primarily with the defense problems within the area extending from the Suez Canal and the Southeast Turkish border to the western border of Pakistan. We do not consider the problems of defense of Turkey against attack from the north, which is a NATO responsibility, nor the defense of the lines of communication into the area.

conclusions

1. The Turk-Pakistani agreement provides a new basis for development of a Western-oriented defense grouping in the Middle East avoiding some of the problems which defeated the two previous efforts in this direction. Although formidable obstacles still remain to be overcome, a regional grouping based on the Turk-Pakistani agreement would be less subject to the stigma of being under direct Western control than were the Middle East Command and Middle East Defense Organization. The desire for US military and economic aid is probably the most powerful inducement to enter into such an arrangement, and the willingness of individual states to join will depend largely on the nature, scale, and terms of the US aid offered them.

2. An important obstacle to the adherence of any Arab state to the Turk-Pakistani agreement is Egypt’s opposition prior to a Suez settlement. If a satisfactory Suez agreement can be reached, Egypt will in fact be involved in regional defense and much of its opposition to Western-supported regional defense arrangements will be undercut. Under these circumstances we believe that Iraq would adhere to the Turk-Pakistani agreement and the way would be paved for the adherence of other Arab states. Egypt, conscious that it might be unable to play a key role in a scheme based on the Turk-Pakistani agreement, would probably prefer some other form of peacetime defense association with the West. However, it might be willing to adhere to the agreement if necessary to secure substantial US aid.

3. Even if there is no Suez settlement, Iraq probably would be willing to adhere to the Turk-Pakistani agreement in the face of opposition from Egypt alone. Such a move would raise a critical issue among the Arab states, but some might still follow the Iraqi lead. Iraq would probably not adhere if it thereby incurred a grave risk of general opposition from the other Arab states and increased internal opposition.

4. Iran’s adherence to the Turk-Pakistani agreement is unlikely at any early date. However, it might eventually join an established regional defense grouping if: (a) the oil dispute had been resolved; (b) Iran’s leadership had confirmed its ability to hold extremist anti-Western elements in check; and (c) Iran’s military strength had been substantially increased with US aid.

5. The immediate effects of a loose regional defense grouping based on the Turk-Pakistani agreement and backed by US military aid programs would be primarily political and psychological rather then military. Creation of such a grouping would: (a) tend to create a favorable climate for development of greater awareness of the Soviet threat and closer regional defense cooperation; (b) possibly encourage participating states to cooperate more closely on other matters, both with the Western allies and among themselves; and (c) strengthen the position of Western-oriented elements in participating countries. However, such developments would not materially affect the internal weaknesses which have thus far undermined Middle East strength and stability, and would by no means eliminate the tensions and fears which have thus far alienated much of the area from the West.

6. Such a loose grouping would not per se result in any significant reduction of the area’s military vulnerability. However, together with US military aid programs, it would create greater opportunities than in the past for reducing existing Middle East defense deficiencies. The requirements for outside ground forces might eventually be significantly reduced. However, achievement of even this limited goal would be a long and costly operation, involving considerable training and equipment over a period of years, and effective Middle East defense will continue to depend for the foreseeable future on substantial Western force contributions.

7. Creation of a regional defense grouping would also facilitate eventual development of a formal defense organization with some form of direct US–UK participation. However, serious political difficulties arising from intraregional rivalries and distrust of Western participation would first have to be overcome.

8. Finally creation of even a loose regional defense grouping and related US aid programs would encourage development of a more favorable atmosphere for at least some working arrangements for Western base and operating rights. However, most states would remain reluctant to countenance peacetime US–UK base rights and would probably demand that such facilities remain under their control. Should the US push too fast or too far for commitments, it might jeopardize overall progress toward defense cooperation.

9. US arming of the Arabs and efforts to associate them with a regional grouping would arouse strong Israeli opposition and to that extent increase Arab-Israeli tensions. There would be increased danger of renewal of the Palestine war unless suitable precautions were taken to discourage Israeli aggression and possible future Arab military adventurism. Israel will press for US arms aid to counter such aid to the Arab states.

10. While further US moves in support of the “northern tier” concept would in some degree increase US-Indian tensions, it is unlikely that an open rift would develop between India and the US as a result of this factor alone. Should Pakistan be materially strengthened as a result of US aid, India also would seek to build up its own forces. In any event, it is extremely unlikely that India would move significantly closer to the Soviet Bloc.

11. The USSR will attempt to counteract US efforts to build a defense grouping in the Middle East, particularly if US bases are involved. The USSR would increase its political warfare activities in the Middle East and might exert pressure on such vulnerable points as Iran and Afghanistan. We believe, however, that the USSR would not feel itself sufficiently threatened to undertake major retaliatory actions such as invasion of either of these states.

[Here follows discussion of the reasons for reaching the above conclusions. These included a brief history earlier efforts to develop a Middle East regional defense organization; the factors operating to the advantage and disadvantage of a regional defense grouping based on the Turkish-Pakistan agreement; the prospects for adherence of other Middle East states to that agreement; the political and military consequences of the creation of a loose Middle East defense grouping; the probable reactions of other interested countries; and the consequences of the failure of current efforts to create a Middle East defense grouping.]

1. Files of National Intelligence Estimates, Special Estimates, and Special National Intelligence Estimates, retained by the Directorate for Regional Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
2. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) were high-level interdepartmental reports presenting authoritative appraisals of vital foreign policy problems. NIEs were drafted by officers from those agencies represented on the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), discussed and revised by interdepartmental working groups coordinated by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved by the IAC, and circulated under the aegis of the CIA to the President, appropriate officers of Cabinet level, and the National Security Council. The Department of State provided all political and some economic sections of NIEs.
3. According to a note on the cover sheet, the Estimate was “submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence. The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff. Concurred in by the Intelligence Advisory Committee on June 22, 1954. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Director of Intelligence, AEC, and the Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction. ”
4. The “northern tier” states are Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, and Iran. [Footnote in the source text.]